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1. Chapter 1 
1.1 Introduction of dissertation 
This thesis consists of 7 psychophysical studies in which the effects of visual stimuli on human cognition are 
investigated. Pupillary dynamics are measured as a proxy of cognitive neuronal processes. With these studies 
several questions were answered about how humans perceive, interpret, and handle visual information, and 
which neural processes are possibly involved. More specifically, this thesis assesses how humans process 
visual stimuli that are ambiguous and subject to multiple interpretations because of unclear or impoverished 
conditions. It further assesses why ambiguity leads to changes between being aware or unaware of the 
existence of particular stimuli in scenes. 
1.1.1 Rivalry: from noisy environments to multiple interpretations 
Although humans have highly developed skills to process and react to stimuli in our surroundings, noise and 
ambiguity in our surroundings can cause us to miss visible stimuli or infer incorrect stimulus interpretations. 
For instance, it may sometimes be difficult to find an item because it is embedded in a cluttered environment, 
or to determine the physical motion of an object moving in depth. Nevertheless, the human visual system is 
very skilful in inferring a rich set of information from constrained input that is noisy or incomplete. Humans 
(and many other species) can, for example, imagine how objects would look in their full entity when they are 
partially occluded by other objects (Figure 1A).  
Sensory information is generally ambiguous that often can be interpreted in multiple ways. Although 
multiple are available, a single interpretation is often acquired with prior knowledge (e.g., Gerardin, Kourtzi 
& Mamassian, 2010). Interpretations tend to be based on the strongest and most likely activated memories 
(Figure 1B) rather than unlikely representations (Figure 1C). However, in situations where there are multiple 
and equally likely interpretations, the human mind does not seem to have a fixed preference but “resolves” 
ambiguity by switching between interpretations. Take for example the image shown in Figure 1D in which 
two gratings with dissimilar colors and orientations overlap (Breese, 1899, Campbell, Gilinsky, Howell, 
Riggs & Atkinson, 1973). During fixation of this image, fluctuations in luminance for each of the overlapping 
grating will be observed after several seconds. One grating can be dominant for a specific duration after it is 
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visually suppressed and perception is “taken over” by the other grating. Thus although their physical 
appearance remains constant, cognition alters across multiple interpretations. Note that despite their relative 
equality, these interpretations can have small deviations in likelihood as well. One of the two interpretations 
may be more likely to be seen than the other interpretation because its features are stronger (Figure 1E).  
 
Figure 1. Likely and unlikely interpretations. (A) An example of two occluded objects. The visual system can infer and interpret 
the lay-out of objects, even if they are partially occluded by other objects. The visual system may for example assume that the red 
circle is occluding a complete green square. (B) A likely non-occluded interpretation of (A). The most obvious and likely 
interpretation of the occluded green object in (A) would be a green square behind a red circle. (C) A less likely non-occluded 
interpretation of (A). It is unlikely that a deformed green square is behind the red circle. (D) Example of a monocular rivalry stimulus. 
In some rare cases, an object may consist of multiple interpretations that compete (i.e., rival) with each other. By fixating on the white 
dot in the centre of the stimulus, one observes perceptual rivalry between the red and green overlapping gratings. The luminance of 
each grating will fluctuate from very bright and conspicuous to hardly visible, and vice versa, while the luminance of the other grating 
will do the opposite. (E) An example of a rivalry stimulus with small deviations in strength between percepts. Interpretations may be 
likely or less likely depending on which features they represent. In this example, the luminance of the green grating is increased. 
Consequently, the green grating is stronger and will be dominant and visible more often than the red grating. 
 
Such ambiguous images are called multi-stable stimuli because they induce multiple alternating percepts 
and Figure 2 depicts just a couple examples of an extensive collection of stimuli that have been described 
during the last couple of centuries (Boring 1930, Breese, 1899, Necker, 1832, Schröder, 1858). The actual 
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phenomenon of ongoing alterations between dominant interpretations over time is called perceptual rivalry 
and several types can be observed across sensory modalities, including visual (images; Blake & Logothetis, 
2002 for review), auditory (sounds; Van Noorden, 1975, Warren & Gregory, 1958), olfactory (odours; Zhou 
& Chen, 2009), and tactile rivalry (skin pressure; Carter, Konkle, Wang, Hayward & Moore, 2008). This 
suggests that perceptual rivalry is a very general phenomenon and perhaps a generic property of how a brain 
handles ambiguous information. Moreover, the phenomenon on itself is of importance to the scientific field of 
perception as multiple representations exist in parallel while the sensory input remains constant. Hence, the 
effect of having more states during perceptual rivalry is purely a cognitive process. This has been an 
important factor for several studies of this dissertation in which we tested how the cognitive interpretations of 
visual stimuli affected behavior although their physical properties were fixed (Chapter 4 and 5). Why 
perceptual rivalry is useful for perceptual sciences and what its implications have been so far will be clarified 
in the following paragraph. 
1.1.2 Unresolved issues in perception: Rivalry and its applications 
When viewing a rivalrous bi-stable stimulus, you are basically aware of one of the two interpretations and 
unaware of the other rivaling interpretation at any given time point. This phenomenon is quite remarkable 
because even though it is obvious that both interpretations are available, only one percept dominates 
awareness at the expense of the other. Perceptual rivalry can be categorized in two types: monocular and 
binocular rivalry. Monocular rivalry is induced by presenting the same stimulus to both eyes (i.e., normal 
viewing conditions; Figure 1D and E, and Figure 2). The stimulus itself contains multiple interpretations that 
consist of particular features that can rival for dominance (i.e., for visibility or visual awareness). 
Alternatively, binocular rivalry is induced by presenting dissimilar stimuli to each eye separately. Both types 
induce changes in visual awareness. It has been, however, very challenging to perform reliable and non-
confounded measurements of rivalry because so many processes affect it, including attention, motor 
responses, performance, and feature binding. Despite these potential confounds have some limitations, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, rivalry is a good basis for research of awareness because it exemplifies how 
perception can change as a function of time without modifying stimulus design. This is why rivalry has often 
been used as a tool to investigate the neural correlates of visual awareness or consciousness. 
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Figure 2. Three examples of perceptual rivalry. (A) The Necker Cube. It induces two percepts of a cube that can be orientated to 
either the bottom-left or the top-right. (B) Rubin‟s Vase-Face bi-stable figure. It can be interpreted as either a vase in the centre or two 
faces at the sides. (C) Boring‟s old lady-young woman picture. It can be seen as either an old lady with a big nose and a sharp chin 
that faces towards the front-left, or a young woman with a necklace that faces to the left away from the viewer. This figure is taken 
from Blake & Logothetis (2002). 
 
Perceptual rivalry can also be employed to study feature or stimulus strength. Rivalry occurs between 
two percepts that each have specific features such as luminance and color (Figure 1D). Varying these features 
has an effect on the dominance periods during rivalry. For example, if the perceived contrast of one percept is 
higher, the other rivaling percept with a relatively lower perceived contrast is less likely to dominate 
perception (Levelt, 1965). By measuring the dominance durations of each percept (i.e., how long a percept is 
visible until the rivaling percept takes over perceptual dominance), it can be examined which percepts and the 
features they are made off are “stronger”. But what does it mean when a percept has a higher strength? Does it 
receive more attention or does it recruit on increased levels of visual processing? Recent studies indicate that 
perceptual dominance is indeed closely intertwined with attentional processes (Kanai, Bahrami & Rees, 2010, 
Paffen, Alais & Verstraten, 2006, Paffen & Van der Stigchel, 2010) and saliency (Paffen, Naber & Verstraten, 
2008, Stuit, Verstraten & Paffen, 2010a). Saliency is here used in a purely bottom-up, i.e., stimulus-driven, 
meaning that assumes that a highly salient feature automatically retrieves increased resources or priority from 
brain processes (Hopfinger & Ries, 2005, Koch & Ullman, 1985). The terms stimulus strength and saliency 
are often used to describe how sensitive an observer is for a percept and its constituting features. These are 
also terms for the probability that an excess of resources is deployed to a particular brain mechanism that 
processes a visual attribute. Salient features attract visual attention and many studies use saliency models to 
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predict where observers will fixate when a particular image is shown (e.g., Einhäuser, Spain & Perona, 2008a, 
Itti & Koch, 2001). For example, saliency models may weight specific features in an image (Figure 3A and 
E), such as orientation (Figure 3B), intensity (Figure 3C), and color (Figure 3D), to subsequently end up with 
a saliency map (Figure 3F) that indicates which areas in the image will most likely be attended and fixated by 
observers. Note that features alone cannot explain all fixations as formations of higher-level object 
representations are also important (Einhäuser et al., 2008a). It has remained elusive, however, whether 
saliency is a mechanism that can not only be assessed by measuring both fixations during free viewing of 
images, but also dominance durations during rivalry (Paffen et al., 2008). Salient features that attract visual 
attention could similarly increase dominance during rivalry. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 2 and 3, 
rivalry seems to be an excellent tool to study feature strengths and the visual mechanisms that process them. 
Lastly, rivalry can be used to diagnose and treat medical and psychiatric disorders. For instance, 
amblyopia (“lazy eye”), a disorder of the visual system that results in degraded vision of the neural pathways 
coming from one eye, can be both measured and treated through the application of binocular rivalry. During 
binocular rivalry, dissimilar images are separately presented to each eye (Figure 4A). Thus, the left eye 
receives for example a green grating and the right eye a red grating. This induces rivalry between the eyes 
(and colors) and perception will switch dominance between red and green percepts over time. If one eye and 
its related neural visual pathway strongly dominates the other, as is the case in amblyopia, this can be 
determined by simply inducing binocular rivalry, asking the patient to report visual dominance of both 
patches, and determine whether there is a strong bias in dominance for one percept (i.e., one eye) (e.g., 
Huang, Zhou, Lu, Feng & Zhou, 2009). Furthermore, amblyopia can be treated by adding a dark eye-patch to 
the healthy “eye”. As the healthy eye will then be less likely to dominate the other unhealthy eye because of 
lacking input (extremely low levels of luminance, contrast, color, etc.), the unhealthy eye is consequently 
forced to dominate vision. This eventually results in a process that facilitates the slow development and 
recovery of vision for the eye that initially had poor vision (e.g., Holmes, Repka, Kraker & Clarke, 2006). 
Binocular rivalry has further been suggested as a diagnostic test for patients with bipolar disorders (Hunt & 
Guilford, 1933, Krug, Brunskill, Scarna, Goodwin & Parker, 2008, Miller, Gynther, Heslop, Liu, Mitchell, 
Ngo, Pettigrew & Geffen, 2003, Nagamine, Yoshino, Miyazaki, Takahashi & Nomura, 2009, Ngo, Mitchell, 
Martin & Miller, 2011, Pettigrew & Miller, 1998). Euthymic (i.e., with neutral mood) patients diagnosed with 
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a bipolar disorder tend to have a slower rate of switches between percepts. Unfortunately, populations of 
healthy controls and patients are not fully dissociable based on binocular rivalry rates as both groups depict 
large overlapping ranges of alternation rates. Nonetheless, further development of such rivalry tests may 
result in reliable, fast, and objective diagnoses of such psychiatric disorders. 
 
 
Figure 3. Saliency Map Algorithms. (A) Input image for the saliency model. (B-D) The resulting output for each feature filter of the 
saliency models‟ algorithm. Areas with highest orientation contrast (i.e., where borders of lines clearly cross), intensity contrast (i.e., 
strong local differences in luminance), and color contrast (i.e., strong local differences in color) are indicated as most salient areas. (E) 
Another input example of an image for which a saliency map is calculated. This picture of a local gymnasium school class was taken 
in a lecture hall of the Philipps-University Marburg. (F) The resulting overlaying saliency map of the linearly added feature filters 
outputted by the algorithm. Red colored areas are the most salient. 
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1.1.3 Measuring perceptual rivalry 
As mentioned, several types of rivalry exist, each with their own characteristics. The types of rivalry 
described in this dissertation are restricted to the visual domain and we use both monocular (Chapter 2 and 5) 
and binocular rivalry (Chapter 3 and 4). Monocular rivalry can simply be induced by presenting the stimulus 
on a screen and asking experimental participants to observe the stimulus. Binocular rivalry can be induced 
with a stereoscope (Wheatstone, 1838). A stereoscope stimulates both eyes with dissimilar stimuli by adding 
mirrors in front of each eye that reflect light coming from two screens. In one study of this thesis we wanted 
to assess how changes in perception during binocular rivalry affected pupil size and the direction of gaze 
(Chapter 4). This approach led to the development of a novel stereoscope with the following characteristics 
(Figure 4A): First, two images that ranged over a large visual field were presented with two monitors to each 
eye separately. The monitors were positioned left and right from the observer, 90 degrees rotated from the 
view point of the observer, facing each other, and the light they emitted was reflected towards the observer 
with a 45 degree rotated mirror located between them. This setup resulted in a viewing distance of ~30cm and 
ranged across a large visual field (height: 50.6 deg, width: 37.1 deg). Second, an eye-tracker camera (EyeLink 
2000, SR Research, Osgoode, ON, Canada) could monitor pupil size and gaze direction through the mirrors. 
The mirrors were reflective to visible light and transparent for infra-red light (i.e., cold mirrors) such that 
observers could not see the eye-tracker setup and that the infra-red sensitive camera could capture light 
reflected from the eyes. An array of infra-red diodes was installed next to it for illumination of the observers‟ 
eyes. The final stereoscopic setup could thus induce binocular rivalry, and measure pupil size and gaze 
direction. 
Binocular rivalry consists of the perceptual rival between the eyes, or strictly speaking, between the 
features at the local areas of the visual input to each eye. Rivalry results in dominant percepts that may consist 
fully of the stimulus presented to one eye (Figure 4B and C), or components of both the dissimilar images that 
are presented to each eye (i.e., piecemealing or fractionation; Figure 4D and E). Remarkably, if components 
of two rivaling figures are distributed between the two eyes (e.g., Figure 4D and E are jigsaw puzzles of 
Figure 4B and C), these components are likely grouped into coherent percepts (i.e., interocular grouping; 
Kovács, Papathomas, Yang & Fehér, 1996). Thus although each eye receives incoherent input, the visual 
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system combines it into a coherent figure. Interocular rivalry – a term for the local conflict between merely 
the visual areas captured by the two eyes – occurs when information processed by each eye separately start to 
rival. Rivalry between the visual fields of each eye can be described as an additional rivalry modality to 
feature modalities (Knapen, Kanai, Brascamp, van Boxtel & van Ee, 2007a). However, note that not only the 
eyes but the features of which the percepts are made off can rival for dominance in binocular rivalry as well. 
In sum, percepts are not strictly separated (i.e., changes in perception do not have an all-or-none nature) and 
changes in visual awareness can be driven by rivalry between features and the eyes. Visual dominance 
fluctuates between percepts and a percept is merely a subjective categorization of what is presented. Figures 
that are presented to each eye separately during binocular rivalry may thus not always result in a coherent 
visible percept and separate parts of both rivaling figures can dominate locally at the same time. More details 
on the properties of piecemeal rivalry processes will follow later (Chapter 3 and 4). 
The principle process of rivalry consists of alternations between two or more percepts over time 
(Figure 4F). The previously suppressed percept becomes dominant by “spreading” over the rivaling percept 
(Wilson, Blake & Lee, 2001), and this process continues between the percepts as long as the stimuli are 
observed. Perceptual alternations are generally measured by having observers report which percept is 
dominant. Thus, through introspection, an observer may, for example, hold down buttons, each assigned with 
a percept, to report dominance during rivalry. The net result of such a measurement is a timeline that indicates 
the observed perceptual dominance of an observer (Figure 4F; reaction times are not taken into account).  
Percepts have inherent stimulus properties that determine their dominance “strength”, that is, how 
easily they are rendered invisible or visible. To measure the stimulus strength of each percept, the distribution 
of dominance durations is computed per percept (Figure 4G). If one percept has longer average dominance 
durations, it is indicated as stronger and more dominant than the other rivaling percept. Note that dominance 
duration distributions are typically leptokurtic (supra-Gaussian) and thus more robustly described by their 
median rather than their mean. Another calculation that is similar to the median dominance duration is the 
dominance rate. The dominance rate is based on the ratio of time a percept was dominant during a fixed time 
interval (e.g., a percept was visible for 60 out of 100 seconds).  
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Figure 4. Rivalry methods. (A) A stereoscope that can be used to induce binocular rivalry. This particular setup was developed for 
this thesis and used in several of the reported studies. It was special in the sense that it enabled the independent stimulation of both 
eyes to induce binocular rivalry, in combination with the measurement of gaze direction of the eyes and pupil size with an eye-tracker. 
Two (cold) mirrors reflect light coming from two screens to each eye separately (black lines). Both mirrors are reflective for normal 
light and transparent for infrared light (>750nm). Both eyes are lit with infrared emitting diodes and light reflects back to the eye-
tracker (grey lines). (B-C) Examples of dissimilar images that can be presented by each screen of the binocular setup. If two dissimilar 
images are shown to each eye separately, binocular rivalry is induced and two dissimilar percepts of each image emerge. (D-E) 
Examples of piecemeal percepts. Percepts from the eye of origin are not always fully dominant and piecemeal percepts may occur 
occasionally. (F) Example of alternations between percepts over time. Full dominance occurs more often than piecemeal, especially if 
both images are substantially dissimilar and small. Both images are either dominant (visible) or suppressed (invisible) at any given 
time, and after being dominant for a particular period, it will be “taken over” and the previously suppressed image will visually 
“spread over” the previously dominant image until the reversed process starts. (G) Heavy-tailed distribution of dominance durations. 
For each rivalry stimulus, periods of short dominance durations occur more often as compared to long dominance durations. 
 
After the dominance durations are calculated, it can be determined whether subsequent dominance 
durations depend on each other. Surprisingly, dominance periods that follow each other in time correlate in 
durations (van Ee, 2009). Such serial correlations provide information about whether it is likely that a 
dominance period of a percept with a particular duration is followed by a dominance period of the other 
percept with a similar duration. Serial correlations may thus give an indication of how strong percepts are 
related and how processes, such as attention, affect the overall dominance durations during a given time 
period. Furthermore, when a rivalry stimulus depicts more than two percepts, it can be determined how often 
a particular percept is followed by each of the other percepts (e.g., percept A is followed by percept B in 60 of 
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100 alternations, and followed by percept C in 40 of 100 alternations). Such alternation or switch probabilities 
cannot be computed for bi-stable rivalry because the probability to go from one percept to the other is 1.0. 
Hence, more complex analyses can be applied to tri-stable rivalry (i.e., rivalry between three percepts) as is 
shown in Chapter 2. It is demonstrated that both dominance durations and switch probabilities depend on 
perceptual stimulus strength, and that perceptual sequences indeed correlate over time in both durations and 
switch probabilities. 
Alternations in dominance may sometimes seem to be abrupt, that is, a percept can be rendered 
invisible by a rapid change in dominance to the rivaling percept. Especially if stimuli are small and dissimilar, 
rivalry may appear to be an all-or-none process (Blake, O'Shea & Mueller, 1992, O'Shea, Sims & Govan, 
1997). A percept is then either fully visible or fully invisible. As mentioned above, however, transitions in 
dominance are not necessarily abrupt but often consist of piecemeal rivalry: a gradual change in perceived 
transparency or spatial fractions of dominance across several percepts. So far only button presses were used to 
report changes in rivalry. It is conceivable that part of the abruptness is a consequence of a discrete response 
mode, which is often used to report rivalry. To assess gradual transitions, we offered observers a continuous 
scale by having them use an analog joystick (Chapter 4), also touching upon the more general issue of action 
to perception transfer in rivalry (Beets et al., 2010). An observer can deflect the joystick fully to the left to 
indicate full dominance of a percept, fully to the right to indicate full dominance of the other percept, or 
somewhere in between to indicate partial dominance of either one of the percepts. Importantly, the amount of 
piecemealing during rivalry could be an indication of local inhibition between features and depends on the 
dissimilarity between the rivaling percepts (i.e., distance in feature space; Knapen et al., 2007a). In other 
words, more piecemealing is observed when both percepts look alike. Thus, the amount of piecemeal rivalry 
depends on stimulus similarity rather than on stimulus strength. 
In conclusion, there are a variety of rivalry measurements possible and each has its own implications on 
how the brain processes and represents stimuli, multiple interpretations, ambiguity, and changes in awareness. 
Perceptual rivalry is a unique method to measure cognitive processes and how the brain processes ambiguous 
information, interprets our surroundings, and eventually organizes these interpretations in meaningful 
behavior, are key issues that can be tested with it. Despite a tremendous pool of information on rivalry is 
available, there are several issues that have remained unclear. For example, what happens to alternation 
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sequences when more than two interpretations are available (Chapter 2), how do ambiguous stimuli drive the 
alternations in percepts over visual space (Chapter 3), how does introspection affect these processes 
(Chapter 4), and can ambiguity change the way we perceive objects (Chapter 5)? The following paragraph 
extends on this by evaluating how the visual system processes and labels interpretations of feature 
constitutions as items and objects when these are ambiguous due to brief presentations. 
1.1.4 Impoverished object representations 
A percept is an interpretation of a sensory appearance, event, or experience. Similarly, an object is an 
interpretation of a relatively complex sensory experience that consists of one or more features. The color red 
in Figure 1A is often referred to as a low-level feature rather than an object. But when the color is paired with 
an enclosed circular shape that contrasts the red color with its background, an object is formed. It seems that 
the binding of for example color and shape results in the subjective interpretation of an object. But it is not 
clear which processes turn a set of features into a cognitive representation of an object. This binding process 
is also subject to ambiguity and depends on the features and context of the objects. The binding of features 
into the conscious perception of objects or gestalts is a well-known but still not fully understood phenomenon 
(Revonsuo & Newman, 1999). How is it possible that the separate feature analyses by our visual system 
create the subjective impression of coherent percepts and objects? If features such as color, motion, and shape 
are functionally processed in anatomically separate brain areas (Livingstone & Hubel, 1988, Zeki, Watson, 
Lueck, Friston, Kennard & Frackowiak, 1991, Zeki, 1978), how is each separate analysis combined into a 
bound object label (Chapter 5), representation (Chapter 5-7), or memory trace (Chapter 7)? Furthermore, 
how are these representations encoded (Chapter 7), how are they activated and retrieved, and what is the role 
of separate features in these processes (Chapter 6)? These questions all relate to the “binding problem”, an 
intriguing phenomenon that has several implications on some of the studies in this dissertation. By 
meticulously adjusting features and presentation time of items – a commonly applied technique in 
psychophysics – the effects of object formation, detection, categorization, and identification can be measured. 
Such methodological approaches can be used to gain insights in the underlying mechanisms of feature 
binding and ambiguity. For example, very brief and presentations of many objects will demand high 
processing capacities of already limited resources. Such an approach results in ambiguous neural 
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representations of the presented objects and subsequently the observer has difficulty determining what was 
shown. This type of ambiguity, is however, not explicitly visible as is the case with perceptual rivalry, but 
occurs on a decision-making level. What have I seen and which is the most likely interpretation when there 
are multiple available? The impoverishment of the stimuli by for example limiting the presentation time is 
thus another method to induce ambiguity (Chapter 6). It has remained challenging, however, to assess the 
actual neurological processes of feature binding and ambiguity with merely psychophysical methods. 
Alternatively, physiological methods can also determine how certain components and stages are represented 
in the brain. Recent studies have therefore focused on neurophysiological measures of feature binding and 
object formations (e.g., Ostwald, Lam, Li & Kourtzi, 2008, Seymour, Clifford, Logothetis & Bartels, 2009). 
Such physiological measures may reveal the underlying cognitions related to visual interpretations of 
ambiguous stimuli and impoverished objects. Another advantage is that these measures do not necessarily 
rely on human introspection and are thus objective indications of cognition (Chapter 4). The next paragraph 
focuses on several popular neurophysiologic methods that enable measurements of cognitive brain processes. 
It is explained why specifically the dynamics of the pupil – an important physiological measure for the studies 
presented in this dissertation – are so useful regarding research on the visual system. 
1.1.5 Pupillometry: An open window into our minds 
To understand cognition, it is necessary to study how the brain projects information within its complex 
network of neurons. There is a vast array of tools available to measure information processing in the human 
brain and generally they consist of methods that probe neuronal activity. For example, functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) studies measure the oxygenation of blood in the brain with sophisticated MRI 
scanners. Increases and decreases in oxygenated blood (i.e., BOLD responses) can be measured at a three-
dimensional scale of approximately 1-3 mm in each dimension. BOLD responses are often assumed as 
indirect indicators of increased or decreased activation of neuron clusters. The advantage of fMRI is the 
relatively high spatial resolution, but the disadvantages are noisy measurements and the slow time course of 
changes as BOLD responses have approximately a 4 second latency. Other examples of methods that measure 
activity are electro-encephalography (EEG) and magneto-encephalography (MEG) and these can probe brain 
activity through electric currents and magnetic dipoles measured close to the scalp of the head. These 
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methods have a much lower spatial resolution than fMRI but can measure at much higher temporal resolution. 
This enables scientists to focus in on the temporal dynamics of cognitive processes.  
Despite the tremendous informative nature of these methods, they are very expensive, subject to a 
variety of noise sources (e.g., head movements for fMRI), and can have limited resolution in either spatial or 
temporal domains. An alternative and nowadays often neglected measure is the pupil (Figure 5A). Changes in 
pupil size reflect brain processes and are much more practical indicators of cognition because pupil size can 
be accurately recorded at high temporal resolutions with a simple camera setup. It is generally known that 
pupil size adapts to changes in illuminance on the eyes‟ retinas. Surprisingly, pupil size is controlled by a 
much more complex network of brain pathways that is also intertwined with neural areas responsible for 
higher-level cognitive processes. As such, pupil size has been correlated with many behaviors and cognitive 
states such as attention (Daniels, Hock & Huisman, 2009, Kahneman, 1973, Karatekin, 2004, Karatekin, 
Couperus & Marcus, 2004), arousal (Bradshaw, 1967), alertness (Yoss, Moyer & Hollenhorst, 1970), 
decision-making (Einhäuser, Koch & Carter, 2010, Simpson & Hale, 1969), anxiety and emotions (Bitsios, 
Szabadi & Bradshaw, 2002, Charney, Scheier & Redmond, 1995, Nagai, Wada & Sunaga, 2002, Simpson & 
Molloy, 1971, Steinhauer, Boller, Zubin & Pearlman, 1983), deception (Dionisio, Granholm, Hillix & 
Perrine, 2001, Wang, Spezio & Camerer, 2006), task-engagement (Gilzenrat, Nieuwenhuis, Jepma & Cohen, 
2010, Jepma & Nieuwenhuis, 2011), mental effort, resource allocation, cognitive or working memory load 
(Ahern & Beatty, 1979, Beatty & Wagoner, 1978, Bijleveld, Custers & Aarts, 2009, Cabestrero, Crespo & 
Quirós, 2009, Granholm, Asarnow, Sarkin & Dykes, 1996, Hess & Polt, 1964, Kahneman, 1973, Kahneman 
& Beatty, 1966, Karatekin, 2004, Reinhard & Lachnit, 2002b, Verney, Granholm & Dionisio, 2001), target 
onset probabilities (Friedman, Hakerem, Sutton & Fleiss, 1973, Privitera, Renninger, Carney, Klein & 
Aguilar, 2010, Raisig, Welke, Hagendorf & van der Meer, 2010, Reinhard, Lachnit & König, 2007), and, 
particularly interesting in the present context, perceptual alternations in rivalry (Einhäuser, Stout, Koch & 
Carter, 2008b). With so many factors affecting the pupil (Andreassi, 2000, Beatty & Lucero-Wagoner, 2000, 
Janisse, 1977, Loewenfeld & Lowenstein, 1993, for review), this outwardly visible part of a sensory organ is 
an excellent measure for the temporal dynamics of cognition, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, 6, 7, and 8. From 
a neuroscientific perspective, it may also provide information about particular neurotransmitters that are 
responsible for cognitive processes (Chapter 7). 
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Figure 5. The pupil. (A) Example image of an eye with a slightly constricted pupil. (B) Pupil size as a function of time around the 
onset of a stimulus or change in cognitive state. In this example, pupil size was measured as a function of time around the onset of 
either an image on a screen (grey) or a reported transition between percepts during perceptual rivalry (black). Pupil size can either 
constrict (i.e., decrease in size) or dilate (i.e., increase in size). Note that the pupillary constriction as a response to stimulus onset is 
fast with an approximate latency of about 300-400ms, while pupil dilation as a response to a change in a cognitive state is slow with 
much longer latencies of 600-1100ms. Pupil dilations can also be preceded by small constrictions, and constrictions are often followed 
by a pupil size increase back to baseline. 
 
Most studies on pupil size and behavior or cognitive states report a facilitated (i.e., stronger) or 
attenuated (i.e., weaker) dilation (mydriasis) or constriction (miosis) during a particular task, stimulus 
presentation, or change in cognitive state (Figure 5B). There are two main pathways that may separately 
contribute to both the dilation and constriction of the pupil (Loewenfeld & Lowenstein, 1993). Dilation of the 
pupil can be accomplished by the excitation of the smooth radial muscle and the inhibition of the sphincter 
muscle. Conversely, inhibition of the smooth radial muscle and excitation of the sphincter muscle results in 
pupil constriction. The dilatory radial muscle is controlled by the sympathetic nervous system through the 
posterior hypothalamic nuclei. The constrictory sphincter muscle is driven by the parasympathetic nervous 
system through the Edinger-Westphal complex of the oculomotor nucleus in the midbrain. Each neural 
pathway is characterized by the sensitivity for specific neurotransmitters that either activate or inhibit nerves 
in these pathways, and eventually the constriction or dilation of the pupil. The administration (e.g., with 
cholinergic drugs) of acetylcholine (ACh) leads to a constriction of the pupil as ACh acts on the muscarinic 
receptors of the sphincter muscle (Elliott & Carter, 1989, Fountoulakis, Fotiou, Iacovides, Tsiptsios, Goulas, 
Tsolaki & Ierodiakonou, 1999, Fountoulakis, St Kaprinis & Fotiou, 2004, Loewenfeld & Lowenstein, 1993). 
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Furthermore, Alzheimer studies have also shown indirect evidence of ACh‟s contribution to pupil 
constrictions as Alzheimer patients have reduced levels of ACh (e.g., Francis, Palmer, Snape & Wilcock, 
1999) and attenuated, thus weaker, pupil constriction (Fotiou, Fountoulakis, Tsolaki, Goulas & Palikaras, 
2000, Prettyman, Bitsios & Szabadi, 1997). The release of ACh also consequences in the inhibition of 
norepinephrine (NOR) related activity (Yoshitomi, Ito & Inomata, 1985). NOR is a neurotransmitter that is 
released from the brain nucleus “locus coeruleus” and acts on alpha-adrenergic cell receptors that regulate 
activity of the dilator muscle (Loewenfeld & Lowenstein, 1993, Yoshitomi et al., 1985). In contrast to ACh, 
release of NOR results in the dilation of the pupil (Elliott & Carter, 1989), and inhibition of NOR activity, by 
for example ACh, leads to a constriction of the pupil. Activation of the sympathetic pathway, and thus 
dilation of the pupil, has been indicated as an effect caused by cognitive states (Steinhauer & Hakerem, 1992, 
Steinhauer, Siegle, Condray & Pless, 2004). Also the inhibition of the parasympathetic pathway, and thus the 
attenuation of constriction, has been similarly indicated as an important factor during cognitive demand 
(Steinhauer et al., 2004). In sum, both the constriction and dilation of the pupil seems to be a trade-off 
between the release and inhibition of ACh (cholinergic) and NOR (noradrenergic). This delicate balance – as 
reflected in the pupil – will play an important role in the elucidation of several results presented in this 
dissertation. How the pupil behaves during the processes of perceptual rivalry (Chapter 4), object detection 
(Chapter 6), identification (Chapter 6), memory formations (Chapter 7), and decision-making (Chapter 8) 
is explained in the following outline of experiments. 
1.2 Outline of dissertation chapters 
As described in the Introduction, the general gist of this dissertation is the investigation of how the visual 
system infers interpretations from ambiguous information. With the help of the phenomenon perceptual 
rivalry and the physiological measure of pupillary dynamics, important insights in the role of ambiguity, 
visual awareness, object formations, features, introspection, memory, and decision-making were gained. Here 
follows a concise outline of the studies in which these insights are reported. 
The first two studies of this dissertation consist of psychophysical papers about perceptual rivalry and 
its dynamics. With only a few exceptions, almost all studies on ambiguity during perceptual rivalry have used 
stimuli that induce two percepts (bi-stable stimuli; Figure 2). For the first study (Chapter 2), several tri-stable 
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stimuli were developed to assess how rivalry behaves if observers may have three instead of just two separate 
percepts. Tri-stable stimuli further enabled us to not only measure dominance durations, but also switch 
probabilities (the probability to switch from one percept to the other during bi-stable rivalry is trivially 1.0). 
These stimuli were presented to observers who were asked to report their perception. They indicated, with 
three buttons, which of the three percepts was dominant. It is found that switch probabilities between and 
dominance durations of percepts depended heavily on the preceding history of perceptual dominance. 
Furthermore, by varying the luminance of a percept across experimental trials, it was discovered that these 
results depended on stimulus strength. 
As mentioned before, resolving ambiguity is not all-or-none and switches or changes between 
percepts in rivalry may occur gradually. Rivalry is, however, often assumed to be and measured as a discrete 
process. On the contrary, a switch in visual dominance between percepts is a “spread-like” or “wave-like” 
event. These perceptually traveling suppression or dominance waves may start at a certain location inside the 
stimulus and travel towards another location with a specific direction and speed. In a second study the 
dynamics of traveling dominance waves during binocular rivalry were investigated (Chapter 3). Two main 
questions were answered: 1) whether the speed of such gradual switches in perceptual dominance depended 
on the spatial direction of the change and the stimulus strength of the stimulus that initiates the switch, and 2) 
the generality of these speed dependencies across two different phenomena. Results showed that dominance 
wave speeds indeed depend on their direction as they decelerated towards the visual fovea while they 
remained at constant speed when moving towards the periphery. In addition, the speed was determined by the 
luminance of the stimulus that was used to initiate the wave. These two novel characteristics of binocular 
rivalry were also observed in a related but different phenomenon termed generalized flash suppression. This 
indicates that traveling suppression waves might be a phenomenological property of a very general process 
that causes changes in visual awareness in a variety of visual illusions. 
Besides rivalry‟s usefulness regarding the initiation of multiple cognitive states and interpretations 
during a constant display, it is further often used to study the neural mechanisms underlying visual awareness. 
The search for the neural correlate of consciousness is a popular topic in contemporary neuroscientific 
studies. However, these studies face the challenge to extract the mere neural process strictly related to 
changes in visual awareness. Such processes are inevitably confounded by a variety of processes that occur 
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during perceptual rivalry, such as attention, motor responses, and other cognitive functions. More specifically, 
changes in visual awareness can be induced by monocular or binocular rivalry but the actual timing of 
perceptual switches is typically measured through introspection and button presses by observers. 
Experimental participants have to report which percept is dominant at a given time point. Rivalry studies are 
thus limited to and by subjective interpretations and response latencies. In the third dissertation study 
(Chapter 4), these problems were circumvented by the development of a new objective measure of rivalry 
(i.e., pupil dynamics) and comparing it with an existing objective measure (i.e., optokinetic nystagmus, 
OKN). By varying luminance and movement direction of gratings separately for each percept, and by 
inducing changes in dominance through binocular rivalry, pupil size and the OKN direction were modulated 
accordingly. Thus unlike to pupil dilations induced by the actual switch in perception (Einhäuser et al., 2008b, 
Hupé, Lamirel & Lorenceau, 2009), when a percept with a high luminance was dominant during rivalry, pupil 
size decreased, and when a percept with a low luminance was dominant, pupil size increased. It was shown 
that pupillary dynamics were relatively reliable indicators of rivalry dynamics and could be used as an 
alternative to the OKN to objectively measure changes in visual awareness. In addition, reflexive signals such 
as pupillary dynamics and the OKN were examined to estimate whether they provide more information about 
rivalry dynamics than conventional introspective measures. By using these reflexes as objective measures of 
rivalry, we revealed that the process underlying switches in perceptual interpretations is gradual rather than 
abrupt, is sped up by overtly reporting perception (i.e., introspection), and that some of the switches can slip 
away from awareness. Future studies can now filter out confounding factors of activity related to motor 
responses and attention with the aim to extract the “pure” neural correlate of visual awareness by applying 
this pupil method in combination with sophisticated brain imaging tools. All together, these results are strong 
motivators to use objective measures of rivalry and ambiguity in future studies on visual awareness. 
In a fourth study, ambiguity was applied as a tool to examine how the visual system processes and 
interprets objects (Chapter 5). There are two views on how objects are represented in the brain and how 
object-based attention is allocated to them. First, objects consist of features such as luminance, color, 
collinearity of borders, and closure. If these features are combined in the right formation, attention can be 
deployed to them and then an object representation is formed through a bottom-up process. An object can 
then consequently be labeled and categorized by our visual system. Alternatively, features may automatically 
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draw attention, but a unique top-down formed object representation is needed to deploy attention. The main 
difference between these two views is thus the order of how attention is deployed to parts in a scene: View 1 
suggests that specific feature combinations drive and allocate attention to the object while view 2 argues that 
the mere concept and neural representation of an object allocates attention to these features. Whether just one 
of the two views can explain object-based attention effects and whether features play a role in the deployment 
of attention to parts in a scene per se, was tested with a special rivalry stimulus termed as the ambiguous 
moving diamond. The moving diamond induces two percepts, one of a single, bound, and coherently moving 
object (i.e., a 45 degree rotated square or diamond), or multiple unbound, independently- and incoherently-
moving objects. This stimulus enabled the dissociation between a cognitive single and multiple object 
interpretation while the physical appearance remained unchanged. In other words, the cognitive state of the 
observers and not the presented stimuli determined whether a single or multiple objects were seen. Results 
showed that the state of seeing a single object lead to a facilitated detection and discrimination of targets on 
this object. Thus, if a single rather than the multiple object state is perceptually dominant, attentional 
allocation to the object is activated. In conclusion, specific features combinations are not necessary to allocate 
attention but object-based attention effects are controlled by a top-down allocation of attention through an 
object interpretation that is stored as a higher-order representation. This finding would not have been possible 
without the use of the elegant phenomenon of perceptual rivalry. 
Combining the issues of Chapter 4 and 5, it was next investigated whether pupil dynamics could give 
insights into how the brain processes objects and which features can help to resolve ambiguity connected to 
interpretations of objects (Chapter 6). The stages that relate to detection and identification of animals in 
rapidly presented natural scenes were elucidated by looking at pupil responses to image presentations. 
Furthermore, image features were analyzed and tested for their effects on detection and identification 
performance. The effect of anxiety for the depicted animals on performance was also assessed. Surprisingly, 
anxiety had a small but negative effect on performance as animals were detected faster and identified with 
higher confidence when they were less frightening. Features, such as luminance, contrast, saturation and color 
contrast also strongly affected performance, and especially the contrast between the object and its background 
turned out to be an important predictor of performance. Pupil size correlated with detection, identification, 
and anxiety judgments at different time-points after image presentation. In sum, rapid visual processing 
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depends more on target pop-out features than on overall visual context, is negatively affected by anxiety, and 
finds its processing stages differentially reflected in the pupillary response. Measurements of pupil size show 
herewith that it can reveal the timing and strength of rapid visual processing of objects in natural scenes. The 
results further suggest that features are highly important for object recognition during the rapid bottom-up 
processing of ambiguous visual stimuli, and that higher-order features such as anxiety have less effects than 
previously suggested. 
The fifth study reported that pupil dynamics provide information about how the brain processes 
objects that are only shown for short periods. The sixth study focuses on how the viewing of objects and 
scenes affects pupil responses during memorization and retrieval and whether the subjective and ambiguous 
nature of deciding whether an image is old or novel is similarly reflected in the pupil (Chapter 7). The 
memorization of visual objects and natural scenes consists of the storage of a memory trace (i.e., a 
representation), and is known to be imperfect and prone to mistakes due to perceptual ambiguity. The 
retrieval of object representations from memory during the task to judge whether an image is new or old 
(familiarity memory), is a difficult task and subject to ambiguity as it is often unclear whether an object has 
been seen before or not. In this study it is found that the pupil constricts more when an image is successfully 
encoded and later remembered, and when an image is recognized as novel during retrieval. These results are 
explained in the context of the encoding of novel items and the release of the acetylcholine (ACh) and 
norepinephrine (NOR) – two neurotransmitters known to be responsible for both the constriction and dilation 
of the pupil. 
The seventh and last study discusses the effects of decision-making on pupil size and tests the ability of 
human observers to use pupil size as an informative signal about another person‟s cognition during a game 
(Chapter 8). Movies of the eye of several participants (“opponents”) were recorded while they played several 
trials of a game of rock-paper-scissors during which they had to make a decision within a certain interval. 
These opponents had to choose one of three options (rock, paper, or scissors) per trial that were serially 
presented with four second intervals in between. Pupil size tended to briefly dilate during an interval 
following a decision, and was a reliable indicator of when and thus which option was chosen by the opponent 
on a trial-by-trial basis. A new group of participants (“players”) were allowed to watch these movies (viewing 
conditions were made as life-like as possible) and had to determine which one of the three options had been 
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chosen by the opponent. Remarkably, only one player was able to extract useful information from the pupil 
shown in the video of the opponents‟. Other players were “distracted” by other potentially informative cues 
such as eye-brow movements and blinks. Only when informed to look for pupil dilations, all players were 
able to considerably increase their performance. This is a good example of how multiple visual cues can be 
available to an observer and that after correct instructions, observers are able to resolve ambiguity and focus 
on the relevant cues. In conclusion, observers can interpret a person‟s cognitive state by looking at pupil 
dynamics. 
  
30 
 
2. Chapter 2 
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Abstract 
In rivalry, constant stimuli allow several interpretations ("percepts"). Percepts are characterized by their 
probability to occur and by the duration of their dominance. During continuous presentation of bi-stable 
stimuli, both percept probabilities are trivially 50%. To disentangle the processes triggering a percept from 
those stabilizing it, we introduce tri-stable stimuli having three percepts. We find the probability and 
dominance duration of a percept independently adjustable. Percept probabilities and dominance durations 
show mutual dependencies across several perceptual switches. Consequently, the current perceptual 
experience depends on perceptual history; therefore, rivalry - even for continuous presentation - is not a 
memory-less process. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Signals arriving at our sensory system typically contain incomplete or ambiguous information about their 
sources in the real world. The system is then faced with the challenge to infer a unique and consistent 
interpretation. If several interpretations are equally probable, the perceptual experience tends to switch 
between several alternatives over time, while at any given time point one interpretation dominates. This 
phenomenon, termed rivalry, is observed for a huge variety of stimuli (Blake & Logothetis, 2002 for review), 
ranging from geometrical figures (Necker, 1832; Schröder, 1858), faces (Boring, 1930), structure from 
motion (Ullman, 1979), binocular (Wheatstone, 1838), tactile (Carter, Konkle, Wang, Hayward, & Moore, 
2008), auditory (Warren & Gregory, 1958; Van Noorden, 1975), and olfactory stimuli (Zhou & Chen, 2009). 
Although these stimuli differ substantially across features and modalities, they induce a strikingly similar 
rivalry process: continuous and stochastic perceptual alternations between two interpretations of an 
ambiguous sensory stimulus (e.g., Brascamp, van Ee, Pestman, & van den Berg, 2005; Rubin & Hupé, 2003; 
Sheppard & Pettigrew, 2006; Pressnitzer & Hupé, 2006; Naber, Carter, & Verstraten, 2009; O‟Shea, Parker, 
Rooy, & Alais, 2009).  
In rivalry, successive dominance durations (i.e., the time period a certain percept is visible) are 
generally considered as independent and the exact timing of rivalry switches as unpredictable (Fox & 
Hermann, 1967; Levelt, 1967; Blake, Fox, & McIntyre, 1971; Borsellino, De Marco, Allazetta, Rinesi, & 
Bartolini, 1972; Walker, 1975). However, several outwardly accessible physiological measures, such as eye 
position, saccades, eye-blinks, and pupil size have been found to relate to rivalry states (Wundt, 1898; Becher, 
1910; Glen, 1940; Eure, Hamilton, & Pheiffer, 1956; Ito, Nikolaev, Luman, Aukes, Nakatani, & van 
Leeuwen, 2003; Einhäuser, Martin, & König, 2004; van Dam & van Ee, 2005, 2006; Einhäuser, Stout, Carter, 
& Koch, 2008; Hupé, Lamirel, & Lorenceau, 2009) and may potentially serve as predictors for dominance 
durations and switch times. 
Even without the use of physiological markers, independence and unpredictability of perceptual states 
have received considerable challenge. By carefully accounting for noise effects in reporting the perceptual 
state, van Ee (2009) has recently reported a non-zero correlation between successive dominance durations in 
rivalry. On long and on very brief time-scales, perceptual history also is known to affect the speed of rivalry 
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switching: Suzuki & Grabowecky (2007) find a brief initial decrease of dominance durations during the first 6 
trials of 20-s rivalry presentations and a feature-specific long-lasting effect of daily exposure to a rivalry 
stimulus. Most evidence against the stochasticity of rivalry, however, has resulted from studies using 
interrupted presentations of rivalry stimuli. In such a setting the order of percepts and their dominance 
durations also contain information about subsequent percepts (e.g., Maloney, Martello, Sahm, & Spillmann, 
2005; Brascamp, Knapen, Kanai, Noest, van Ee, & van den Berg, 2008; Pastukhov & Braun, 2008). More 
specifically, if a bi-stable stimulus presentation is interrupted by a blank presentation period, the chance that 
the preceding percept returns after the blank is related to the length of its previous dominance duration. Some 
of the resulting theories and models of multi-stable perception that take into account these facts, have denoted 
a significant role of an internal bias and memory (Leopold, Wilke, Maier, & Logothetis, 2002; Maier, Wilke, 
Logothetis, & Leopold, 2003; Kanai, Knapen, van Ee, & Verstraten, 2007; Brascamp et al., 2008; Pastukhov 
& Braun, 2008; Brascamp, Pearson, Blake, & van den Berg, 2009). These studies generally imply that a 
perceptual bias cumulatively builds up during the dominance periods of a percept and the larger the bias for 
this percept (i.e., the longer its preceding dominance durations), the higher the probability to turn dominant 
again after interruption. An exogenously controlled factor, such as blanking the stimulus, however, may itself 
affect rivalry dynamics. Indeed, during discontinuous presentation of bi-stimuli, the process of alternations 
can, depending on the duration of blank interruptions, either be sped up (Orbach, Ehrlich, & Heath, 1963) or 
slowed down (Leopold, et al., 2002). In addition, the effect of an intermittently presented stimulus depends on 
whether the interrupting stimulus itself is ambiguous and on its similarity to the interrupted stimulus. If an 
ambiguous stimulus interrupts a percept, this percept is less likely to survive as compared to an unambiguous 
interrupting stimulus (Pearson & Clifford, 2005). If the interrupting and the interrupted are dissimilar, the 
interruption has effects comparable to a blank; increasing similarity between the features of the rivalry 
stimulus and the interrupter, however, decreases the survival probability of the percept preceding the 
interruption (Pearson & Clifford, 2005; Kanai et al., 2007). The probability of a percept to survive an 
interruption furthermore depends on the contrast of the rivalry stimulus (Brascamp, Knapen, Kanai, van Ee, & 
van den Berg, 2007). These studies show that intermittent presentation of a rivalry stimulus reveals important 
features about the process of rivalry. However, here we are interested in the dynamics of rivalry without any 
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exogenous events (such as interruptions). Hence we here aim at studying effects of perceptual history on the 
current perceptual experience by using the continuous presentation of an uninterrupted stimulus. 
 Most stimuli used in rivalry research are bi-stable, that is, they allow exactly two distinct percepts. 
For continuously presented bi-stable stimuli, the probability to experience one of the two percepts at an 
arbitrary point in time is proportional to the average dominance duration of this percept. Only considering the 
percept sequence, both percepts occur equally often (provided the sequence is sufficiently long to neglect 
edge effects from start and end of the sequence). If we refer to the percentage of occasions in which a percept 
becomes dominant as percept probability, percept probability will thus be exactly 50% for any uninterrupted 
bi-stable stimulus by definition. (Note that the average TIME a percept is dominant, i.e. the dominance 
duration, is distinct and can be substantially different between the two percepts of a bi-stable stimulus). 
Hence, the factors underlying the stabilization of a given percept and those subserving its (re-) occurrence 
cannot be disentangled in bi-stable stimuli, unless perceptual states are exogenously interrupted. To keep 
presentation continuous, while nevertheless dissociating dominance durations from the probability of entering 
a percept, we here use tri-stable stimuli (i.e., figures that induce three distinct interpretations of a constant 
stimulus).  
Stimuli with more than two interpretations have been studied before. Burton (2002) used a quad- (or 
tetra-)stable perceptual rivalry stimulus and showed an effect of instructions on the percept sequences, but did 
not report relations between dominance durations and switches. Other studies on multi-stable stimuli 
combined binocular rivalry with other forms of rivalry. O‟Shea, Tep, Roeber, & Schröger (2008) showed 
different perceptual rivalry stimuli to each eye to achieve a tri- (to hex-)stable percept ("trinocular rivalry"). 
Suzuki & Grabowecky (2002) asked subjects to report four different dominance states during bi-stable rivalry 
in which the percept could have exclusive dominance (i.e., one eye was fully dominant) or was intermixed 
with its rival to achieve 4 different percepts through instruction. Despite several similarities between 
perceptual and binocular rivalry (Andrews & Purves, 1997), both might differ from each other in other 
respects, in particular with regard to the dependence on perceptual history (van Ee, 2009). Hence it is well 
conceivable that using binocular rivalry or a combination of binocular and perceptual rivalry stimuli, may 
yield substantially different results as compared to using a rivalry stimulus without binocular conflict. To 
assess whether multi-stable perception without binocular conflict reveals similar dependencies between 
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dominance durations and transition probabilities, we use different tri-stable stimuli without inducing 
binocular rivalry.  
With our stimuli, rivalry is either induced in the motion (Experiments 1 and 2) or in the color domain 
(Experiments 3 and 4). Within each domain, slight modifications of the stimulus allow us to bias the stimulus 
such that either one of the three percepts dominates (experiments 1 and 3) or all are about equally strong 
(experiments 2 and 4). Hence we can measure the relation between dominance duration and percept 
probabilities and check whether any perceptual history effect is contingent on a specific parameter choice. In 
addition to analyzing the sequence of percepts, we measure dependencies between dominance durations and 
percept probabilities, and identify a new relation between these measurements. Our data support the view that, 
even under continuous viewing conditions and without binocular conflict, rivalry is not a memory-less 
process, but biased by perceptual history. 
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2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 Observers 
Author M.N. and 7 naive observers (age 18-31) participated in each experiment. Observers had normal or 
corrected to normal vision. Each observer gave written informed consent to participation; all procedures 
adhered to national standards on experiments with human observers and with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
2.2.2 Stimuli 
We used four different tri-stable stimuli in four separate experiments. In Experiment 1 and 2, the stimulus was 
a moving plaid consisting of two superimposed gratings (Wallach, 1935; Adelson & Movshon, 1983) (Fig. 
1A). These plaid stimuli allowed three distinct alternating percepts: coherent upward motion (U), incoherent 
transparent motion in which the leftward motion is perceived on top (L), and incoherent transparent motion 
with rightward motion on top (R). In Experiment 1 the gratings were tilted ±120 degrees against the vertical 
midline. In Experiment 2 the tilt was increased to ±140 degrees. The latter parameter change generally 
increased the relative stimulus strength of the incoherent sideward motion percepts. In both experiments, 
gratings were square-waves, had a spatial frequency of 0.73 cycles per degree, a peak luminance (white) of 
84.2 cd/m
2
, a minimum luminance (gray) of 23.3 cd/m
2
, a 5 degree circular aperture, and drifted outwards at a 
speed of 1.73 deg/s. 
Stimuli in Experiments 3 and 4 consisted of three stationary overlapping color gratings (for bi-stable 
version: Breese, 1899) in a 5-degree circular aperture (Fig. 1B). Despite the fact that luminance remained 
physically constant throughout the experiment, the stimulus induced alternating shifts in perceived luminance 
per color, with one of the 3 colored gratings clearly dominating (i.e., appearing brightest) at any given point in 
time. Each grating's color was produced by a single gun of the screen only. For Experiment 3 the gratings had 
CIE coordinates (x, y, Y) of (0.623, 0.332, 17.7 cd/m
2
), (0.298, 0.598, 60.6 cd/m
2
), and (0.153, 0.068, 
8.99 cd/m
2
), respectively. In Experiment 4 the luminance (Y) of the green grating was lowered to 25.1 cd/m
2
 
with otherwise identical settings. This made the perceived luminance of the green grating closer to that of the 
other gratings and therefore increased the relative stimulus strength of the red and blue gratings. Gratings 
were square-waves and had a spatial frequency of 1 cycle/degree. Orientations relative to the vertical midline 
were -120 degrees (red grating), 0 degrees (green), and +120 degrees (blue). For consistency of notation with 
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Experiments 1 and 2, we referred to the red, green and blue gratings by their tilt to the midline, i.e. by L (red), 
U (green) and R (blue), respectively. 
2.2.3 Setup 
Stimuli were generated using Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA) with its Psychophysics toolbox extension 
(Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997; http://psychtoolbox.org) running on an Optiplex Dell computer and presented 
with a 21 inch EIZO Flexscan monitor on a gray background with 1280x1024 pixels at a refresh rate of 100 
Hz. Mean luminance of the background was 23.3 cd/m
2
, minimum luminance (black) of the screen as well as 
ambient light levels were negligible. Head position was stabilized using a chin and forehead rest that assured 
a steady viewing distance of 82cm. 
 
 
Figure 1. (A) Moving plaid stimulus used in experiments 1 and 2. Two superimposed gratings move sideward, inducing three possible 
percepts: coherent upward motion (U), transparent (incoherent) motion with leftward moving grating in front (L), or transparent 
motion with rightward-moving grating in front (R). (B) Static color grating stimulus used in experiments 3 and 4. Perceptually one 
color grating of the stimulus dominates at any given point in time (red=L, U=green, R=blue). Note that the figure's color and 
luminance values might differ dramatically from the actual presentation and that it takes several seconds before rivalry initiates. (C) 
Considering triplets of percepts, two sequence types can be observed: "switch forward" (Si is different from Si-2) and "switch back" 
(Si is the same as Si-2). Si denotes the state (percept), di denotes the corresponding duration of the percept being dominant 
(dominance duration), and i denotes the index of the percept in the sequence. 
 
2.2.4 Procedure 
Observers were instructed to indicate the percept by holding down one of three arrow keys of a USB-
gamepad (Left, Up, or Right) per percept. Observers were asked to always press one button even if their 
37 
 
perceptual dominance was weak. Since during transitions the button for the preceding percept had to be 
released, while the button for the new percept had to be pressed, in the transition period either two or none of 
the buttons were pressed. In 30% of the cases this transition was below the resolution of the input device (36 
ms). In the remaining cases, the overlap periods lasted on average (medians) 80ms (two buttons, 31% of 
cases) and 130ms (no button, 39% of cases), which is very short compared to the overall dominance durations 
(median: 2750ms). This indicates that the transitions between percepts were experienced as sharp. In both 
cases, the period with two or no button were allotted to the second percept. Only very rarely (3% of all 
transitions) did observers release a button and press the same one again. For the reported data, we aggregated 
the periods if the release lasted less than 10s and excluded the whole period otherwise. Neither exclusion nor 
inclusion of all these periods, however, changes any of the reported results or conclusions (data not shown).  
Each experiment consisted of three 5-minute blocks. Experiments were taken on separate days and 
observers were allowed to take breaks between blocks. Before the actual experiment observers were 
familiarized with the stimuli and apparatus. 
2.2.5 Notation 
We denote the sequence of perceptual states ("percepts") by S1, S2 ..... SN where . The 
dominance duration corresponding to the i-th state is denoted by di. To enable analysis across observers, we 
normalized distributions of dominance durations by dividing them through the median dominance duration 
within blocks and observers. These normalized dominance durations are denoted as di*. We also analyzed 
relative dominance durations; i.e. how much longer was percept di-2 relative to di-1. Hence we defined relative 
dominance duration as (di-2-di-1)/(di-2+di-1). The experimental setting only allows transitions between different 
states (as same-state transitions, if existent, would not be reported as "switch"), that is Si ≠ Si-1. Consequently, 
given Si-2 there are only two alternatives for Si. If S i-2 = Si, we will refer to a (Si-2, Si-1, Si) triplet as “switch 
back” (SB), otherwise we refer to (Si-2≠Si) as “switch forward” (SF, Fig. 1C). 
2.2.6 Test for Markov property 
If rivalry were a memory-less process, the probability to transit from a current state to another should be 
independent of any preceding state other than the current one. In other words, the sequence of perceptual 
states would have the so-called Markov property. In the Appendix, we devised a test of the null-hypothesis 
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that a given finite sequence fulfills the Markov property; p-values in Results section 3.4 (denoted as pMarkov to 
avoid confusion with the transition probabilities) refer to this test. A low pMarkov implied that the null-
hypothesis, and thus the hypothesis of a memory-less process, is likely to be refuted. 
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2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Tri-stable stimuli show the same dominance-duration statistics as bi-stable stimuli 
We investigated tri-stable rivalry with four different stimuli in four separate experiments. First we assessed, 
per experiment, whether general properties of tri-stable stimuli, in particular the distribution of dominance 
durations, match those typically observed for bi-stable stimuli. At visual inspection, the sequence of 
perceptual states and associated dominance durations appears irregular and random (Fig. 2A), similar to the 
typical observation for bi-stable stimuli. To facilitate comparison and pooling across observers, we consider 
normalized dominance durations di* (see 2.5; Table 1 for raw durations). As for bi-stable stimuli the 
distribution of dominance durations has a leptokurtic (i.e., heavy-tailed) distribution, which can be 
approximated well by a Gamma or a Log-normal distribution (Fig. 2B). Hence the 0
th
 order properties of all 
our tri-stable stimuli, namely the distribution of dominance durations, are similar to the bi-stable case. 
2.3.2 Dominance durations and percept probabilities are independently adjustable 
In bi-stable stimuli the probability of both percepts to occur in the sequence is exactly 50% (neglecting initial 
/ final percept). In tri-stable stimuli, however, percept probabilities may range from near 0 (only the other two 
percepts are observed) to 50% (the percept re-occurs after every other switch). Dominance durations, in turn, 
need not be coupled to these percept probabilities (consider for illustration a case, where the sequence of 
percepts is ABACABACA, but B's and C's duration is twice that of A's). If the processes underlying 
stabilization and (re-)occurrence of a percept, however, would be the same, we would predict percept 
probabilities and dominance durations to be proportional to each other. To test this hypothesis, we analyze 
whether stimulus parameters can adjust percept probability independently from average dominance duration. 
First, we compare the two drifting plaid stimuli (Experiment 1 and 2). In Experiment 1, both the mean 
dominance duration of the up percept (Fig. 2C) and its probability (Fig. 2D) are higher than the other two 
percepts. Note that compared to Experiment 1, the motion direction of the gratings was deliberately changed 
to “weaken” the U percept in Experiment 2. In Experiment 2, however, the up-percept still has (marginally) 
the highest average dominance duration, while it occurs substantially less frequent than the left and right 
percept. Consequently - although we cannot exclude some coupling between dominance duration and percept 
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probability; the relation that trivially holds in the bi-stable case, does indeed not hold for tri-stable rivalry. We 
observe a similar result for the color stimuli of Experiment 3 and 4.  
 
Figure 2. (A) Example sequence of reported percepts over time (observer KL in first block of Experiment 1), illustrating the 
seemingly stochastic nature of rivalry. (B) Distribution of normalized dominance durations, pooled across observers and normalized to 
unit integral (probability densities). Gamma (black) and log-normal (gray) distributions are shown with the same mean and variance as 
empirical data. (C) Median and standard error of pooled normalized dominance durations per percept. Since dominance duration 
distributions are non-Gaussian (panel B), significance markers refer to a non-parametric Wilcoxon test on equality of medians. (D) 
Probabilities for each percept to occur, data pooled across observes. 
 
The U percept is dominant in both mean dominance duration and percept probability in Experiment 3. In 
contrast, the U percept still has significantly higher dominance durations in Experiment 4, but is only second 
to the L percept in terms of percept probability. Again, percept probability and dominance duration are not 
proportional. In conclusion, the processes determining the probability of a percept to occur and the processes 
subserving the persistence of its dominance are – at least partly – distinct. 
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2.3.3 First-order transition probabilities 
For all experiments, we analyzed the first-order transition probabilities between the 3 percepts (Fig. 3). No 
comparable measure exists for continuously presented bi-stable stimuli, as the probability to switch to the 
other percept is always 1 if only two percepts exist. In the tri-stable case, however it is relevant to see whether 
certain transitions are preferred. As illustrative example, consider a case in which all percepts had equal 
occurrence probability. With this example all transition probabilities could be 0.5, but, on the other extreme, 
could also be 1 for LR, RU, UL and 0 for the other (LU, UR, RL). In the former case, switch 
back and switch forward would be equally likely, while in the later case only switches-forward would exist.  
In Experiment 1 (Fig. 3, left), it is more likely to switch from an incoherent percept (L or R) to the 
coherent percept (U) than between the incoherent percepts. This is not surprising, given that the U percept is 
most probable to occur (Fig. 2D). Conversely, in Experiment 2 the transition from incoherent to coherent is 
less likely than between incoherent percepts, although there is a slight asymmetry in favor of the R to L 
transition (Fig. 3, 2
nd
 from left). In Experiment 3 there is a bias to switch from U to L (rather than to R), while 
in Experiment 1 and 2 the incoherent to coherent transition probability is independent of whether the 
incoherent percept was L or R (Fig. 3, 3
rd
 from left). The preference to go from U to L is preserved in 
Experiment 4 (Fig. 3, right). In both cases this is consistent with the overall more likely occurrence of L as 
compared to R (Fig. 2D). In sum, there is an effect of stimulus properties on first-order transition 
probabilities. However, this effect is mostly accounted for by the effects on the (0
th
 order) percept 
probabilities and beyond this, there is no evident preference for any specific first-order transition.  
 
 
Figure 3. First-order transition probabilities between the different percepts for the 4 different experiments, data pooled across all 
observers. Gray value of arrows is negatively related to the size of probabilities. 
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2.3.4 The sequence of percepts is non-Markovian 
If rivalry were a memory-less process, percept sequences induced by the tri-stable stimuli should have the 
Markov property (cf. Methods). To test this, we calculated for each possible triplet (see Appendix) the 
probability that a particular sequence is Markovian (pmarkov). When calculating pmarkov for all observers and 
experiments, we find that in Experiment 1, the null-hypothesis of the sequence being Markovian can be 
refuted (at pmarkov <0.05) in 4 out of 8 observers (Fig. 4, top-left). In Experiment 2 even 6 out of 8 observers 
violate the Markov assumption (Fig. 4, top-right). With the exception of observer KG in Experiment 1, the 
violation consistently occurs when U is the intermediate percept (Si-1) in a triplet sequence (Si-2, Si-1, Si) and is 
symmetrical with respect to the two possibilities for Si-2. In all significant cases (at p<0.05) the switch forward 
is more likely than the switch back. Again for 3/8 observers in Experiment 3 (Fig. 4, bottom-left) and 4/8 
observers in Experiment 4 (Fig. 4, bottom-right) the Markov property is violated. Since we perform 192 
individual comparisons, (4 experiments * 8 observers * 6 transitions), an adjustment of the alpha-level of the 
test is needed. When adjusting the expected false discovery rate (FDR) to 0.05 by using the Benjamini & 
Hochberg (1995) method, the corrected level across all experiments is 0.006. Using this corrected level, we 
still find significant preferences for the switch forward in 3/8 observers in each experiment.  
It should be noted that the lack of significant Markov violation in the remaining observers does not 
imply that their sequences are indeed Markovian. First, we only checked violations of the Markov property in 
the transitions up to Si-2. Second, for particularly short sequences, like in observer SG with only 66 switches, 
the statistical power to reject the Markov assumption is low. In sum, we find the Markov property to be 
violated in all experiments, which is clear evidence against a memory-less process in continuous rivalry.  
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Figure 4. Estimated p-values for the null-hypothesis that a sequence of perceptual states has the Markov property (i.e., is memory-
less). Each bar represents the data of one particular transition per experiment and observer. A bar exceeding the p=.05 line indicates 
that for this particular sequence, the Markov assumption is violated and the probability to switch from the current percept (Si-1) to the 
next percept (Si) depends on the preceding percept (Si-2). The y-scale is logarithmic and significance increases towards the top (-
log10 p represented).  
 
2.3.5 Dominance durations are influenced by the preceding percept 
Next we address whether the dominance duration of a given percept depends on which percept preceded it. 
Again, this question cannot be posed for continuous presentation of a bi-stable stimulus, as there is only one 
possible preceding percept. Separately for each experiment and each percept (L, U, R), we compared the 
median dominance durations between the two different preceding percepts (Fig. 5). Since the distributions of 
dominance-durations are non-Gaussian, the non-parametric Wilcoxon test for the comparison of medians is 
used. In all experiments, we find a significant effect of the preceding percept on median dominance duration 
for at least one of the percepts. In experiments 1, the incoherent percepts (L or R) are significantly longer 
when preceded by the coherent (U) percept than when preceded by the other incoherent (R or L) percept (Fig. 
5 left panel; p=7.65*10
-4
 for Si=L, p = 0.04 for Si=R). The same and even stronger pattern is observed for 
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Experiment 2 (Fig. 5, 2
nd
 panel from left; p=1.99*10
-5 
for Si=L, p=9.81*10
-11
 for Si=R). In experiments 3 and 
4, when there is no obvious hierarchy of the percepts (coherent vs. incoherent), we nonetheless observe a 
similar dependence of the dominance duration on the preceding percept for some percepts (Fig. 5 right panels; 
Experiment 3: p=8.79*10
-3
 for Si=U; Experiment 4: p=4.90*10
-3
 for Si=L: p=7.31*10
-3
 for Si=U). Note that 
while the reported p-values are uncorrected, all but one of the significant effects survive an individual 
Bonferoni-adjustment within each experiment (0.05/3=0.0016) and most of the significant effects survive an 
adjustment to an expected FDR of 5% across all experiments (adjusted alpha level: 0.0088). In sum, there is a 
significant dependence of dominance duration on the preceding percept. 
 
 
Figure 5. Boxplots of median normalized dominance durations (d*i) per experiment. Any difference within a pair of bars indicates 
that the median dominance duration (d*i) of the current percept (Si) depends on the preceding percept (Si-1). Current percept is 
labeled on x-axis, the preceding percept (Si-1) is encoded by gray values (legend on top). Boxes represent the lower quartile, median, 
and upper quartile of the data, whiskers the extent of the data. Significance markers refer to uncorrected results of two-sided 
Wilcoxon-test on equality of the medians. 
 
2.3.6 Subsequent percept depends on preceding dominance durations 
We have demonstrated that dominance durations depend on the preceding percept. Does in turn the 
probability to switch to a certain percept depend on the dominance durations of the preceding percepts? To 
answer this question, we consider the effect of preceding dominance durations on the subsequent switch 
probability in triplets of percepts: for an identical pair of Si-2 and Si-1 (i.e., identical 2
nd
 order history) does Si 
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depend on di-1 and/or di-2? As before, we compare two distinct cases (Fig. 1C): the switch-back (SB, Si=Si-2) 
and the switch forward (SF, Si≠Si-2) across all experiments and all (Si-2, Si-1) pairs (4x6=24 data points). To 
achieve sufficient amounts of data, we pool across all observers and consider normalized dominance 
durations d
*
i. If switch probabilities were associated with the duration of preceding percepts, then we would 
expect that the median dominance duration per condition is different between the switch back triplets and 
switch forward triplets. Data show that for switches back the dominance duration d
*
i-1 is longer than for 
switches forward in 18/24 cases (points below diagonal in Fig. 6, left panel). This fraction is significantly 
larger than expected by chance, even when the absolute size of the durations is neglected (p=0.02, sign-test). 
Conversely, d
*
i-2 is shorter if Si-1Si is a switch back than if it is a switch forward (22/24 cases, Fig. 6 middle, 
p=3.6x10
-5
). The relative dominance duration (di-2-di-1)/(di-2+di-1), which was computed individually at each 
switch and thus not affected by normalization, confirms this result (Fig. 6, right): in 21/24 cases, a longer di-2 
(as compared to the following d i-1) is observed for switches back than for switches forward. In sum, this 
shows that the shorter a percept has lasted and the more time has elapsed since it disappeared, the more likely 
it is to reappear. This result is consistent with a slowly adapting bias that persists across several percepts and 
is not reset by a perceptual switch.  
 
 
Figure 6. Effect of preceding dominance durations on transition from preceding state (Si-1) to current state (Si). Median values for 
d*i-1 (left), d*i-2 (middle), and relative duration (right) on y-axes for switches forward (Si-2≠Si), on x-axis for switches back (Si-
2=Si), cf. Fig. 1C. Gray values denote experiment, markers denote pairs of subsequent states (Si-2, Si-1) as given in the legend on top. 
Points above the diagonal imply higher durations for switches forward. Note that for each data point the two preceding percepts, 
whose dominance durations are considered (Si-2, Si-1), are identical on both axes, only the current state (Si) differs between the axes. 
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2.4 Discussion 
To dissociate the probability of a certain percept to occur from the duration of its dominance, we introduced 
tri-stable stimuli. Indeed, dominance duration and occurrence probability can – at least to some extent – be 
adjusted independently of each other. Furthermore, the sequence of percepts is non-Markovian. This implies 
that the perceptual history of at least two percepts back influence the current perceptual experience. Further 
analysis revealed that also dominance durations and percept probabilities are coupled across subsequent 
perceptual states, extending previous work on multi-stable percepts. These effects were independent from 
stimulus domain (motion or color) or specific stimulus features (i.e., motion direction and color luminance), 
and insensitive to one percept being dominant. In sum, we find that perceptual state and dominance durations 
are related to more than just the current and immediately preceding state. Hence, we demonstrate – for the 
first time during continuous presentation of an unchanged stimulus without binocular conflict – that neither 
the sequence of percepts nor their dominance durations are generated by memory-less processes; instead both 
are biased by perceptual history. 
In our experiments 1 and 2, dominance durations of the incoherent percepts (L, R) were significantly 
shorter if preceded by the other incoherent percept (R, L) as compared to being preceded by the coherent 
percept (U). One possible interpretation of this finding is that switches between percepts of different quality 
(here: coherent versus incoherent) prolong the subsequent dominance duration. Such an interpretation would 
be in line with a high-level "fatigue" (adaptation) account of rivalry (Attneave, 1971; Taylor & Aldridge, 
1974; Lehky, 1988; Blake, 1989): stimuli with more similar properties fatigue overlapping neuronal 
populations. It should be noted, however, that adaptation in a single population of neurons with simple 
direction preferences ("component cells") would generate the opposite prediction: by itself upward motion is 
more similar to left- and rightward motion than the two side-wards directions are to each other. Neurons 
reflecting the percept (rather than only the stimulus) with– say – a left-ward motion preference would also 
partially encode the U percept. They should therefore be adapted more by U than by R, and thus an L percept 
following a U percept should be comparably shorter. Instead our findings require distinct populations for 
encoding U, L and R. Higher areas in the dorsal stream of visual cortex (such as MT) indeed tend to code 
coherent pattern motion separately from component motion, while lower areas such as V1 almost exclusively 
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encode the components (Movshon, Adelson, Gizzi & Newsome, 1985; Gizzi, Katz, Schumer, & Movshon, 
1990). A fatigue account of rivalry thus – at least for the plaid stimulus –would need to involve not only early 
visual areas but also higher areas. This argues in favor of rivalry originating at more than one level of the 
visual hierarchy (Blake & Logothetis, 2002). 
In rivalry, the function of interruptions is an ongoing puzzle. It is known that interruptions tend to 
stabilize the percept (Leopold et al., 2002), although this effect reverses when interruptions are sufficiently 
short (Orbach et al., 1963). In the present context it is tempting to speculate that the middle percept of each 
triplet acts as endogenous analogue to the exogenous interruption with respect to the other two percepts. At 
first glance our results support this interpretation: a longer di-1 (equivalent to the interruption) makes switches 
back more likely (Figures 4, 6). However, some recent studies have found a positive correlation between the 
probability of a percept to "survive" after an interruption and the preceding duration of its dominance 
(Brascamp et al., 2008; Pastukhov & Braun, 2008). In the "middle percept (Si-1) equals interruption" 
interpretation, this would predict a positive relation between the duration of di-2 and the probability to switch 
back, contrary to our actual findings. Nonetheless, the present results might provide some hint on the role of 
interruptions. In the view that prolonged experience of a percept makes it less likely to return to a percept 
without actively destabilizing it, a short blank would render a switch more likely (one cannot return to the 
percept after the blank), while a long blank allows for recovery. In any case, our results are in line with the 
general finding of Brascamp et al. (2008) and Pastukhov & Braun (2008) in that perceptual history modulates 
percept probabilities. Our stimuli in Experiment 1 and 2 as well as in Experiment 3 and 4 differ only in one 
feature value (the relative direction of the drifting gratings and the luminance of the green grating). These 
subtle differences mainly reduce the relative bias towards one dominant percept. However, we also observe 
that the coupling between state and subsequent dominance duration becomes somewhat more pronounced 
(Fig. 5). Since the feature change affects both the interrupting and the interrupted percept, this effect might be 
related to the findings that survival probabilities are modulated by stimulus features (Brascamp et al., 2007) 
and by the similarity between interrupted and interrupting percept (Pearson & Clifford, 2005; Kanai et al., 
2007). To assess the role of feature similarity and to fully uncover the role of the interruptions as compared to 
intervening ("middle") percepts, a combination of tri-stable rivalry and independently varied interruptions 
seem a promising approach, which is, however, beyond the scope of the present study. 
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The dissociation of percept probabilities and dominance durations suggests that at least partially 
distinct processes are responsible for either. In other words, there is a different mechanism determining 
whether a percept is (initially) chosen as compared to those controlling its persistency. Interestingly, this 
qualitative distinction has been predicted by a theoretical account of rivalry (Noest, van Ee, Nijs, & van 
Wezel, 2007) that models initial choice of percept and later switches without the necessity for a high-level 
decision stage. Although this model aims primarily at explaining the effect of stimulus interruptions, an 
extension to the tri-stable case is well conceivable. 
]Multi-stable stimuli with more than two percepts have been described earlier (Burton, 2002; Suzuki 
& Grabowecky 2002; O‟Shea, Tep, Roeber, & Schröger, 2008), but either included binocular rivalry or were 
designed for different analyses. Closely related to the current study is the phenomenon of "trapping" 
described by Suzuki & Grabowecky (2002). In a tetra-stable (4 percepts) condition, these authors find a 
violation of the Markov property ("path dependence" in their terms). In addition, they report an increased 
probability to stay within a pair of percepts. The probability to stay in this "trap" decreases with the length of 
the "trapped" sequence, while dominance durations tended to increase within the trapped sequence. This 
result argued in favor of a long-term ("post-selection") adaptation, but against an adaption of the currently 
available stimulus. The method employed by Suzuki & Grabowecky (2002) is different from the one used 
here in various respects. Most importantly, these authors used binocular conflict, while in our paradigm 
rivalry is purely perceptual. Furthermore, they separated "exclusive" from "intermixed" percepts by 
instruction, thus combining binocular rivalry with binding features into objects. Our stimuli, in turn, operate 
in distinct feature domains (motion or color). Despite obvious commonalities, it is unclear, to what extent 
binocular rivalry and perceptual rivalry are comparable; these potential differences particularly pertain to the 
dependence on perceptual history (van Ee, 2009) and to the transition between dominant states, which in 
binocular rivalry often spreads in wave-like manner (Wilson, Blake, & Lee, 2001) and is feature-dependent 
(Knapen, van Ee, & Blake, 2007; Naber, Carter, & Verstraten, 2009). In the light of these differences it is 
remarkable that Suzuki & Grabowecky (2002) arrive at similar conclusions. First, both studies observe a 
violation of the Markov property ("path dependence" in Suzuki & Grabowecky's terms, Fig. 4). Second, we 
find a dependence of the switch probability on dominance durations of preceding percepts (Fig. 6), which is 
well in line with Suzuki & Grabowecky's finding of "post-selection" adaptation. In conjunction with Suzuki & 
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Grabowecky's (2002) results, our data suggest the following interpretation: experiencing a certain percept 
does not per se destabilize it (simple adaptation); instead, prolonged experiencing of a percept reduces the 
probability to return to this percept once it has been left (thus the dependence on di-2. in Fig. 6). This reduction 
in probability then relaxes over time (thus the converse dependence on di-1 in Fig. 6). In the case of trapping, 
the reduction in the probability to switch back to the preceding percept is most evident for transition between 
closely related percepts, which - after a while in the trap - can drop below the between-trap transition 
probability and thereby release trapping (Fig. 6 in Suzuki & Grabowecky's study). Our results both confirm 
and generalize these earlier results for multi-stable stimuli without binocular conflict. 
The trapping phenomenon depends on the similarity between percepts and can be affected 
dramatically by comparably subtle changes of instruction (Burton, 2002). Consequently, it is important to 
show that the effect of perceptual history on the current percept does not need a particular trapping pattern. 
By varying stimulus parameters, we here modulate several of the parameters affected by trapping: dominance 
durations, percept probabilities and first-order transition probabilities. Since results on perceptual history, in 
particular the coupling between dominance durations and percept probability, are qualitatively similar across 
all our experiments, our findings also generalize beyond the trapping stimuli. 
In sum, we find effects of perceptual history on the current perceptual experience. This history 
dependence is reflected in percept probabilities, dominance durations and the coupling between the two 
across subsequent percepts. This general finding is neither contingent on binocular conflict nor on trapping. 
Taken together with the aforementioned studies, our results therefore demonstrate that the dependence of the 
present perceptual experience on perceptual history is a general property of rivalry, which is independent of 
whether rivalry is induced through binocular conflict, motion, shape or color. This is further support for the 
view that rivalry is to some extent predictable by perceptual history, occurs at multiple levels of perception 
with similar properties, and that the encoding and eventual resolution of rivalry might be as ubiquitous in the 
sensory systems as ambiguity is in real-world stimuli. 
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2.7 Appendix – Test for Markov property 
To consider a process memory-less, the sequence of perceptual states S1, S2, ... SN would need to fulfill the 
Markov property. That is, the conditional probability of a state Si may only depend on the directly preceding 
state Si-1 but not on any other preceding state Sj (j≠i, j≠i-1), that is p(Si|Si-1) = p(Si|S0,...Si-1). In other words, if 
the Markov property is fulfilled, this conditional probability would be the same independent of preceding 
sequences. In the present context, we considered triplets of sequences which could only either constitute an 
SB - (C,B,C) - or an SF - (A,B,C) with C ≠ A (Fig. 1C). If the Markov property holds, it follows that 
p(Si=C|Si-1=B,Si-2=C) = p(Si=C|Si-1=B,Si-2=A) [C≠A].  
By the definition of the conditional probability this can be rewritten (under the assumption that p(Si-1=B,Si-
2=A)≠0 and p(Si-1=B,Si-2=C)≠0): 
 
or for the counts of the respective triplets and pairs in the sequence: 
 
The discrepancy between the left-hand side (LHS) and right-hand side (RHS) of equation (2) provides a 
measure as to what extent a sequence of perceptual states violates the Markov property. Even if a Markov 
process underlies the generation of state sequences, only infinite sequences will be guaranteed to fulfill 
equations (1) and (2) perfectly. For finite sequences deviations from equation (1) and (2) are to be expected 
due to random fluctuations. Since the length of an observed sequence is necessarily finite, we thus need a 
baseline to estimate which discrepancy from equation (2) can be expected for a finite sequence by chance. 
Accordingly, we tested the Markov property by computing the discrepancy between the conditional 
probability p(Si|Si-1,Si-2) of SB and SF triplets of subsequent states (Si-2, Si-1, Si).  
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We exemplify this procedure for observer KL in Experiment 2 for the pair (Si-1,Si)=(U,R). This analysis 
shows that the switch back is less likely than the switch forward (Fig. 7A, dot), that is p(Si=R|Si-1=U,Si-2=R) < 
p(Si=R|Si-1=U,Si-2=L). Consequently, in this example the Markov property is clearly violated. To assert the 
significance of this discrepancy, we compared it with a baseline, that is the same discrepancy computed on 
simulated sequences. To compute this baseline, we performed 10
5
 simulations for each observer and 
experiment to create surrogate sequences under the Markov assumption, whose first-order transition 
probabilities p(Si|Si-1) and sequence lengths were matched to the actual data. When testing for the Markov 
assumption, the data for most of these simulated chains falls closer to the diagonal than the actual data 
(histogram represented as heat map in Fig. 7). In the example of observer KL 99934 of 100000 simulated 
chains fall closer to the diagonal than the actual data, yielding an estimate for the probability of p=1-
99934/100000=6.6*10
-4 
that the actual data can occur under a Markov assumption. In contrast, when 
comparing a switch back and a switch forward for the data for (Si-1,Si)=(R,U) in the same observer (Fig. 7B, 
dot), there is no evidence against the Markov assumption, as estimating the p-value from the respective 
simulations yields p=1-13644/100000=0.86. These p-values provided an estimate of the probability to obtain 
the actual sequence from a Markov process. Hence the fraction will be referred to as pmarkov and indicates the 
significance level for the null-hypothesis that the state sequence has the Markov property. These data are 
given for all observers, transitions and experiments in figure 4 of the Results section. 
 
 
Figure 7. Example to illustrate the test for Markov property in Experiment 2, data from observer KL. Colored dots show the actual 
data for the conditional switch probabilities; heat maps represent a histogram of the results for 105 simulated surrogate sequences that 
share length (N=456) and first-order transition probabilities with the actual data. Left: Si=R, Si-1=U; Right: Si=U, Si-1=R. The 
maximum significance of rejecting the null-hypothesis, that a sequence has the Markov property, is reached when all 105 simulations 
fall closer to the diagonal than the actual data (dashed line). 
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2.8 Tables 
Exp. 1 FP FR KG KL MH MN MtH SG 
L 3.89±2.24 
(061) 
1.94±1.14 
(067) 
1.76±1.92 
(096) 
2.17±1.22 
(079) 
3.27±1.88 
(084) 
1.91±0.91 
(101) 
1.06±3.81 
(056) 
4.09±12.0 
(025) 
U 3.34±6.53 
(084) 
6.43±5.11 
(077) 
3.29±3.05 
(099) 
3.62±2.67 
(115) 
4.71±4.75 
(072) 
3.93±2.14 
(108) 
3.19±6.75 
(092) 
19.6±15.2 
(025) 
R 3.32±2.67 
(055) 
1.82±1.30 
(077) 
2.04±1.83 
(097) 
2.19±1.63 
(083) 
2.41±1.72 
(063) 
2.38±1.12 
(092) 
0.99±3.59 
(066) 
5.38±3.44 
(018) 
Exp. 2 FP FR KG KL MH MN MtH SG 
L 4.83±3.78 
(079) 
1.34±0.80 
(177) 
1.68±1.86 
(136) 
1.94±2.25 
(123) 
3.36±3.22 
(096) 
2.57±1.36 
(118) 
2.93±2.68 
(104) 
6.20±10.7 
(027) 
U 1.62±2.55 
(054) 
3.17±1.78 
(085) 
2.78±2.59 
(083) 
2.77±2.22 
(078) 
4.40±2.64 
(028) 
2.18±1.25 
(102) 
1.10±2.07 
(094) 
14.2±13.3 
(024) 
R 3.63±2.88 
(063) 
1.39±0.85 
(197) 
1.78±1.95 
(122) 
1.85±1.85 
(116) 
2.45±3.35 
(093) 
3.07±1.31 
(107) 
3.00±2.07 
(097) 
5.74±9.15 
(020) 
Exp. 3 AP AR AV CP JA JS MN MtH 
L 2.66±2.09 
(084) 
2.66±4.11 
(037) 
1.43±11.54 
(036) 
2.12±1.15 
(102) 
2.55±1.94 
(081) 
1.11±1.54 
(184) 
0.94±0.48 
(223) 
1.54±2.70 
(099) 
U 3.38±2.64 
(112) 
9.31±9.77 
(039) 
3.48±14.12 
(042) 
3.48±1.84 
(115) 
5.06±3.78 
(090) 
1.57±1.69 
(199) 
1.52±0.97 
(252) 
3.19±4.33 
(117) 
R 1.81±2.13 
(075) 
6.25±6.61 
(018) 
1.41±13.58 
(045) 
2.46±1.20 
(077) 
2.01±1.66 
(038) 
1.01±1.81 
(152) 
1.02±0.56 
(219) 
0.94±2.33 
(062) 
Exp. 4 AP AR AV CP JA JS MN MtH 
L 3.33±2.93 
(117) 
5.10±8.91 
(039) 
1.84±3.53 
(052) 
2.34±0.93 
(111) 
2.31±3.60 
(114) 
1.31±3.59 
(156) 
1.22±0.83 
(218) 
1.90±1.97 
(130) 
U 1.45±0.94 
(076) 
6.92±13.17 
(041) 
3.71±11.55 
(062) 
2.89±1.45 
(143) 
2.90±2.43 
(117) 
1.51±1.90 
(108) 
1.28±0.80 
(205) 
2.13±3.93 
(130) 
R 2.33±1.81 
(108) 
3.10±3.81 
(026) 
1.61±6.05 
(042) 
2.19±0.90 
(086) 
1.44±1.97 
(032) 
1.22±2.11 
(154) 
1.38±0.74 
(187) 
1.19±2.18 
(057) 
 
Table 1. Median and standard deviation of dominance durations for individuals and number of occurrences.  
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Abstract 
We used binocular rivalry and generalized flash suppression to identify several new shared 
properties of traveling suppression waves. A strong relationship was found between suppression 
wave speed and induction pulse strength: increasing the contrast or dot density of the induction pulse 
led to an increase in wave speed. Evidence of visual field anisotropies in wave propagation speeds 
were also seen, with suppression waves decelerating as they travel towards the fovea. This 
deceleration could not be accounted for by cortical magnification in lower level brain areas, 
suggesting an important role for other, yet to be identified, factors.   
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3.1 General introduction 
 
As any good magician or pickpocket will attest, people are often unaware of many of the objects and events 
that surround them. Experimentally, it has been shown that even when attention is focused intently on an 
object, that object can be rendered perceptual invisible with a few simple stimulus manipulations. One such 
method used to suppress stimuli from conscious awareness is binocular rivalry (BR) (Wheatstone, 1838; 
Levelt, 1965; Blake & Logothetis, 2002). Binocular rivalry arises when one eye receives a significantly 
different image than the other eye. These incompatible images compete for perceptual dominance, causing 
them to perceptually alternate. Many studies have used BR to investigate the neural mechanisms underlying 
conscious experience. However, until recently, little was known about the complementary process of 
conscious suppression. Here we are interested in the mechanisms by which perceptually salient stimuli come 
to be suppressed, with the specific aim of identifying the dynamic properties of perceptual suppression. 
Although the mechanisms underlying suppression are still poorly understood, it is clear from 
observation that the transition from suppression to dominance is often gradual and appears to propagate in a 
wavelike fashion. A recent study showed that it is possible to control the starting point of this transition by 
generating a brief contrast increment (pulse) at one location of the suppressed image. At the point of the 
pulse, the previously suppressed image will generally break through and its dominance will spread and travel 
in a wavelike manner (Wilson, Blake, & Lee, 2001; Lee, Blake, & Heeger, 2005). This technique has opened 
up the possibility of systematically studying suppression propagation. However, there is one important 
limitation with BR: suppression of one target image is necessarily accompanied by dominance of the alternate 
image in the corresponding region of visual space. This makes it impossible to measure the spread of 
suppression independent of dominance and, more importantly, to dissociate the relative interacting 
contributions of the suppressed and dominant visual input.  
Wilke, Logothetis, and Leopold (2003, 2006) developed a paradigm, called generalized flash 
suppression (GFS), which overcomes this problem by generating perceptual suppression in an area spatially 
adjacent to the suppression inducing stimulus. In order to induce disappearance of targets, GFS combines the 
dichoptic viewing of binocular rivalry flash suppression (BRFS: Wolfe, 1984) and large monoptic motion 
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fields typical of motion induced blindness (MIB: Bonneh, Cooperman, & Sagi, 2001). In GFS, a target 
stimulus is presented to one eye. After several hundred milliseconds, a mask pattern consisting of small 
moving dots is suddenly presented to both eyes. Even though the mask pattern does not overlap the spatial 
location of the targets, they are perceived to disappear for periods of seconds (Wilke et al., 2003). The fact 
that the latency of the perceptual suppression in GFS increases with the target‟s distance from the mask 
pattern suggests that suppression propagates successively through adjacent areas of the visual field.  
Despite these differences, the obvious parallels between the suppression seen in BR and GFS lead 
Wilke et al. (2003) to suggest that suppression in GFS may propagate in a wave-like manner similar to that in 
BR (Wilson et al., 2001; Lee et al., 2005). While the labeling of these suppression effects as wave-like is 
convenient and allows for an intuitive description of the perceptual experience, the primary characteristics of 
and the degree to which these are shared between suppression phenomena remain unknown. As researchers 
continue to investigate how the brain generates perceptual suppression, one critical question is whether there 
are multiple mechanisms or only one.  By carefully manipulating properties in both BR and GFS, the present 
study attempts to: 1) identify the factors responsible for the spatio-temporal pattern of suppression; 2) 
determine whether these factors are common for GFS and BR. 
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3.2 Experiment 1 
 
Previous studies show that it is possible to create a suppression wave with a constant speed. A psychophysical 
study using BR (Wilson et al., 2001) measured cortical brainwave speeds of 2.24 cm/s and an fMRI study 
(Lee et al., 2005) reported similar speeds between 1.6 and 2.0 cm/s. Despite the consistency of the speeds 
measured, it was also noted that the inducer does not always trigger a wave at the time or location of the 
pulse. It is not clear from these studies which features of the inducer influence either the probability that a 
wave is initiated, or the speed of its subsequent propagation. As it is known that increasing stimulus contrast 
increases the alternation rate during binocular rivalry (Levelt, 1965), it is possible that this increased 
alternation rate reflects an increased likelihood of suppression wave initiation or propagation rate. Here we 
investigate the effect of changing the contrast of the induction pulse on the initiation probability and dynamics 
of traveling suppression waves during BR.  
 
Figure 1. Experiment 1 stimulus consisted of two annuli with a 3.0° radius (r1) and a 1° width with a gaussian contrast adjustment. 
One annulus with radial gratings was presented to one eye followed by the second annulus containing concentric gratings presented to 
the other eye. This procedure resulted in a dominant percept of the newly introduced concentric grating. A brief inducer pulse (60% or 
90% contrast increment) was then presented at the top of the radial annulus gradually returning dominance to the radial grating which 
is perceived to spread out over the concentric gratings (d1 – 4.7 deg) in a wave-like manner from the inducer location (shown in the 
right column). The subject‟s task was to report when the dominance of the radial grating had reached either of the horizontal blue lines 
transecting the annulus (the distance from the inducer to each blue line was 4.7°).  
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3.2.1 Methods 
3.2.1.1 Participants 
Two authors (MN & OC) and three naïve observers took part in this experiment. All participants had normal 
or corrected to normal vision and were experienced psychophysical observers recruited from the Vision 
Sciences lab at Harvard University. The experiments were approved by the Harvard University Committee on 
the Use of Human Subjects in Research, and conformed to the standards of the Declaration of Helsinki. 
3.2.1.2 Stimuli 
Stimuli were generated in MATLAB 7.1 using Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) and presented on a 
17” monitor (60Hz, 1024x786 pixels) with a grey background. The stimuli used in the experiment were based 
on those used by Wilson et al. (2001) and Lee et al. (2005). Stimuli consisted of either high contrast 
concentric, or low contrast radial, sinewave gratings presented in an annulus around fixation (Fig. 1). 
Background and mean stimulus luminance was 22 cd/m
2
. The radial grating had a 30% Michelson contrast, a 
spatial frequency of ~6.5 cycles/deg. The concentric grating had a 70% Michelson contrast, a spatial 
frequency of ~0.5 cycles/deg. Each annulus had an inner and outer radius of 2.5° and 3.5° respectively with 
the edges of the annulus smoothed using a Gaussian function. Two 0.05° x 1.0° blue lines transecting the 
annulus along the left and right horizontal meridian were presented dichoptically. The inducer was a 0.4° x 1° 
contrast increment to either a 60% or 90% Michelson contrast presented in the upper-most (12 o‟clock) region 
of the low contrast radial annulus. The distance around the annulus from the inducer to either of the blue 
markers was approximately 4.7°. 
3.2.1.3 Procedure 
Observers viewed the stimuli through a mirror-stereoscope and were asked to maintain fixation on a central 
red dot, while head position was stabilized using a chin rest that assured a steady screen distance of 40cm. 
Participants were first presented with the low contrast radial grating to one eye. After 500ms a similar size 
high contrast concentric annulus was presented in the corresponding retinal location of the other eye (BRFS – 
Wolfe, 1984) which generally resulted in perceptual suppression of the low contrast radial annulus and 
dominance of the concentric annulus. An additional 500ms later, the inducer was flashed for 80ms, causing 
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the previously suppressed image to become perceptually dominant in a wave propagating away from the 
induction point. The observer was instructed to press a button when the wave reached either one of the 
transecting blue marks. The button response caused the trial to end.  
Next, the observer was asked whether a complete wave-like event was experienced from the location 
of the inducer to the blue test line. The trial was repeated if participants failed to respond within 2s or if they 
reported that the wave was either incomplete or irregular. Observers initiated the next trial by pressing the 
space bar. The experiments consisted of two blocks of 100 successful trials (approximately 15min each) and 
the two contrast conditions were randomly presented throughout each block. Paired t-tests were performed on 
the mean traveling wave latency and initiation probability. 
As reaction times lengthen the measured suppression wave latencies, we ran a control experiment in 
which observers were instructed to press a button as soon as they detected the onset of the inducer pulse. The 
mean RT measured in the control experiment was subtracted, per observer, from the mean traveling wave 
latency in each condition. Reaction times (RTs) outside the range of 3 standard deviations from the mean 
were discarded.  
3.2.2 Results & discussion  
The mean travel latency (travel latencies were normally distributed for 4 out of 5 observers) was 512ms in the 
low contrast condition (SD: 244ms) and 466ms in the high contrast condition (SD: 241ms) (Fig. 2). The mean 
difference between the disappearance latencies for the low and high contrast pulse was a significant 46ms 
(SD: 20ms) [t(4)=5.2382, p<0.01] which corresponds, depending on the observer, to an increase of speed 
between 8-32% with a high contrast induction pulse as compared to a low contrast pulse. Note the large 
differences between observers in wave speeds (5.9-18.0 deg/s), but that all subjects showed the same effect of 
decreasing wave speed with the low contrast inducer (Fig. 2A) The likelihood that an appropriate wave was 
initiated (incomplete or irregular waves were not included in the initiation probability) was also much lower 
in the low contrast pulse condition than in the high contrast pulse condition for all subjects (Fig. 2B). The 
mean initiation probability was 92.46% for a high contrast inducer (SD: 4.90) and significantly lower for the 
low contrast inducer at 83.15% (SD: 10.88) (t(4)=3.3663, p<0.05).  
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Our results are the first to illustrate this tight link between the traveling suppression wave inducer and 
the following wave speed. As it has recently been shown that motion in the suppressed eye‟s stimulus can 
speed up the traveling wave (Knapen, van Ee, & Blake, 2007), we were curious whether wave speeds could 
be modified by other factors, once the wave had begun propagating across visual space. 
 
 
Figure 2. The effect of inducer strength on traveling wave propagation. Low contrast (LC) and high contrast (HC) pulses are shown 
on the x-axis respectively. (A) Mean travel latencies and (B) initiation probability of the traveling waves for each observer. Both travel 
speed and initiation probability of a wave is respectively faster and greater in the high contrast inducer condition for all participants. 
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3.3 Experiment 2 
 
Experiment 1 showed that the induction probability and subsequent speed of suppression waves is not fixed 
but depends on the strength of the inducer (i.e. the contrast). This raises the question of whether suppression 
propagation shows similar variability across different areas of the visual field. An earlier study fixed the 
eccentricity of the wave‟s path and found that it had a constant speed (Wilson et al., 2001). To test whether 
the speed remains constant at different eccentricities, we measured the propagation of traveling waves 
towards the fovea.  
3.3.1 Methods 
MN, OC and two naive observers participated in experiment 2. To create a traveling wave in BR that 
propagates towards the fovea, we used a rectangle extending from the periphery to the fovea (Fig. 3). The 
inducer had a fixed contrast (90%) and was presented as a brief pulse at the outer-most point of the rectangle 
6° from fixation. Wave latency was measured at four different eccentricities (1.2, 1.6, 2.0, & 2.4° of visual 
angle from the fixation point). All other aspects of the apparatus and procedure used were identical to that 
described above in experiment 1.  
As wave latencies were measured at different distances from fixation, it is possible that any observed 
differences in response times may reflect a difference in speed at which people are able to detect and report 
the arrival of the wave at different locations in the visual field. To make certain that wave latencies were not 
influenced by the effects of spatial anisotropies on response latencies, we ran a control experiment with four 
new naïve observers in which waves were simulated at a fixed speed that was randomly chosen per trial from 
a 15-30 deg/s range (all other aspects of the apparatus, stimuli and procedure were identical to that described 
for the main experiment 2). Median values were analyzed using a repeated measures ANOVA to compare the 
travel latencies per eccentricity condition. Trend tests were performed to analyze the development of the 
median travel latencies as a function of eccentricity. 
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Figure 3. Experiment 2 stimuli. A) A low contrast horizontal sinewave grating was first presented to one eye and this was followed by 
B) a high contrast vertical grating presented to the other eye. C) After a period of time an inducer pulse was presented, triggering a 
suppression wave that travels from top at an eccentricity of 6.0° (r
1
), to bottom at an eccentricity of 1.2 (d
1
). To find out whether the 
wave has a constant speed as it travels towards the fovea, the travel latency was measured at four different locations; each separated 
by a 0.4° (d
2
) difference in eccentricity (indicated by the dashed lines in A and B). Only one eccentricity was tested in each trial.  
 
3.3.2 Results & discussion  
Figure 4A shows the latency of the suppression wave as a function of eccentricity for all observers. There was 
a significant increase in median latency values 656ms, 659ms, 669ms and 699ms at eccentricities closer to the 
fovea away from the inducer (F(3)=9.554, p=0.004). For three of the four observers, this increase in latency 
towards the fovea appeared to be quadratic (data not shown). Indeed, trend analysis over all observers showed 
that a cubic fit achieves a higher significance level (F(1)=29.061, p=0.013) compared to a linear fit of the 
same data (F(1)=12.533, p=0.034). Propagation speeds between the four distances (1.2, 1.6, 2.0, & 2.4 and 
distal from the fixation point) are estimated at 13.4 deg/s, 39.5 deg/s and 157.0 deg/s respectively (Fig 4B), 
and indicate a clear deceleration of suppression waves. As activity in visual brain area V1 is found to 
spatiotemporally reflect traveling suppression waves (Lee, Blake, & Heeger, 2007), it is a plausible neural 
locus for the initiation and processing of suppression waves. Because central visual regions are 
overrepresented in areas such as V1 (also known as the cortical magnification factor, Daniel and Whitteridge, 
1961), the observed deceleration could be absent in V1 activity patterns when asymmetric cortical distances 
are taken into account. In other words, if the spread of activity in V1, caused by traveling suppression waves, 
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progresses with a constant velocity towards the relatively larger brain regions that process the central field of 
vision, the cortical magnification factor could explain the perceptual experience of deceleration. Using 
cortical magnification values from Larsson & Heeger (2006) we calculated the predicted speed across the 
three eccentricity differences based on a constant cortical speed of 16.62cm/s. At this cortical speed the 
corresponding differences in degrees of visual angle would only be 13.4 deg/s, 17.19 deg/s & 19.86 deg/s. 
The minimal deceleration found in these values indicates that the difference in speed cannot be accounted for 
by cortical magnification in V1. Also in contrast to the retinal speeds, the simulated wave latencies showed a 
significant linear increase (F(3)=29.411, p<0.001; linear trend: F(1)=85.346, p<0.001) (Fig 4A). The 
calculated propagation speeds for the simulated waves were 38.69 deg/s, 23.47 deg/s, and 30.62 deg/s (Fig 
4B). The fact that these propagation speeds were relatively consistent across eccentricities indicates that 
changes in speed reported for the illusory suppression waves, are unlikely to be due to response error. In 
summary, the results of experiment 1 and 2 show two new characteristics that influence the speed of traveling 
suppression waves: the strength of its inducer; and its location in the visual field. The following two 
experiments focus on the generality of these characteristics by measuring suppression effects induced by a 
different experimental paradigm, namely GFS. 
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Figure 4. (A) Median traveling wave speed (s) with standard errors, as a function of eccentricity for the real (left y-axis) and 
simulated control (right y-axis) experiments. The linear function of the simulated waves shows that reaction times did not account for 
the deceleration of waves found in the BR wave experiment. (B) The median traveling wave propagation speeds (s) based on travel 
latency as a function of eccentricity (deg of visual angle in respect to the retinal image) presented in solid black. The propagation 
speed increases as a function of eccentricity which indicates that a wave slows down as it travels towards the fovea. The speeds were 
calculated between the target locations that match the locations used in experiment 2. The dashed light grey line illustrates the change 
in wave speed predicted on the basis of cortical magnification alone (with a constant speed of 16.62cm/s). The solid light grey line 
presents the calculated speeds of the simulated waves in the control experiment. 
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3.4 Experiment 3 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the BR paradigm makes it impossible to measure the spread of suppression 
independent of the corresponding spread of perceptual dominance. In contrast, the GFS paradigm allows us to 
investigate the spread of suppression independent of any changes in perceptual dominance. Wilke et al. 
(2003) argued that suppression waves could underlie their GFS results. It is unclear, however, whether these 
suppression waves are identical to those seen in BR, or whether they are simply wave-like. In experiment 3 
we looked at whether the wave characteristics found in BR are the same in GFS. Wilke et al. (2003) 
previously reported that GFS waves traveled at a cortical speed of 0.5cm/s, which is slower than the slowest 
speed calculated for BR in our experiments as well as those reported previously in other studies (Wilson et al., 
2001). Here, we were interested to see whether these apparent differences in travel speeds can be explained by 
properties of the inducing stimuli. 
 
Figure 5. (A) The targets were presented at one of four eccentricities from fixation and the distances between targets (d2) were the 
same as in experiment 2. The induction stimulus was presented in a surrounding annulus 3.6 (r2) to 6.3 (r1) degrees from fixation. (B) 
In experiment 4, the opposite configuration was used with the induction stimulus presented centrally between 0 and 3.6 (r2) degrees 
from fixation. The targets were presented at one of 4 eccentricities extending towards the periphery and the minimum distance 
between the targets and the induction stimulus was 1.2 degree (d1). In all cases, 4 targets were presented at the specified eccentricity (1 
target along each of the 4 cardinal axis). 
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In previously reported studies, the inducer in GFS consisted of randomly moving dots with a certain density. 
Since it is known that increasing the density of the inducer results in an increase of the suppression effect 
(Wilke et al, 2003), it is an appealing thought that the “strength” of the inducer influences the suppression 
strength and the speed of the wave. If GFS suppression waves are similar to waves in BR, inducer strength 
should influence their speed and initiation probability and perhaps their duration of disappearance as well. 
3.4.1 Methods 
Authors MN, OC, and three naive observers took part in experiment 3. In the first condition, four blue target 
dots were presented centrally along the vertical and horizontal axis at either 1.2, 1.6, 2.0, or 2.4° eccentricity. 
These eccentricities corresponded to four different distances (2.4, 2.0, 1.6, & 1.2°) distal from the inducer 
flash. The GFS inducer consisted of randomly moving dots (speed=3.00°/s, maximum angle of deviation = 45 
°/frame) presented in a surrounding annulus that extended between a radius of 3.6° and 6.3° from fixation 
(Fig. 5A). Dots going out of bounds were relocated at the opposing boundary at the same visual angle. 
Targets and moving dots each had a diameter of 0.27°.  
Three different suppressor dot densities (0.25, 0.50, or 1.00 dots/deg
2
) and the four target distances 
were randomly varied between trials (12 conditions). Targets were viewed monocularly and after 1s a 
stimulus (inducer/suppressor) was flashed to both eyes dioptically. If one or more targets disappeared after the 
presentation of the inducer, observers were asked to immediately indicate this initial disappearance of any 
target by pressing a button. The button was then released as soon as this same target reappeared. The trial 
ended when observers reported the reappearance of the targets. If no disappearance was reported for 8s the 
trial was automatically terminated. The experiment consisted of 288 trials divided in two blocks of 144 trials 
and each block contained 12 trials of all 12 conditions, presented in a random order. The apparatus and all 
other aspects of the methodology were identical to that described in the preceding experiments. 
 Median values were analyzed using a repeated measures ANOVA to compare the disappearance 
latencies and disappearance durations across eccentricities and inducer strengths. Trend tests were performed 
to analyze how the median disappearance latencies and disappearance durations developed towards higher 
eccentricity. 
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3.4.2 Results & discussion  
Figure 6 presents both median disappearance latencies (A) and median disappearance durations (B) as a 
function of inducer density and target location.  There was a significant difference in disappearance latency as 
a function of distance towards the fovea (F(3)=30.161, p<0.001). A trend analysis confirmed that the increase 
of disappearance latency was quadratic (F(1)=8.229, p<0.05), indicating that the wave of suppression slows 
down systematically as it moves towards the fovea. From these results we estimated that our GFS inducing 
annulus caused retinal propagation speeds of 0.28, 0.35, and 1.70 deg/s and cortical speeds of 0.34, 0.34, 
1.34cm/s between distances of 1.2, 1.6, 2.0, and 2.4 deg distal from the induction point respectively. The 
target distance also had a significant effect on disappearance duration, with closer targets disappearing for a 
greater time (F(3)=5.982, p<0.01). A trend analysis showed a linear decrease in disappearance duration, for 
target locations further from the inducer and closer towards the fovea (F(1)=9.512, p<0.05).   
Increasing the dot densities of the surrounding inducer from 0.25 to 0.5 and 1.0 dots/deg, resulted in 
mean disappearance probabilities of 85.6% (SD: 14.2), 91.0% (SD: 8.6), and 92.1% (SD: 7.5) respectively.  
This relationship between disappearance probability and dot density showed a clear positive trend but 
differences in disappearance probabilities between the dot densities did not reach significance (F(2)=2.302, 
p=0.162). The density of the inducer also had an overall effect on disappearance latencies (F(3)=2.715, 
p=0.126) but not on the duration of disappearance (F(3)=1.212, p=0.347). Although the observed trend 
towards lower density flashes taking longer to produce a target disappearance than higher density flashes did 
not reach significance, the findings mirror significant effects previously reported (Wilke et al, 2003). The lack 
of significance in the current study likely reflects a ceiling effect. In the previous study (Wilke et al., 2003), 
density had an effect on disappearance probabilities in the range of 0-80% but not for probabilities between 
80-100%. 
These results show that like BR induced suppression waves, GFS suppression wave speed is not fixed 
during propagation, but slows down as the wave travels towards the fovea. In the following experiment we 
investigated whether this slowing down was specific to the foveal direction of the wave. 
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Figure 6. The disappearance latency (A and C) and duration (B and D) of the targets when the dot pattern is either flashed in an 
annulus around the targets (A and B) or centrally with the targets located in the periphery (C and D). Latencies quadratically decrease 
if waves travel toward the fovea (A) and inducer density seems to influence both disappearance latencies and durations (A, C, and D).  
Data points and error bars represent the medians and standard error of data pooled across all subjects. 
73 
 
3.5 Experiment 4 
 
To investigate whether this deceleration was specific to propagation towards the fovea, or whether we had 
identified a more general principle for traveling waves, a fourth experiment measured the propagation of 
suppression waves away from the fovea, towards the peripheral visual field.  
3.5.1 Methods 
In this experiment the observers, stimuli, apparatus, and procedure were as described in experiment 3, the 
only difference being that the inducer was presented centrally, and the targets in the periphery (Fig. 5B). 
Target eccentricities were 4.8, 5.2, 5.6, or 6.0° and their relative distances from the inducer were the same as 
in experiment 3 (i.e. 1.2, 1.6, 2.0, & 2.4°). 
3.5.2 Results & discussion  
Changing the dot density of the central inducer from 0.25, 0.5 and 1.0 dots/deg had a systematic effect on the 
disappearance latencies (Fig. 6C), with lower density flashes taking significantly longer to produce a target 
disappearance than higher density flashes (F(3)=7.251, p<0.05; linear trend: F(1)=8.247, p<0.05). Inducer 
density also had a significant effect on the disappearance duration (F(3)=7.440, p<0.05) wherein higher 
densities produced longer disappearance durations (linear trend: F(1)=12.083, p<0.05) (Fig. 6D). Inducer 
density had no effect on disappearance probability (F(2)=0.331, p=0.727).  
Target eccentricities had a minor but non-significant effect, leading to slightly increases in 
disappearance latencies (mean: 4.8° = 2.06s; 5.2° = 1.98s; 5.6° = 2.10s; 6.0° = 2.50s. F(3)=2.816, p=0.084), 
and decreases in disappearance duration respectively (mean: 4.8° = 1.70s; 5.2° = 1.65s; 5.6° = 1.60s; 6.0°  
1.36s; F(3)=1.497, p=0.265).  
These results suggest that increasing the strength of the central inducer results in both strengthening 
of the inhibitory effects of the waves and the speed of the propagation, but there is negligible slowing 
between the ranges of peripheral eccentricities used in the current experiment. The deceleration of waves 
appears to be specific to foveal propagations. 
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As the target sizes in experiment 3 were held constant at different eccentricities, the parts of cortical 
area V1 responsible for processing the more foveally presented targets was larger than the cortical area that 
processed the peripherally located targets. Because the foveal targets received more visual processing, this 
cortical magnification effect might have biased the results making the foveal targets slower and less likely to 
disappear than the peripheral targets. The following experiment investigated this possibility.  
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3.6 Experiment 5 
 
To assess whether differences between foveal and peripheral representation of the targets may have 
contributed to the reduction in propagation speeds calculated in experiment 3, we performed a final 
experiment in which the targets were kept constant and the inducer was presented at variable eccentricities. 
3.6.1 Methods 
MN and 4 naïve subjects participated in this experiment. Across the different trials, the target eccentricity was 
kept constant at 1.2° and inducer eccentricity (i.e. the inner boundary of the annulus) was randomly varied 
between 2.0 and 4.0°. In order to ensure that the inducer was stimulating a similar sized area of visual cortex, 
the width of the inducer‟s annulus was adjusted such that it equated to approximately 8mm of primary visual 
cortex. In all other respects the stimuli, apparatus, and procedure were identical to that used in experiment 3 
and 4.  Trials were ended as soon as subjects reported target disappearance by pressing a button. Median 
values were analyzed using a repeated measures ANOVA to compare the disappearance latencies per 
eccentricity condition. An additional analysis was performed to test for a trend of disappearance latencies 
across eccentricities. 
3.6.2 Results & discussion  
Differences in target disappearance latencies between foveal inducers were larger than between peripheral 
inducers (Fig. 7). The nonlinear development of the latency function indicates a decrease of speed when 
suppression waves travel towards the fovea (F(7)=24.518, p<0.001; quadratic trend: F(1)=5.171, p<0.05). 
Because the deceleration is present in the data while we controlled for the size of the cortical area that 
processes the target and mask, it seems unlikely that cortical magnification effects are responsible for the 
speed values found in experiment 3. Together with the results of experiment 2, this adds further evidence that 
suppression waves slow down as they travel towards foveal regions of visual space. 
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Figure 7. Target disappearance latencies (s) as a function of mask eccentricity (deg) for all 5 subjects. Medians and standard errors 
were calculated by dividing pooled data into 8 bins. The nonlinear increase of the function indicates the deceleration of waves when 
traveling towards the fovea. As target eccentricity was kept constant and the annulus width was adjusted to the cortical magnification, 
these results exclude the possibility that stimulus sizes underlie the very similar results found in experiment 3. 
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3.7 General discussion 
 
In conclusion, we report a number of new characteristics of suppression wave propagation. Firstly, we have 
demonstrated that the latency and duration of perceptual suppression is systematically influenced by the 
“strength” of the inducer.  Secondly, the suppression wave decelerates as it travels towards the fovea. Thirdly, 
as these effects were seen in both BR and GFS, it is tempting to suggest that the two phenomena may share a 
common neural origin. The most surprising result of this study, though, was the finding that the deceleration 
could not be accounted for by cortical magnification alone. 
 Our findings fit within a new body of research suggesting that perceptual suppression is propagated in 
a wave-like fashion throughout the cortex. Studies that used voltage sensitive dye imaging to image waves 
evoked by electrical pulses in brain slices of animals, found wave propagation speeds in the range between 1-
5 cm/s, values that are very close to the speed values found in this study (Bai, Huang, Yang, & Win, 2006; 
Sanchez-Vives & McCormick, 2000). In support of the proposed existence of traveling suppression waves 
underlying GFS, recent electrophysiological recordings from awake monkeys found that the latency of V1 
cell responses to a surround onset increased systematically as the distance between surround and receptive 
field border increased (M. Wilke, personal communication). Evidence of similar wave-like effects in V1 was 
seen in a recent human fMRI study that found activity in V1 to be correlated with the observation of a 
traveling wave in binocular rivalry (Lee et al., 2007). While the current GFS propagation speeds are similar to 
those found by Wilke et al. (2001), it is noteworthy that our calculated BR speed values are approximately 10 
fold faster than the 1.6–2.24cm/s reported in earlier studies (Wilson et al., 2001). Although the general pattern 
of slowing was seen consistently across observers, it is difficult to know how much significance to place on 
the difference in speeds calculated between BR and GFS when taking the stimulus-related differences into 
account. Beyond the potential differences in wave speed, it is also possible that small errors in reported 
latency (that varied only by a few milliseconds) would have resulted in large overestimations of the calculated 
speed. Therefore, while the overall pattern of results stand, the exact speed values reported here should only 
be considered as estimates. We are also confident about our consistent finding of a non-linear decrease of 
foveal wave speeds in both BR and GFS. In further support of this decrease in wave speed, several observers 
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reported seeing waves slowing down until they stagnated and flipped back to the top of the stimulus during 
experiment 2.  
The dissimilarity between the foveal and peripheral disappearance durations, and the finding that 
waves slow down as they propagate towards the fovea, was surprising and in need of some explanation. The 
most obvious possibility was cortical magnification - the amount of brain tissue in the occipital lobe 
responsible for foveal visual processing is much larger than that for peripheral processing (Tootell, Silverman, 
Switkes, & De Valois, 1982; Horton & Hoyt, 1991; Engel, Glover, & Wandell, 1997; Sereno, Dale, Reppas, 
Kwong, Belliveau, Brady, Rosen, & Tootell, 1995; Duncan & Boynton, 2003; Larsson & Heeger, 2006). 
Related to this difference in cortical representation are neuronal receptive field (RF) sizes. Neurons that 
represent the fovea have significantly smaller RFs than neurons in the periphery in each of the brain areas V1, 
V2, V3, and V4 (Dow, Snyder, Vautin, & Bauer, 1981; Smith, Singh, Williams, & Greenlee, 2001). It is 
possible that these neuronal characteristics underlie the wave‟s substantial deceleration when it is propagating 
towards the fovea. As the results in experiment 2 show, however, the cortical magnification factor can only 
explain a small fraction of the observed deceleration. The cortical magnification factor varies substantially 
between subjects (Duncan & Boynton, 2003) and could as such have been exceptionally prominent in all 
subjects. Although we cannot exclude this possibility, the total number of 11 different observers that 
performed in experiments 2, 3 and 5 makes it very unlikely that all observers‟ cortical magnification factors in 
V1 deviated strongly from the mean. Therefore, it appears that feedback from higher cortical areas or long 
range lateral connections within visual cortex may also play a role (Bringuier, Chavane,Glaeser, & Frégnac, 
1999; Grinvald, Lieke, Frostig, Hildesheim, 1994). Lee et al., (2007) concluded that attention plays an 
important role in promoting the V1 neural activity of waves to higher visual areas. Given that waves travel 
faster in the absence of attention (Lee et al., 2007), it is tempting to suggest that when waves enter the fovea 
and the spatial acuity becomes higher, attentional processes further reduce the spread of activity in V1. 
Unfortunately, it is only possible to speculate as to the likely causes of the observed visual field anisotropies 
and inducer dependencies in wave propagation. Exactly how the brain‟s complex networks of distributed 
neural assemblies coordinate and generate transitions in perceptual awareness, remains one of the biggest 
mysteries in visual neuroscience. Adding further complexity to this question, a recent study found that the 
relative contribution of factors such as thalamic and lateral inputs can vary considerably depending on the 
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strength of sensory input (Nauhaus, Busse, Carandini, & Ringach, 2009). Luckily, the fact that BR and GFS 
provide a means to experimentally control and measure the dynamics of perceptual transitions, suggests these 
phenomena may be ideal for further exploration of this question.  
Our finding that inducer strength can influence propagation speed and initiation probability 
complements recent work showing that the spatial origin of traveling suppression waves can be predicted by 
contrast, spatial frequency, and motion of the inducer (Paffen, Naber, Verstraten, 2008). It is interesting to 
speculate whether there is any functional significance to these systematic effects of inducer strength on the 
rapid propagation of new perceptual information at the expense of the previously perceived stimulus. As 
features such as stimulus contrast are known to be relevant to measures of visual salience, the increase in 
suppression wave propagation speed may be one reason why salient features appear to reach awareness faster 
than non-salient features of the environment. Contemporary theories have not yet linked visual saliency and 
suppression together so further experiments are needed to investigate how, and to what extent, the dynamics 
of suppression waves relate to other visual processes known to be influenced by the salience of visual 
features.  
The similar pattern of results obtained in the GFS and BR experiments presented here, provides 
strong evidence that they may share the same underlying mechanism. Confirming whether or not there is only 
one means by which sensory information is temporarily rendered inaccessible to consciousness, is clearly 
critical for accurate interpretation of future research into the neural correlates of unconsciousness. Again, 
more work is needed before any conclusions can be drawn on this point. If further testing continues to reveal 
such large individual variation in the speed and strength of suppression waves as that observed here, 
individual differences may provide one avenue through which to investigate the relationship between these 
different phenomena.      
The current study focused on BR and GFS, however, there are many other methods known to render 
stimuli consciously unavailable (for review, see Kim & Blake, 2005). With increasing effort being directed to 
these investigations, it is hoped that this study will shed light on why and how stimuli are rendered 
unconscious. The finding that dynamics of suppression waves vary as a function of inducer strength and 
direction of propagation relative to the fovea suggests a possible involvement of cognitive factors (attention), 
or a role for specific neural populations (feedback or long range lateral connections) in constraining the 
80 
 
transitions between perceptual awareness and suppression. The recent finding that visual phantoms also 
propagate in a similar wave-like manner (Meng, Ferneyhough, & Tong, 2007), raises the exciting possibility 
that these widely varying visual phenomena are all tapping into the same basic mechanism.  
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Abstract 
Rivalry is a common tool to probe visual awareness: a constant physical stimulus evokes multiple, 
distinct perceptual interpretations (“percepts”) that alternate over time. Percepts are typically described 
as mutually exclusive, suggesting that a discrete (all-or-none) process underlies changes in visual 
awareness. Here we follow two strategies to address whether rivalry is an all-or-none process: first, we 
introduce two reflexes as objective measures of rivalry, pupil dilation and optokinetic nystagmus 
(OKN); second, we use a continuous input device (analog joystick) to allow observers a gradual 
subjective report. We find that the “reflexes” reflect the percept rather than the physical stimulus. Both 
reflexes show a gradual dependence on the time relative to perceptual transitions. Similarly, observers' 
joystick deflections, which are highly correlated with the reflex measures, indicate gradual transitions. 
Physically simulating wave-like transitions between percepts suggest piece-meal rivalry (i.e., different 
regions of space belonging to distinct percepts) as one possible explanation for the gradual transitions. 
Furthermore, the reflexes show that dominance durations depend on whether or not the percept is 
actively reported. In addition, reflexes respond to transitions with shorter latencies than the subjective 
report and show an abundance of short dominance durations. This failure to report fast changes in 
dominance may result from limited access of introspection to rivalry dynamics. In sum, reflexes reveal 
that rivalry is a gradual process, rivalry's dynamics is modulated by the required action (response 
mode), and that rapid transitions in perceptual dominance can slip away from awareness. 
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4.1 Introduction 
While the signals arriving at the human sensory systems typically provide only noisy and ambiguous 
information about their sources in the real world, introspectively perception seems unified and 
coherent. Introspection suggests further that at any point in time one can either be aware of a distal 
item or not, but such awareness cannot be partial. Whether this all-or-none nature of awareness is 
objectively justified is, however, subject to debate (Alais, Cass, O'Shea & Blake, 2010a, Overgaard, 
Rote, Mouridsen & Ramsøy, 2006, Sergent & Dehaene, 2004) and points to the principled difficulty of 
relying on introspection (but see Ericsson & Simon, 1980, Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
Studying changes in perception and awareness in the real world presents the challenge that 
changes in the stimulus (bottom-up signals) interact with changes in their interpretation. To 
circumvent this bottom-up “confound” we use different variants of rivalry, a phenomenon known for 
at least a quarter of a millennium (Breese, 1899, Dutour, 1760, Wheatstone, 1838). In rivalry, a 
constant stimulus evokes distinct (usually two) perceptual interpretations (“percepts”). Rivalry occurs 
when two distinct stimuli, that cannot be fused, are presented to either eye (binocular rivalry, 
Wheatstone, 1838) or when the stimulus itself allows different interpretations, such as the famous 
Necker cube (Necker, 1832) or the stimulus shown in Figure 1A (monocular rivalry, Breese, 1899). To 
distinguish binocular rivalry from other forms, we here follow the usual convention and subsume the 
latter as “monocular rivalry” despite simultaneous presentation to both eyes. Rivalry is not restricted 
to vision, but also observed in touch, audition and olfaction (Carter et al., 2008, Van Noorden, 1975, 
Zhou & Chen, 2009).The extent to which all these forms of rivalry exhibit the same phenomenology is 
subject to debate (Klink, van Ee & van Wezel, 2008b, Knapen et al., 2007a, Meng & Tong, 2004, 
O'Shea, Parker, La Rooy & Alais, 2009, Wade, 1975) as is the neural origin of rivalry.  
While rivalry is often described as an all-or-none process, a variety of physiological markers 
show a gradual modulation around the time of transition between two percepts: eye-position 
(Einhäuser, Martin & König, 2004, van Dam & van Ee, 2005, van Dam & van Ee, 2006), 
(micro-)saccade frequency (Glen, 1940, van Dam & van Ee, 2005), pupil dilation (Einhäuser et al., 
2008b, Hupé et al., 2009), blink frequency (van Dam & van Ee, 2005), or gamma-band activity 
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(Doesburg, Green, McDonald & Ward, 2009, Doesburg, Kitajo & Ward, 2005). As with awareness in 
general, however, this conflict between discrete phenomenology and continuous physiology, may be a 
consequence of relying on introspection and subjective report. Hence we here combine rivalry with 
objective measures to probe visual awareness without relying solely on introspection. 
Numerous studies have attempted to pinpoint neural processes underlying rivalry. 
Conceptually, local and modality specific processes have often been put forward: the representations 
of each percept mutually inhibit each other and loss of dominance follows from neuronal adaptation 
(“fatigue”) of the dominant percept (Attneave, 1971, Blake, 1989, Taylor & Aldridge, 1974). In 
addition, evaluative higher-order processes could account for the reversals between percepts as these 
trigger changes in visual awareness by reorganization of activity (e.g., Leopold & Logothetis, 1999). 
Several studies support a low-level account of rivalry, linking transitions between percepts to spatial 
activity patterns in V1 (Lee, Blake & Heeger, 2005, Lee, Blake & Heeger, 2007, Lee & Blake, 2002) 
or indicating correlations between fluctuations of early visual activity and changes in visual awareness 
(Lee & Blake, 2002, Leopold & Logothetis, 1996, Polonsky, Blake, Braun & Heeger, 2000, Tong & 
Engel, 2001). Other studies, however, have shown that higher brain areas are linked to awareness 
(Leopold & Logothetis, 1999, Lumer, Friston & Rees, 1998, Sheinberg & Logothetis, 1997, Tong, 
Nakayama, Vaughan & Kanwisher, 1998). To reach consensus on the subject, several authors have 
argued that rivalry may occur at different levels of the visual hierarchy (Blake & Logothetis, 2002, 
Freeman, 2005, Long & Toppino, 2004, Sterzer, Kleinschmidt & Rees, 2009, Tong, Meng & Blake, 
2006, Wilson, 2003). Supporting this proposition, Haynes and Rees (2005) show that different forms 
of rivalry (in their case between eyes or between colors) have representations at distinct locations in 
the visual processing stream. It seems thus likely that both high and low level mechanisms contribute 
to initiation of rivalry (Sterzer et al., 2009). 
One possible reason for the lack of consensus on the neuronal origin of rivalry and awareness 
is the effect of attentional and motor processes that add an additional difficulty to the interpretation of 
imaging data. For example, attention could selectively activate or modulate distinct regions;  
subjectively attending a specific feature, such as one orientation in two overlapping gratings with 
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different orientations, activates neurons processing that feature in early visual areas (Kamitani & 
Tong, 2005). Similar to attending one feature, the allocation of attention to one percept could result in 
the activation of neurons processing the features tied to the corresponding percept. The activated brain 
regions during rivalry could thus be a consequence of attentional processes rather than the actual 
process involved with visual awareness. Attentional mechanisms are indeed known to affect brain 
regions differently during rivalry (Lee et al., 2007). Regions responsible for the allocation of attention 
to salient events (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002) seem to be involved with spontaneous perceptual 
switches as well (Britz, Landis & Michel, 2009, Lumer et al., 1998, Sterzer & Kleinschmidt, 2007, 
Sterzer, Russ, Preibisch & Kleinschmidt, 2002). Also, decreasing attentional resources to a rivalrous 
stimulus slows the rate of alternations in rivalry (Alais, van Boxtel, Parker & van Ee, 2010b, Paffen et 
al., 2006), and selectively attending a percept prolongs its dominance (Meng & Tong, 2004, van Ee, 
Noest, Brascamp & van den Berg, 2006). In summary, attentional processes may strongly affect 
rivalry and interact with the neural representations of the rivaling stimuli. 
A key issue that bedevils many studies on rivalry is their reliance on introspection (i.e., 
subjective report). Although occasional physical changes in the stimulus can verify that observers try 
to achieve a veridical report (“catch trials”), four fundamental issues persist: First, the motor-act of 
reporting itself may affect perception (Beets, Hart, Rösler, Henriques, Einhäuser & Fiehler, 2010, 
Maruya, Yang & Blake, 2007, Wohlschläger, 2000); second, the report mode might restrict response 
possibilities (e.g., button presses allowing only discrete reports); third, very brief dominance periods 
of one percept might not suffice to trigger a report; and forth, catch trials might not mimic the entire 
phenomenology of rivalry. Here we use three strategies to overcome these issues: first, we use two 
reflexes – pupil response and optokinetic nystagmus – as objective indicators of percept; second, we 
test different input devices, a discrete (button press) and a continuous (joystick) one; third we simulate 
discrete and gradual transitions in catch (“simulated”) conditions.  
While changes in pupil size are typically thought of as a reflex to changes in illumination, 
there are many studies showing cognitive effects on pupil size (e.g., Beatty & Lucero-Wagoner, 2000, 
Daniels et al., 2009, Einhäuser et al., 2010, Hakerem, 1967, Harrison, Singer, Rotshtein, Dolan & 
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Critchley, 2006, Hess, 1975, Kahneman, 1973, Privitera et al., 2010, Simpson & Hale, 1969, 
Steinhauer et al., 1983). In the context of rivalry, transitions induce pupil dilation (Einhäuser et al., 
2008b, Hupé et al., 2009) and the pupil light reflex is diminished during suppressed periods (Brenner, 
Charles & Flynn, 1969, Báràny & Halidén, 1948, Lowe & Ogle, 1966, Richards, 1966). Here we find 
that if stimuli of different luminance or contrast are presented to either eye, pupil size follows the 
percept rather than the physical stimulus allowing us to use pupil size as one objective indicator of 
rivalry.  
When observers are presented a large coherently moving field (such as when looking outside 
from a moving train), their eyes usually show an optokinetic nystagmus (OKN, Purkinje, 1925): slow 
phases try to match the stimulus speed to keep the retinal image stable and are interrupted by fast 
phases that reset the eye in orbit. Here we employ OKN slow phase speed as second objective measure 
of rivalry. In the present context, this measure is of particular interest, as previous studies have 
described both rivalry and the resulting OKN as all-or-nothing mechanisms (Enoksson, 1963, Fox, 
Todd & Bettinger, 1975, Logothetis & Schall, 1990, Watanabe, 1999, Wei & Sun, 1998). Combining 
OKN with an analog input device allows us to challenge this interpretation. Using both pupil size and 
OKN allows us to verify that results are general and not restricted to specific methods of measurement 
or stimuli.  
Using OKN and pupil size, using discrete and continuous response modes, and using sharp 
and piece-meal simulated transitions, we address three questions: is awareness temporally “all-or-
none” or gradual, are the results explainable by piece-mealing, and do reflexes have access to different 
levels of processing than introspection? 
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4.2 Results 
4.2.1 Experiment 1 – Pupil size as measure of rivalry 
To robustly induce rivalry, ten observers were presented two stationary gratings that were distinct in 
color (red/green) and orientation (+60° or -60° relative to the vertical). In a monocular rivalry 
condition (Breese, 1899), both gratings were overlaid as plaid and presented to both eyes 
simultaneously (Figure 1A; note that we stick to the term monocular rivalry although the stimulus was 
presented to both eyes); in binocular rivalry, each grating was separately presented to one eye through 
a stereoscope. In addition, either the green grating‟s luminance (binocular and monocular condition) or 
contrast (binocular only) was varied across 4 levels between experimental trials, while the red grating 
was kept identical at an intermediate level of luminance or contrast. During each 5-minute trial, both 
gratings were constant, and observers were asked to indicate by pressing a button, which grating they 
perceived. Despite a constant stimulus, pupil dilation depended on the luminance of the dominant 
percept (Figure 1B): if the grating of higher luminance or contrast was perceived dominant, the pupil 
size was smaller than if the other grating was dominant, and significantly so for binocular luminance 
(t(9)=6.79, p<0.001) and for binocular contrast (t(9)=4.99, p<0.001) conditions. During monocular 
rivalry, pupil size was significantly smaller during the second half of a dominance duration (i.e., close 
to the next perceptual transition) if the dominant percept was brighter than the suppressed percept 
(t(9)=2.34, p<0.05). We align pupil traces to the times when observers reported transitions. The 
average over these aligned traces shows that the difference in pupil dilation is largest just before and 
after the transition (Figure 1C-E) and levels off after about 1.5s. Some of the leveling off in the 
average trace may be attributed to the high variability of time to the subsequent transition (i.e., the 
high variability in dominance durations). We control this confound by performing the analysis in a 
normalized time frame: we resample the time between each pair of subsequent perceptual transitions 
(i.e., a dominance duration) to a single fixed length before averaging. This time-normalized 
representation still shows a gradual change in pupil from one transition to the next transition (Figure 
S1). This rules out dominance-duration variability as sole source of the graduality of transitions. 
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Importantly, the difference in pupil size between percepts increases with increasingly distinct stimuli, 
while the time course remains rather similar (Figure 1F-H). This pupil response is therefore also 
distinct from a generic biphasic pupil response associated with the perceptual transition as such, which 
is independent of the polarity of the transition (low to high or high to low) and degree of dissimilarity 
between the rivaling stimuli (Figure 1I-K, cf. Einhäuser et al., 2008b, Hupé et al., 2009). In sum, 
experiment 1 demonstrates that pupil size – both in monocular and binocular rivalry - follows the 
perceived rather than the physical stimulus. A similar result has recently been found independently 
and was first reported as abstract (Fahle, Stemmler & Spang, 2010) together with a presentation of the 
current results (Naber & Einhäuser, 2010). The most important aspect is that pupil dilation seems to 
indicate a gradual transition between the two perceptual states (Figure 1B). Whether these gradual 
transitions are truly a property of rivalry rather than of the pupillary response itself, shall be addressed 
in experiment 2. 
4.2.2 Experiment 2 – Graduality: a true property of rivalry 
Experiment 1 leaves open whether the time course of the pupil around transitions reflects a gradual 
nature of rivalry or just sluggish pupil dynamics. To distinguish these two alternatives, we simulate 
abrupt rivalry transitions and compare the speed of pupil size changes around these simulated 
transitions to real rivalry transitions. 
All methodological aspects of experiment 2 were identical to that of experiment 1 with the following 
exceptions: First, rather than using multiple contrast or luminance levels, we only used the stimulus 
conditions for which the difference in luminance or contrast between the rivaling stimuli had been 
maximal in experiment 1; second, we simulated rivalry in half of the trials by switching presentation 
of the two gratings per dominance duration (“simulated rivalry”). Dominance durations in these trials 
were based on the preceding rivalrous trial and perceptual transitions consisted of abrupt switches 
between images of both “rivaling” gratings.  
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Figure 1. Experiment 1 – Pupil size as a function of rivalry dynamics. (A) Example of a monocular rivalry stimulus 
presented in experiment 1. Fixate on the center dot to observe rivalry. The perceived luminance of each grating fluctuates 
over time during which one grating has a more dominant luminance than the other. (B) Example of the pupil size as function 
of time during a single rivalrous trial of one observer. Letters indicate which grating was dominant (R = low luminance red 
grating, G = high luminance green grating). Black vertical lines are indications of perceptual transitions by the observer. The 
pupil adapted to the perceived luminance of the dominant percept during rivalry, while physical stimulation was kept 
constant. (C-E) Average pupil size as function of time relative to the perceptual transitions; red: transition from high to low 
luminance or contrast, green: transition from low to high luminance or contrast. Light colored patches indicate s.e.m. over all 
dominance durations. Bars indicate time points were both traces are significantly different at an uncorrected p<0.05. (F-H) 
Differences between pupil size traces for the two switch directions as a function of time around transitions for all tested 
luminance and contrast conditions (legend provides luminance/contrast of changed grating, other remains constant, see 
Methods), means across observers (n=8); grey-level coded bars indicate time points at which means are different from 0 at 
p<0.05 . (I-K) Sum of pupil size traces, notation otherwise as in panels F-H. (C-H) For pupil size as a function of normalized 
relative time between transitions, see Figure S1.  
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Visual inspection of the average traces indicates that pupil size changes more abruptly during 
simulated transitions (Figure 2A-C, dotted traces) than during rivalrous transitions (Figure 2A-C, solid 
traces) for all conditions. This is particularly evident in the difference plot between the two transition 
polarities (Figure 2D-F), where effects of the transition itself (i.e., irrespective of polarity) are 
subtracted out. Although this is already suggestive of rivalrous transitions being more gradual than 
simulated transitions, such apparently faster transitions in the average trace of simulated trials, may in 
principle, still be a consequence of decreased variance (jitter) between the times of actual transitions 
(simulated or real) and their report. We controlled for this potential confound by calculating the 
steepness (speed of transition) in a 0.2 second window around each change in pupil size tied to a 
perceptual transition. When using  the z-normalized pupil size for computing pupil speeds, pupil 
speeds around simulated transitions were significantly larger than around rivalrous transitions for all 
conditions (Binocular luminance: simulated: 4.4± 1.2, rivalrous: 0.9± 0.5, t(7)=7.73, p<0.001; 
Binocular contrast: simulated: 2.5± 0.8, rivalrous: 1.2± 0.3., t(7)=6.53, p<0.001; Monocular 
luminance: simulated: 1.5± 0.5, rivalrous: 0.8± 0.5, t(7)=2.95, p<0.05; Figure 2G-I, all values in units 
of z-normalized pupil size divided by 200ms). Finally, to exclude artifacts of trial-wise normalization, 
we computed the same analysis for unnormalized pupil sizes and find the same pattern (t(7)=5.95, 
p<0.001; t(7)=5.02, p<0.01; t(7)=3.53, p<0.01, respectively). These data confirm that transitions in 
simulated rivalry are indeed significantly steeper than in real rivalry. Hence, the gradual nature of a 
change in dominance is not a mere consequence of sluggish pupillary dynamics, but it is a true 
property of perceptual transitions in rivalry. 
4.2.3 Experiment 3 – Generality of graduality and limitations of report 
Pupil size indicates the gradual nature of rivalry. To address whether this phenomenon is restricted to 
the effect of perception on pupil dynamics or a general property of rivalry, we use an alternative 
objective measure. Especially in the context of binocular rivalry and moving stimuli, the velocity of 
the slow phase component of the optokinetic nystagmus (OKN) provides such an alternative. 
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Figure 2. Experiment 2 – Pupil graduality. (A-C) Average pupil size as a function of time relative to the perceptual 
transitions for rivalry (green and red traces) and physical stimulus changes (simulated rivalry, orange and cyan traces) per 
condition. (D-F) Difference in average pupil size per for rivalrous transitions (black solid traces) and simulated transitions. 
To compare rivalrous and simulated transitions, average pupil traces were normalized by dividing through the distance 
between the maximum and minimum of each trace per observer and trial. (G-I) Average horizontal pupil speed in a 0.2 time 
window around the pupil speed's zero crossing, mean and s.e.m. across observers for simulated (left) and real (right) rivalry. 
Pupil size was more gradual during rivalrous transitions as compared to simulated transitions. 
 
Eight observers were presented a grating moving to the right to one eye and a grating moving 
to the left to the other eye, both at a speed of 6.7 deg/s (Figure 3A). Our analysis is based on the 
horizontal eye velocity during the slow phases of the OKN, whose direction significantly depends on 
whether the leftward or rightward moving grating is perceived as dominant (horizontal velocity left: -
1.15± 0.27 deg/s, right: 1.09± 0.20 deg/s, t(7)=5.49, p<0.001; Figure 3B). Note that the low gain of 
about 0.16 (=1.1/6.7) is a consequence of averaging over the whole period, including times around the 
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transitions: Similar to the pupil signal in experiment 1, the OKN velocity changed smoothly around a 
perceptual transition (Figure 3C, solid traces) and leveled off to baseline around 2s afterwards. Similar 
to experiment 2, we excluded the possibility that the smoothness of the transition is a property of the 
OKN velocity rather than of the rivalry process.  
We simulated rivalry by interleaving experimental trials in which both gratings for each eye 
drifted in the same direction and physically switched their direction with the same temporal statistics 
as the preceding rivalrous trial (i.e., the same randomized dominance durations). In these cases, 
transitions in OKN velocity are more abrupt and take less time to follow the change in stimulus 
direction (Figure 3C, dotted traces). The difference in the steepness of transition is quantified by the 
average eye acceleration during the transition, which is significantly larger for simulated than for real 
perceptual transitions (simulated: 36.8± 3.7 deg/s
2
, rivalrous: 21.7± 1.6 deg/s
2
, t(7)=4.74, p<0.01; 
Figure 3D). In line with the pupil data from experiment 2, the gradual nature of transitions indicated 
by the OKN is therefore a true and general property of rivalry. This raises the question as to whether 
rivalry is governed by a continuous process that is shadowed by a discrete (binary) response mode. 
If fluctuations in visual awareness of percepts are in fact governed by a gradual process, why 
do its measurements suggest an all-or-none nature (Fox & Check, 1972, Norman, Norman & Bilotta, 
2000)? One plausible hypothesis sees the typically discrete response mode (button press) responsible. 
There are two ways button presses can influence measured dominance durations. First, button-press 
report may miss very brief dominance durations (van Ee, 2009); second, the act of overtly reporting 
per se may influence perception. For the first issue, it is conceivable that short dominance durations 
are not reported, because they do not reach awareness or an internal integration criterion for report. To 
test this, we use pupil size and OKN-slow-phase velocities and their sign changes (i.e., a directional 
change in pupil size and crossing of the zero-velocity line) as objective indicator of perceptual 
dominance. While in real rivalry it remains open for principled reasons whether very brief reflex-based 
dominance durations are noise (i.e., false alarms for transitions by reflexes) or true dominance periods 
missed by overt report, simulated rivalry provides such ground truth. Since simulated rivalry is based 
on real-rivalry button-press data, noise related to the reflex itself would show up as transitions in both 
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conditions, while truly missed short periods of dominance would only be present in real rivalry. In 
general, pupil-based and especially OKN-based dominance durations are largely consistent with 
button-press-based dominance durations; for some regime of parameter settings, however, there is an 
abundance of short dominance durations in the signals for real rivalry as compared to simulated rivalry 
(Figure 4A-D).  
 
Figure 3. Experiment 3 – OKN as a function of rivalry dynamics. (A) Example of binocular rivalry stimuli and OKN 
patterns. Rivalry and OKN were induced by presenting dissimilar gratings with opposite movement directions to each eye 
separately. (B) Example of the derivative of the horizontal eye position (OKN speed) as function of time during a single trial 
of one observer (dark grey). OKN‟s fast phases (light gray spikes) were removed and interpolated, and the resulting trace was 
smoothed. Black vertical lines indicate perceptual transitions; arrows denote movement direction of the dominant percept. 
Dashed grey horizontal lines at (-)6.67 deg/s indicate speed of the rivaling stimuli. The OKN speed of slow phases gradually 
increased and decreased as a function of time to transition. (C) Average OKN speed for rivalry transitions (green and red 
traces) and physical stimulus changes (simulated rivalry, orange and cyan traces), mean and s.e.m. across all dominance 
durations. OKN speed was more gradual during rivalry transitions as compared to physical changes of stimulus direction. (D) 
Average horizontal eye acceleration in a 0.2 time window around the OKN speed's zero crossing, mean and s.e.m. across 
observers for simulated (left) and real (right) rivalry. Acceleration during a perceptual transition, an indication of graduality 
of the OKN speed signal, was lower for rivalrous trials. (E) Normalized dominance durations per report conditions, mean and 
s.e.m. across observers. Dominance durations were normalized by dividing by the median dominance duration per observer. 
OKN-based dominance durations (default parameter settings) differ significantly in a condition when observers in addition 
report dominance by button press (left bar) as compared to trials without active report (middle bar). In the parameter regime, 
OKN-based dominance durations in the report condition do not differ from those based on subjective (button press) reports 
(right bar). 
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In addition, latencies between physical transitions and button presses are longer (pooled pupil 
conditions: 0.53s± 0.09s; OKN: 0.66s± 0.03s) than between physical transitions and reflexive sign 
changes (pupil: 0.41s± 0.10s, t(23)=3.62, p<0.01; OKN: 0.42s± 0.05s; t(7)=5.08, p<0.001). Thus, it is 
likely that observers are unaware of or fail to report short dominance durations because of these 
latencies. Furthermore, information on intermediate states of rivalry (Brascamp, van Ee, Noest, Jacobs 
& van den Berg, 2006, van Ee, 2009) can also be lost when relying solely on button-press data. The 
second option, a direct effect of overt report on dominance durations is also supported by our data. For 
parameters that closely match OKN-based to button-based dominance durations, OKN-based 
dominance durations are shorter if observers actively report their percept than if they merely watch the 
stimulus passively (t(7) = 3.21, p < 0.05; Figure 3E; Figure 4E-F). This result stresses the effect of 
report on dominance durations and is in line with earlier observations (Beets et al., 2010, 
Wohlschläger, 2000). Note that we did not measure no-report conditions for pupil experiments, 
because pilot data had already indicated that the pupil is less reliable in determining perceptual 
dominance as compared to OKN, which is confirmed by the data we report here (~65% overlap of 
report-based dominance with pupil-based dominance versus ~90% overlap with OKN-based 
dominance, Naber & Einhäuser, 2010). In sum, reflexes show effects of discrete overt report on 
rivalry: first, a possible miss of brief dominance durations; second, a direct effect of report on 
perception. Given this strong impact of report, it is likely that the commonly used discrete response 
mode (button presses) may shadow the gradual nature of rivalry. 
4.2.4 Experiment 4 – Continuous input device and piece-meal rivalry 
To directly test whether the subjective report has at least some access to the gradual process 
underlying rivalry, we asked the same eight observers to report their perceptual state, that is the 
“amount by which one percept is dominant”, by a continuous input device (an analog joystick) while 
being presented the same rivalrous stimulus as in experiment 3. To mimic the perceptual impression 
more closely, the simulated condition here implemented a wave-like transition rather than the abrupt 
change of experiment 3 (Figure 5A; details see Materials and Methods). The subjective report through 
97 
 
 
the joystick was very consistent with the objective OKN measure (Figure 5B), as reflected in the high 
peak cross-correlation between joystick deflection and OKN slow-phase velocity (simulated: 
r=0.81s± 0.03, rivalrous: r=0.70s± 0.03; Figure 5C). Observers even indicate intermediate states in 
which both percepts dominate equally by centering the joystick for a prolonged period (e.g., Figure 5B 
at around 15s and 45s). The joystick response lagged, however, considerably behind the OKN 
response, which is reflected in the time of peak in the cross correlation (simulated: 0.51s± 0.10s, 
rivalrous: 0.86s± 0.09s) as well as in the time between zero crossings of OKN velocity and joystick 
(simulated: 0.54s± 0.07s, rivalrous: 0.84s± 0.09s). 
 
Figure 4. Parameter settings and dominance durations. (A-D) Difference between dominance-duration histograms for 
real-rivalry and simulated-rivalry based on pupil data (experiment 2, panels A-C) or OKN data (experiment 3, panel D) for 
different widths of the smoothing window applied to the raw trace. For short smoothing windows an abundance of short 
dominance durations that go unreported by button-presses is observed. (E-F) Difference between dominance-duration 
histograms between report (active) and no-report (passive) trials based on OKN (experiment 3) and their dependence on the 
smoothing window (panel E) and sign change threshold (panel F). In real-rivalry trials there is no ground truth as to whether 
transitions - based on pupil and OKN - are veridically identified. However, for a wide range of smoothing parameters there is 
only a small or no difference in such pupil and OKN-based dominance durations and those obtained from the button presses. 
For short time windows on the smoothing filter of the reflexive measurements and low thresholds, however, we observe 
significantly shorter dominance durations based on reflexes than based on button presses for rivalrous and reported trials as 
compared to simulated and unreported trials, respectively. This possibly reflects the difficulty for short dominance durations 
to be reported (see text). These data leave us confident that pupil and OKN sign changes are a reliable indicator of transitions 
in rivalry and may provide access to short dominance durations that observers cannot consciously report. 
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This suggests that very brief dominance periods, which are potentially reflected in the reflexes, either 
do not reach awareness or fail to be reported. This could partially account for the difference between 
subjective and objective measures described above (Figure 3E; Figure 4E-F). Consistent with the 
interpretation of a lag between a low-level transition in percept and its availability to introspection, 
simulated transitions exhibit a significantly shorter lag between OKN and joystick than real transitions 
(peak cross-correlation: t(7)=3.96, p<0.01; time between OKN and joystick crossing: t(7)=2.54, 
p<0.05). Similarly, the peak correlation between OKN and joystick is significantly larger for simulated 
rivalry (t(15)=2.30, p<0.05; separated by switch direction). Unlike in experiment 3, the OKN 
transitions themselves were comparable between simulated and rivalrous trials (simulated: 31.8± 4.6 
deg/s
2
, rivalrous: 29.7± 4.5 deg/s
2
, t(7)=1.07, p>0.25; Figure 5D) as were the speed characteristics of 
the joystick (simulated: 65.2± 9.6 deg/s, rivalrous: 63.3± 9.7 deg/s, t(7)=0.64, p>0.50; Figure 5E). 
Joystick speed and OKN mean acceleration in a 0.2s time window around transitions were also 
correlated (mean r=0.65± 0.07, p<0.001). As such, there was no difference between simulated and real 
rivalry in the response measures, indicating that the simulation of the transition between percepts 
captured the perceptually relevant aspects of the real rivalry transition. Despite possible misses of 
rapid changes in awareness as shown in experiment 3, experiment 4 demonstrates that the gradual 
nature of rivalry transitions revealed by the objective measures (reflexes) grossly corresponds to the 
subjective percept. Hence, the seeming all-or-none nature is likely to be an artifact of the response 
mode. Interestingly, a wavelike transition between percepts offers a possible explanation for a 
considerable amount of the observed graduality. If this hypothesis holds true, this would suggest that 
rivalry is globally gradual, but local differences in perceptual dominance contribute to its graduality. 
Consequently, visual awareness would be gradual in time because of fragmentation in space. 
Irrespective of whether piecemeal rivalry is the cause, our data show graduality of rivalry in time, 
whose accessibility is influenced by response mode. 
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Figure 5. Experiment 4 – Piece-mealing and joystick report. (A) Example of piece-meal rivalry. Piece-meal rivalry 
consists of gradual transitions between percepts during which parts of both percepts are spatially intermixed. (B) OKN speed 
(notation as in Figure 2B) compared to joystick deflection (dashed black line) for a single rivalrous trial of a single observer. 
Joystick deflection was a good indicator of rivalry dynamics and delineated intermediate states. (C) Cross-correlation of 
OKN speed and joystick deflection (positive lags: OKN leading), mean and s.e.m over dominance durations; red: real rivalry, 
orange: simulated rivalry (piece-meal). Observers had longer latencies and lower peak correlations for rivalrous trials as 
compared to simulated rivalry trials. (D) OKN acceleration in a 0.2s time window around OKN zero-crossings, mean and 
s.e.m. across observers for simulated (left) and real rivalry (right). Unlike for the abrupt changes in experiment 2, OKN 
acceleration was not different from real rivalry trials for piece-meal simulation. (E) Joystick speed in a 0.2s time window 
around zero crossings of joystick position, mean and s.e.m. across observers for simulated (left) and real (right) rivalry.  
Speed of the joystick during a perceptual transition did not differ across conditions. 
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4.3 Discussion 
The time course of two reflexes – pupil dilation and OKN – points to a continuous process underlying 
rivalry. Subjective perception has access to this continuous process, though this access is substantially 
delayed and in turn influences rivalry dynamics. Our results have implications not only for current 
models of rivalry, but also for the debate as to whether visual awareness is globally all-or-none or a 
gradual phenomenon (e.g., Overgaard et al., 2006, Sergent & Dehaene, 2004). 
Remarkably, OKN and pupil dilation, which are typically thought of as reflexive behaviors to 
physical changes, depend on the percept rather than on the stimulus. These “reflexes” serve as rapid 
measures of the perceptual state and thus as an objective indicator of a seemingly subjective state: the 
awareness of either perceptual interpretation. Previous studies showed that the pupillary reflex is 
suppressed if contrast increments are presented in the suppressed percept (Brenner et al., 1969, Báràny 
& Halidén, 1948, Lowe & Ogle, 1966, Richards, 1966). We show, however, that the pupil size is 
continuously modulated as a function of dominance between incongruent luminance and contrast 
stimuli. We show that pupil size can be used as novel method to objectively measure both binocular 
and monocular rivalry. A recent study has suggested that monocular and binocular rivalry share 
common underlying mechanisms (O'Shea et al., 2009). In the present study, the increased pupil size 
modulation for binocular rivalry as compared to monocular rivalry could be a consequence of different 
luminance settings or different perceived luminance. It is, however, possible that both rivalry types 
generally differ in rivalry strength or exclusivity of dominance (Knapen et al., 2007a). Such 
differences could be related to the fact that during monocular rivalry only the patterns (color, 
luminance and orientation) rival, while patterns and eyes rival during binocular rivalry. Despite the 
quantitative difference in pupil size modulation, its robust occurrence in both rivalry types suggests 
that monocular and binocular rivalry share a similar mechanism driving pupil size. 
We have discovered several additional advantages of the utilization of reflexes during rivalry. 
Reflexes have a shorter latency than subjective report, and they avoid an influence on perception by 
the response mode itself. The influence of report on rivalry is consistent with the observation that 
report mode affects dominance durations (Beets et al., 2010, Wohlschläger, 2000). Here we show that 
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rivalry is slowed down when observers do not report the percept. Attentional factors may – at least in 
part – account for this effect as they have been found to strongly relate to rivalry dynamics. In 
particular, distracting observers with a dual-task during rivalry, slows down the rate of alternations 
(Alais et al., 2010b, Paffen et al., 2006). This result elegantly concurs to our finding that passive 
viewing of rivalry similarly slows down the rate of alternations. In agreement with the idea that 
attention is responsible for alternation rates in rivalry, a recent study demonstrated that the cortical 
thickness of the superior parietal lobe (SPL), a brain area anatomically close to parietal areas that get 
activated during both shifts in attention (Corbetta, Shulman, Miezin & Petersen, 1995, Yantis, 
Schwarzbach, Serences, Carlson, Steinmetz, Pekar & Courtney, 2002) and perceptual transitions in 
rivalry (Kleinschmidt, Büchel, Zeki & Frackowiak, 1998, Lumer et al., 1998), relates to individual 
differences in alternation rates in rivalry (Kanai et al., 2010). Furthermore, perceptual transitions are 
generally initiated at the most salient (Paffen et al., 2008, Stuit, Verstraten & Paffen, 2010b) or 
attended location (Paffen & Van der Stigchel, 2010). As such, our data suggest that deployment of 
attentional resources to the stimulus through active report of perception, increases the likelihood of 
transitions between interpretations of a stimulus, and thus increases switch rates during rivalry. 
The notion of rivalry as an “all-or-none” process probably dates back as early as Necker 
(1832) who described the transitions of his bi-stable cube as “sudden and involuntary” (p. 336). 
However, for the case of binocular rivalry, Wheatstone (1838) observed that “When complex pictures 
are employed in the stereoscope, various parts of them alternate differently” (§14). Our results imply 
that such fractionation of percepts (piece-meal rivalry, also see Leopold, Wilke, Maier & Logothetis, 
2005) may – at least in part – be responsible for the gradual transitions indicated by the reflexes. 
Recent evidence similarly indicated that fluctuations in the visual awareness of percepts during 
binocular rivalry are gradual because sensitivity to probes presented in the suppressed percept slowly 
rises as a function of time towards the next transition, and vice versa, sensitivity to probes in the 
dominant percept slowly declines over time as a perceptual transition gets more likely to occur (Alais 
et al., 2010a). In one experiment, these authors exclude piece-meal periods from analysis based on 
observer report. In the light of our present results, the reliability of such introspection-based analysis is 
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questionable. Specifically, latencies in responses (and awareness) might prevent observers from 
reporting piece-meal periods veridically. In addition, piece-meal rivalry can manifest itself either as 
discrete transitions or as different levels of perceptual fading, which challenges the dissociation 
between an all-or-none experience of rivalry and a gradual underlying adaptation process. Both effects 
can lead to a globally gradual impression of rivalry, although the former retains discreteness locally. In 
any case, our data show that rivalry is globally gradual over time and that piece-meal rivalry offers one 
possible explanation that is consistent with the data. We have chosen a sinusoidal simulation of piece-
meal rivalry to incorporate graduality of changes in dominance (for details see Methods). We observe 
similar joystick reports in simulated and real rivalry with these settings, which indicates that the 
simulation was realistic. Nonetheless, studying which simulation parameters reflect the most “natural” 
perceptual transitions and how they affect the reflexes could quantify the contribution of piece-
mealing to graduality further and remain interesting issues for future research. 
Neuronal explanations of rivalry generally describe that distinct pools of neurons encode 
percepts separately and inhibit each other reciprocally (e.g., Klink, van Ee, Nijs, Brouwer, Noest & 
van Wezel, 2008a, Lehky, 1988, Sugie, 1982). Adaptation of neurons in the dominant pool eventually 
leads to a decrease in inhibition and thus to a transition in dominance towards the previously inhibited 
and rivaling pool. Our data do not directly contradict this notion or constrain the role of inhibitory 
connections, but they point in the direction that spatiotemporal adaptation, a process also subject to 
interocular grouping (e.g., Kovács et al., 1996, Lee & Blake, 2004), may play a role in the graduality 
of rivalry dynamics. The fractionation of percepts has been linked to representations in early visual 
areas because the size of fractions during piece-meal rivalry changed with eccentricity congruently 
with the human cortical magnification in these areas (Blake et al., 1992). This relation with cortical 
magnification in early visual areas has been argued to be at least partially responsible for visual field 
anisotropies in visual awareness in a variety of phenomena (Naber, Carter & Verstraten, 2009). Recent 
studies also demonstrated that brain activity in V1 is highly correlated with transitions in visual 
awareness (Lee et al., 2005, Lee et al., 2007, Lee & Blake, 2002). It is thus not unlikely that the 
gradual nature of visual awareness has its roots in spatiotemporal mechanisms controlled by early 
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visual areas. Even if the loci of rivalry representations would be known, a different question remains 
as to which processes are responsible for the (gradual) transition as such. One study argues that high-
level fronto-parietal areas produce activity related to the initiation of perceptual transitions (Lumer et 
al., 1998) but does not find evidence for whether this activity precedes and thus triggers changes in 
awareness. A recent study does find a causal relationship between parietal areas and perceptual 
alternations by disrupting activity with transcranial magnetic stimulation and measuring alternation 
rates during rivalry (Kanai et al., 2010). It is still, however, uncertain whether the application of TMS 
to parietal areas disrupts the ability to report perceptual transitions or disrupts the actual initiation of 
an alternation. Nonetheless, the initiation of changes in awareness by higher-order areas could be well 
reflected in the observed pupil dilation around a transition, and may have its roots in processes related 
to decision making (Einhäuser et al., 2010, Einhäuser et al., 2008b), motor planning (Hupé et al., 
2009), or attention allocation (Daniels et al., 2009). On the other hand, activity in later areas might be 
a net result of activity fluctuations related to dominance in rivalry processed by low-level visual areas. 
Indeed, we find that – the presumably low-level controlled – reflexes have much shorter latencies than 
high-level subjective report as a response to perceptual transitions. We now can – with the use of 
reflexes – objectively examine whether high-level effects are a result of or a cause for changes in 
awareness during rivalry (Leopold & Logothetis, 1999). 
4.4 Conclusions 
Reflexes reveal that rivalry is a gradual process, its dynamics are affected by the response mode, and 
fast changes in dominance can slip away unnoticed (or unreported) by observers. Consequently, 
reflexes allow access to earlier (subconscious) levels of perception, which are unavailable to 
awareness, and thus stress the limits of relying on introspection alone.   
104 
 
 
4.5 Materials and Methods 
4.5.1 Observers 
Ten observers (age: 19-48, seven female, three male) participated in experiment 1, eight observers 
(age: 19-48, six female, two male) in experiment 2, and another group of eight observers (age: 19-28, 
five female, three male) in experiment 3 and 4. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were 
naïve to the purpose of the studies, and gave informed written consent before each experiment. The 
experiments conformed to National Guidelines for psychological experiments as laid down in the 
Ethics Regulations of the German Psychological Society and to the ethical principles laid down in the 
Declaration of Helsinki. 
4.5.2 Apparatus 
Binocular stimuli were presented on 21 inch Samsung Syncmaster CRT screens at a viewing distance 
of 30 cm. Monocular stimuli were presented on a 21 inch EIZO Flexscan CRT screen at a viewing 
distance of 70 cm. The display refresh rate of all screens was 85 Hz and the resolution was either 
1152x864 pixels (experiment 1 and 2) or 1280x1024 (experiments 3 and 4). Screens were gamma 
corrected, achieving a linear mapping of pixel values to stimulus luminance. Each colored grating used 
a single gun of the monitor, whose CIE color space coordinates (x,y) were (0.623, 0.344), (0.287, 
0.609), and (0.151, 0.065) for the red, green, and blue gun, respectively. Stimuli were generated on an 
Optiplex 755 DELL computer, using Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA) and the Psychophysics toolbox 
(Brainard, 1997, Pelli, 1997) and EyeLink toolbox (Cornelissen, Peters & Palmer, 2002) extensions. 
Binocular stimuli were dichoptically presented with two monitors by projecting them with a mirror 
stereoscope to each eye separately. Mirrors were transparent for infra-red light (i.e., cold mirrors), 
allowing an infrared sensitive camera (EyeLink 2000, SR Research, Osgoode, ON, Canada), 
positioned behind the mirrors, to track both pupil sizes and direction of gaze at a rate of 500 Hz. 
Monocular stimuli were presented with a single screen and observers looked through a transparent 
mirror that reflected infrared light (i.e., a hot mirror) from the eyes to the eye-tracking camera (Eyelink 
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“Tower Mount”) that recorded at 1000 Hz. In all experiments, the observers‟ head was supported by a 
chin- and forehead-rest. In all pupil experiments, observers fixated a fixation dot (0.8° diameter) 
centered over the stimulus. The eye-tracker was (re)calibrated before each experiment and after each 
break (see procedure).  
4.5.3 Stimuli and Procedure – Experiment 1 
Three different stimulus sets were used in four separate sub-experiments, conducted on separate days. 
The first stimulus set consisted of sinusoidal gratings with a spatial frequency of 2 cycles per degree 
and opposing orientations (i.e., -60° and +60°), one grating colored red and the other green (Figure 
1A). The red grating‟s luminance ranged from 0.011 cd/m2 to 18.5 cd/m2. The green grating‟s 
luminance varied across trials (21.1, 33.5, 47.0, or 60.4 cd/m
2
). Binocular rivalry was induced by 
presenting both red and green grating separately to each eye. Gratings were presented in a gray (33.5 
cd/m
2
) annulus of 10 degree diameter. The whole stimulus was framed by a 2° wide rectangular bar 
consisting of a high spatial frequency noise pattern, to ensure a steady binocular fusion of the 
backgrounds. Stimulus‟ orientation, color, and presentation to the corresponding eyes were 
randomized during each experiment. 
The second stimulus set similarly consisted of sinusoidal gratings but instead of luminance, 
contrast was varied across trials. The red grating had a Michelson contrast of 0.6 with a maximum 
luminance of 11.2 cd/m
2. The green grating‟s contrast was varied, having either one of four Michelson 
contrasts of 0.1, 0.4, 0.7, or 1.0, corresponding to a minimum-maximum luminance of 30.2-36.9, 20.1-
47.0, 10.1-57.0, or 0-67.1 cd/m
2
, respectively.  
The third stimulus set consisted of overlapping sinusoidal gratings with a spatial frequency of 
1 cycle per degree. These stimuli induced a form of monocular rivalry during which the visibility of 
each grating fluctuated over time. These fluctuations consisted of one grating being more visible (i.e., 
a higher perceived luminance) than the other until its perceived luminance decreased while the other 
grating‟s luminance increased. Similar to the first stimulus set, luminance of the green grating was 
varied across trials. The red grating had maximum luminance of 5.7cd/m
2. The green grating‟s 
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luminance was varied across 4 levels, 16.9cd/m
2
, 19.4cd/m
2
, 21.8cd/m
2
, or 24.2cd/m
2
. In contrast to 
the first and second stimulus set, the overlapping gratings were presented monoptically without the 
mirror stereoscope.  
Each of the four possible grating pairs was presented four times per sub-experiment, resulting 
in a total of 16 trials (4x4). A single trial lasted 120 seconds and was followed by a 20 second break. 
During each trial, observers viewed the stimuli and indicated the dominant percept with two buttons. 
As dominance of each percept fluctuated, intermediate states occurred in which both percepts were 
equally dominant. Nonetheless, observers were instructed to always indicate one (i.e., the most 
dominant) percept as dominant. After 8 trials, observers were allowed to take a 5 minute break.  
4.5.4 Stimuli and Procedure – Experiment 2 
In experiment 2, all stimulus aspects were identical to experiment 1, except that only the stimuli, for 
which the green grating was most distinct from the red grating, were used: binocular green grating 
luminance of 60.4 cd/m
2
, binocular green grating contrast of 1.0, and monocular green grating 
luminance of 24.2cd/m
2
. For each of the 3 conditions (binocular luminance, binocular contrast, 
monocular), observers conducted 4 trials of 3 minutes each. Two of these trials were real-rivalry trials 
as in experiment 1, two were simulated-rivarly trials, in which alternations in dominance were 
simulated by switching the presentation of each stimulus (i.e., the red or green grating) per dominance 
duration. Distribution of dominance durations in each simulated-rivalry trial was based on the report 
of the preceding real-rivalry trial.  
4.5.5 Stimuli and Procedure – Experiments 3 and 4 
In experiment 3 and 4, a large (height: 50.6 deg, width: 37.1 deg) drifting sinusoidal grating (0.15 
cycles/deg) was presented to each eye, one dark and red (peak luminance 17.4 cd/m²), the other light 
and green (68.2 cd/m²) on a dark background (<0.01 cd/m²). Both gratings were moving in opposite 
lateral directions (left and right) at a speed of 6.7 deg/s. 
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In experiment 3, we simulated rivalry by presenting the same stimulus to both eyes and 
physically switched colors and drifting directions simultaneously. Statistics of dominance durations 
were matched to the preceding real rivalrous trial. In experiment 4, the perceptual transition was 
simulated as a smooth transition through a state of piece-meal rivalry. The previously invisible 
stimulus became visible by spatially moving it over the dominant stimulus from one side to the other. 
During a simulated transition, complementary parts of both stimuli were thus visible simultaneously 
but divided by a vertical border at which both stimuli transparently overlapped (width: 14 degrees). 
The transitions followed a sinusoidal movement pattern with half periods (i.e., dominance duration) of 
either a fraction of 0.8 or 1.2 of the median dominance duration from the preceding rivalrous trial.  
Experiments 3 and 4 consisted of 4 conditions, which differed in presentation condition (real 
rivalrous versus simulated rivalry) and response mode (active versus passive) and were repeated twice 
(8 trials per experiment). In active report, observers were either instructed to indicate the dominant 
percept by holding down the arrow key on a keyboard (experiment 3) or by deflecting a joystick 
(experiment 4). They were told to release buttons or keep the joystick in a middle position when no 
percept was dominant. During passive trials, observers were instructed to just watch the stimulus. 
Trials lasted 5 minutes and were followed by short breaks. 
4.5.6 Analysis 
In all binocular experiments the pupil sizes of both eyes were highly correlated (r>0.99 in all cases) as 
was the OKN in experiment 3 and 4 (r>0.98), such that only the right eye was used for analysis in all 
cases. Pupil size was based on its diameter as recorded by the Eyelink tracker system. Eye-position 
and pupil size were interpolated with a cubic spline fit during periods in which observers blinked their 
eyes. For analyzing how the pupil size developed around a perceptual transition (Figure 1C-K), pupil 
size was normalized to z-scores per trials (i.e., trial mean subtracted and divided by standard 
deviation). Horizontal eye velocity as function of time is given by the derivative of the eye‟s raw 
horizontal position. To obtain the slow phase of the OKN, multiple thresholds were applied to the 
absolute values of convolution filtered (square smoothing window of 0.1s width) velocity traces (>.5 
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deg/s), acceleration (>.1 deg/s
2
), and the derivative of acceleration (>.01 deg/s
3
) of the horizontal eye 
position signal to remove all fast phases from the OKN speed trace (Figure 3B, slow phases). The zero 
crossing points of the OKN‟s slow phase component velocity were assumed to be objectively defined 
perceptual transitions. The obtained OKN zero crossings points were filtered for random noise in 
OKN speed. If crossing points were preceded by a relatively low maximum or minimum (i.e., those 
extremes were between a "sign-change threshold" of 1.6 or -1.6deg/s), they were assumed to be a 
result of intermediate percepts and removed from the analysis of transition speeds. Mean velocity of 
the OKN was calculated per slow phase and smoothed using a sliding square window of 0.1 seconds 
width. Dominance durations were calculated from either the button presses, joystick deflection 
baseline crossings, or from distance between the unfiltered (i.e., no removals because of low preceding 
extremes) zero crossing points of the OKN. For rivalrous trials, the latency of responses of both the 
button presses and joystick deflections as compared to the OKN were based on the median time 
between a button press or joystick crossing and the preceding OKN crossing that indicated perceptual 
transitions. For simulated trials, the latency of the button presses, joystick crossing, pupil or OKN sign 
changes were based on the median time from a simulated transition. If the latency was longer than 2 
seconds, it was assumed to be a missed transition and was therefore removed from analysis.  
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4.8 Supporting Information 
 
Figure S1. Pupil size during rivalry in a normalized time frame. (A-C) Normalized mean and transparent s.e.m. pupil size 
(z-score) as a function of relative time between perceptual transitions per dominant percept for each stimulus set. The time 
axis was normalized to unit length between transitions by re-sampling all pupil traces per dominance duration (3000 samples) 
before averaging (details see Alais et al., 2010a, Einhäuser et al., 2004). For the red trace the transition from high luminance 
to low luminance percept thus happens at time 0 and back at time 1, while the reverse holds for the green trace. In this 
periodic time frame time, 1 for the red trace corresponds to time 0 for the green trace and vice versa. The pupil increased or 
decreased in size when the dominant percept was low or high in luminance or contrast, respectively. (D-F) Mean differences 
in pupil size traces between the percepts as a function of relative time between perceptual transitions. Grey values of traces 
indicate the level of luminance or contrast of one of the gratings (the other rivaling grating had a fixed intermediate level of 
luminance or contrast). The degree of pupil size modulation to the luminance or contrast of the dominant percept depended 
on the difference in luminance or contrast between the rivaling percepts. Thick patches at the top indicate when traces are 
significantly (p<0.05) different from each other (panels A-C) or from 0 (panels D-F). 
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Abstract 
Object-based attention facilitates the processing of features that form the object. Two hypotheses are 
conceivable for how object-based attention is deployed to an object‟s features: first, the object is 
attended by selecting its features; alternatively, a configuration of features as such is attended by 
selecting the object representation they form. Only for the latter alternative, the perception of a feature 
configuration as entity (“objecthood”) is a necessary condition for object-based attention. 
Disentangling the two alternatives requires the comparison of identical feature configurations that 
induce the perception of an object in one condition (“bound”) and do not do so in another condition 
(“unbound”). We used an ambiguous stimulus, whose percept spontaneously switches between bound 
and unbound, while the stimulus itself remains unchanged. We tested discrimination on the boundary 
of the diamond as well as detection of probes inside and outside the diamond. We found 
discrimination performance to be increased if features were perceptually bound into an object. 
Furthermore, detection performance was higher within - and lower outside the bound object as 
compared to the unbound configuration. Consequently, the facilitation of processing by object-based 
attention requires objecthood; that is, a unified internal representation of an “object” – not a mere 
collection of features. 
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5.1 Introduction 
The question: “what is an object?” has attracted widespread interest. Two main views on how objects 
are formed exist: a "bottom-up" local processing of Gestalt cues and a more traditional Gestalt "top-
down" global organization (e.g., Treisman & Gelade, 1980). The bottom-up approach suggests that the 
brain uses specific Gestalt cues (Brunswik & Kamiva, 1953) to form a holistic object representation 
from a constellation of parts. From this point of view, the representation of an object is formed if the 
right combination and lay-out of features is chosen. The top-down approach proposes that something 
becomes an object after a higher level representation is formed (e.g., Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 
1992). Specific combinations of features may activate such a representation, but the representation 
itself is needed to bind features into a single object. These views are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, 
more recent findings suggest that both, early-feature integration and higher stages, play a crucial role 
in the processing of objects (e.g., Altmann, Bülthoff, & Kourtzi, 2003; Kourtzi, Tolias, Altmann, 
Augath, & Logothetis, 2003). Nonetheless, experimental studies have not yet fully disentangled effects 
of object representations from feature configurations. These disparate views on object integration call 
for resolution. Does attention manifest itself along feature configurations or is it deployed to objects 
(e.g., Crundall, Dewhurst, & Underwood, 2008; Houtkamp, Spekreijse, & Roelfsema, 2003; 
Roelfsema, Houtkamp, & Korjoukov, 2010)?  
How can effects of objects be disentangled from the features they are made of? In the realm of 
attention, the question how objects guide attention allocation has been the topic of many studies (e.g., 
Duncan, 1984; Kahneman et al., 1992; Watson & Kramer, 1999). Evidence in favor of object-based 
attention mainly demonstrates a benefit for responses when attention has to switch within a single 
object opposing to between multiple objects (e.g., Egly, Driver, & Rafal, 1994; Moore, Yantis, & 
Vaughan, 1998). Several other paradigms, including inattentional blindness (Moore & Egeth, 1997) 
and visual search (Enns & Rensink, 1991), are similarly affected by object-based effects. In principle 
such results could still be linked to feature constellations, rather than being specific to "objecthood". 
Even if features are bound to objects pre-attentively, a subjective impression of objecthood might or 
might not be required for "object-based" benefits. The notion of object-based attention has therefore 
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been challenged. In addition the lack of a precise definition of an "object" (Scholl, 2001) makes 
studying objects independent of the constituting features challenging. This definition problem has 
thwarted a sequence of studies from making solid statements about how attention is allocated to 
objects and what underlies object-based attention effect. Studies that evaluated performance 
facilitation of attending to an “object”, have thus experienced difficulty with the disentanglement of 
features cues that constitute the object and the cognitive concept and representation of an „object‟. 
Indeed, subjective formations of objects are highly associated with, and arguably defined by, feature 
cues (i.e., Gestalt) like contour and form. Several attempts have been made to circumvent this 
problem: studies have avoided crafting objects with stimulus manipulations, but instead control an 
observers‟ perceptual interpretation of features as an object (e.g., Baylis & Driver, 1993). However, 
eventually all reported attentional object-based benefits could be explained by specific features such as 
contour (Gibson, 1994), closure (Marino & Scholl, 2005), line collinearity (Avrahami, 1999; Crundall, 
Cole, and Galpin, 2007; Kimchi, Yeshurun, & Cohen-Savransky, 2007), and other Gestalt-like 
principles (Feldman, 2007). These studies opened up the possibility that cues such as figure-ground 
organization, closure, and collinearity facilitate performance and underlie the within-object advantage. 
From this point of view, it may be that a collection of organized stimulus features instead of a unique 
object representation is what derives “object-based” benefits.  
Ambiguous stimuli can disentangle the subjective impression of objecthood from the physical 
constellation of object features. Using fMRI, Murray, Kersten, Olshausen, Schrater, and Woods 
(2002) demonstrated that ambiguous stimuli are useful as a tool for studying object processing in the 
absence of confounding effects related to feature constellations (see also Andrews, Schluppeck, 
Homfray, Matthews, & Blakemore, 2002; Fang, Kersten, & Murray, 2008). The stimulus they used 
was an ambiguously moving diamond which induces two interpretations: either a bound percept of a 
single object or an unbound percept of multiple objects (Lorenceau & Shiffrar, 1992). The diamond‟s 
configuration can lead to the percept (i.e., a subjective impression) of a single diamond moving 
sideways behind three bars (Figure 1a), or as multiple apertures that independently move up and down 
(Figure 1b), while the stimulus is kept constant. Independent of physical changes, attention may be 
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either spatially divided over the four apertures of the ambiguous diamond or allocated to the object as 
a whole. The ambiguous diamond is an ideal tool to address the issue whether object-based attention 
effects are still present if the perceptual differentiation between objects is only caused by an internal 
subjective interpretation. Thus, by using this ambiguous stimulus, the problem of defining an object is 
removed because the observers‟ internal percept defines the objects, and, in contrast to Baylis and 
Driver‟s design (1993), the attended objects will always constitute of exactly the same physical 
properties. 
In the present study, we use the ambiguous diamond to test whether a single or multi-object 
percept has an effect on discrimination and detection performance. In other words, we address the 
question as to whether the perceptual integration (i.e., binding) of the independent moving apertures 
into a single object (i.e., a diamond) will facilitate its processing. We will show that subjective 
impression of a single bound object improves observers‟ performance in both discriminating and 
detecting physical changes of the object as compared to the situation in which the percept constitutes 
of multiple unbound (i.e., non-integrated) objects. We further will show that the processing on an 
object itself gets facilitated while processing on regions outside the object get suppressed. Our 
experimental results are strong evidence for the notion that gestalt cues are not solely responsible for 
object-based effects and that the formation of a unique representation of an object is sufficient to 
enable attention to be allocated to an object. 
 
  
122 
 
 
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Observers 
Author M.N. and 9 naïve observers (4 male and 6 female students in the age range of 20-30) 
participated in each experiment. In each experiment, two observers were excluded from analysis for 
reasons provided below. Data of both experiments were therefore based on 8 observers. Observers had 
normal or corrected to normal vision. Each observer gave written informed consent before 
participation; all procedures adhered to national standards on experiments with human observers and 
with the Declaration of Helsinki.  
5.2.2 Stimuli 
The stimulus used in both experiments was a 10 deg wide square rotated 45 deg (i.e., a diamond) 
moving sideways behind three vertical bars (see Movie 1 in supplementary materials). The movement 
of the diamond induces an ambiguous perceptual state consisting of either a percept of a single object 
oscillating side to side horizontally (Figure 1a) or multiple apertures moving up and down (Figure 1b). 
As differentiation between the two percepts includes the process of binding features into an object, we 
will refer to the single-object percept as bound and the multi-object percept as unbound. The visibility 
(i.e., dominance) of these percepts alternates over time, each percept being dominant for several 
seconds until the other percept takes over. To induce ambiguity, the diamond had a 1 deg sinusoidal 
movement pattern between outer left and right borders of the occluding bars. These bars ensured the 
invisibility of the diamond‟s corners, an essential property for the stimulus‟ ambiguity. A 0.1 deg wide 
fixation dot was presented on the center of the screen. Mean luminance of the stimulus was 33.9 
cd/m
2
. 
5.2.3 Apparatus 
Stimuli were generated using Matlab (Mathworks. Natick, MA) with Psychophysics toolbox 
(Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). Stimuli were presented by an Optiplex Dell computer and a 21 inch 
EIZO Flexscan monitor on a black background with 1152 x 864 pixels at 100Hz refresh rate. Head 
position was stabilized using a chin and forehead rest that assured a steady viewing distance of 73 cm. 
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Figure 1. Stimuli. The ambiguous moving diamond induces two distinct percepts (colors and arrows are for visualization 
only and not present in the actual stimulus): (a) a single bound object (green surface and arrows) coherently moving sideways 
or (b) multiple unbound objects (red arrows) making oscillating movements up and down. To experience the perceptual 
ambiguity induced by this stimulus, see movies in supplementary materials: movie 1 for the ambiguous stimulus, movie 2 for 
disambiguation by luminance changes (c). Procedure during discrimination Experiment 1: Observers indicated the dominant 
percept, 2000-4000 ms later two apertures were briefly changed to either a dashed and/or dotted line, and the probes were 
masked by random noise pattern after 20-120 ms (the SOA depended on the observers‟ performance threshold). Probes were 
either different (i.e., one dashed and the other dotted) or the same (i.e., both dashed or both dotted). (d) Procedure during 
detection Experiment 2: Observers continuously indicated the dominant percept, and every 2000-4000 ms a small probe was 
presented for 20-120 ms inside or outside the diamond. Black and white values in this figure are inversed, that is, the 
background and fixation dot were actually black and the diamond lines were white during the experiment. 
 
5.2.4 Procedure 
Observers performed two experiments on separate days. Experiments consisted either of a 
discrimination (Figure 1c) or detection task (Figure 1d) in which the performance during both the 
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bound and unbound percept was measured. Observers were familiarized with the stimulus and setup 
before the actual experiment. During the experiment, observers had to fixate and indicate the dominant 
percept by holding down one of two buttons. 
5.2.5 Experiment 1 - discrimination  
The first experiment was designed to test whether perceptual binding of multiple apertures (i.e., the 
diamond‟s borders) into a single object facilitated discrimination performance. In each trial of 
Experiment 1, between 2 and 4 seconds after observers started reporting their percept, two adjacent 
borders of the diamond were briefly (see below for timing) changed to either a dotted and/or dashed 
pattern (Figure 1c). This probe was followed by a random noise mask to prevent image after-effects. 
After mask onset, observers stopped reporting their dominant percept and indicated using two buttons 
whether both borders were the same (i.e., both dotted or both dashed) or different (i.e., one dotted and 
the other dashed). Observers were allowed to take all the time they needed to make their decision. The 
next trial only started after the observer‟s response and an experiment consisted of a total of 300 trials.  
5.2.6 Experiment 2 - detection 
In the second experiment we tested whether detection performance in and around the objects was 
modulated by perceptual binding. Observers were briefly presented (20ms) with 0.1 deg wide Gabor 
shaped probes in and around the diamond while they – at the same time – reported their dominant 
percept (Figure 1d). Every time observers had detected a probe, they reported this with an additional 
button. A total number of 1200 probes were shown during the experiment. The time between probe 
onsets was 2 to 4 seconds and probes could be shown anywhere in, and around the stimulus within an 
annulus shaped region with an inner and outer radius of 5 and 15 deg, respectively. Trials in which 
reaction times were faster than 200ms or slower than 2000ms were excluded from analysis (0.7% of 
all trials). 
5.2.7 Individual adjustment of perceptual dominance 
Since perceptual dominance can vary over the course of the experiment and is influenced by 
interruptions of stimulus presentation (e.g., Orbach, Ehrlich, & Vainstein, 1963), and biases in 
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dominance (i.e., one percept is preferred over the other) could in principle be directly related to 
detection or discrimination performance, we aimed at about equal probability in dominance for both 
percepts (i.e., bound & unbound). This perceptual balance was created by altering the luminance of the 
occluding bars: A higher luminance biases dominance towards the bound percept, and a lower 
luminance towards the unbound percept (see Movie 2 in supplementary materials that demonstrates 
that dominance of the percept depends on the luminance of the occluding bars). We adjusted this 
luminance for each observer in a short experiment preceding each of the main experiments. For 5 
minutes observers only indicated the dominant percept and a QUEST procedure (Watson & Pelli, 
1983) resulted in a luminance value for the occluding bars at which the observer‟s perceptual 
dominance between the percepts was balanced. The luminance corresponding to equality spanned a 
wide range across observers, ranging from 0.11 to 6.77 cd/m
2
 (Median: 0.40 cd/m
2
). In the test 
preceding experiment 1, two observers showed a substantial bias in dominance towards the unbound 
interpretation (73% and 80% dominance) and were thus removed from analysis. In the test preceding 
experiment 2, one observer failed to balance both percepts (70% dominance for unbound) and was 
excluded from analysis.  
5.2.8 Individual adjustment of performance 
We prevented floor and ceiling effects in discrimination and detection performance by having 
observers perform a 5-minute version of the main experiment in which a QUEST procedure searched 
for the 75% correct performance threshold. Discrimination performance was adjusted by varying the 
time between probe and mask onset (Stimulus Onset Asynchrony, SOA): shortening the SOA resulted 
in a performance decrease. The mean SOA over all observers for a 75% performance was 63ms (SD: 
34ms). Detection performance was manipulated by adjusting the probe luminance: lowering 
luminance resulted in a decrease in performance (Mean: 0.65, SD: 0.08).  
To make sure that observers did not exchange response buttons, and stayed actively involved with 
the task, we added catch trials in each experiment. During these trials the occluding bars suddenly 
changed to white (luminance: 33.9 cd/m
2
), where it was expected that the observer would always 
report the bound percept. One observer did not report this bound percept in 3 out of 4 cases in 
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Experiment 2, which indicates that this observer might have accidentally switched buttons. This 
observer was excluded from the analysis of experiment 2. 
5.2.9 Analysis 
First we computed performance (number of trials in which probes were correctly discriminated or 
detected divided by the total number of trials) and dominance (number of trials in which a percept was 
dominant at the time of probe onset divided by the total number of trials). For both experiments, trials 
in which no percept was reported were excluded from analysis. Differences in performance between 
conditions were evaluated and statistically tested using paired t-tests. 
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5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Experiment 1 – Object Border Discrimination 
We first examined how observers‟ subjective impressions of the ambiguous diamond affected 
dominance and discrimination performance. The analysis showed that discrimination performance 
depended significantly on whether the bound or unbound percept was dominant at the moment of 
probe onset (Figure 2a). Observers performed significantly better at discriminating features across the 
stimulus for the bound percept as compared to the unbound percept (Difference: 5%; 
t(7) = 3.98, p < 0.01). Dominance of both percepts was balanced well across observers (mean 
unbound: 54%, SD: 9%; t(7)=1.20, p > 0.25). Response times were not significantly different between 
percepts (mean bound: 1.64s, SD: 0.43; mean unbound: 1.59s, SD: 0.38s; t(7) = 1.55, p > 0.10). 
Although there was an overall selection bias of same over different probes (t(7)=6.08, p < 0.001), we 
found no further response biases between the percepts (t(7)=0.58, p > 0.50). In conclusion, the results 
of Experiment 1 clearly indicate that discrimination performance is better during the bound percept 
than during the unbound percept.  
 
Figure 2. Performance in Experiment 1. Mean and standard errors of discrimination performance per percept. Discrimination 
performance was significantly better for the bound percept as compared to the unbound percept. 
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5.3.2 Experiment 2 – Object Area Detection 
 
Figure 3. Performance in Experiment 2. (a) Mean and standard errors of normalized performance (mean performance was 
subtracted per subject) per percept and per presented probe location of either inside or outside the diamond, and 
(b) difference in detection performance between bound and unbound condition separately for probes presented either inside 
or outside the diamond. Detection performance was higher inside the diamond as compared to outside the diamond during the 
bound percept. Detection performance was worse inside the diamond as compared to outside the diamond during the 
unbound percept. 
 
In the second experiment, we tested how subjective impressions of the stimulus affected detection 
rather than discrimination performance. Specifically, we examined whether there were differences in 
detection performance between the bound and unbound percept, and whether this depended on the 
location of the presented probes (i.e., inside or outside the diamond). Detection performance during 
the bound percept was higher for probes presented inside the diamond as compared to outside the 
diamond (Figure 3a; t(7) = 8.98, p < 0.001). Vice versa, detection performance during the unbound 
percept was lower for probes presented inside the diamond as compared to outside the diamond 
(t(7) = 7.50, p < 0.001). Compared to the unbound percept, detection performance during the bound 
percept was higher and lower for probes presented inside and outside the diamond, respectively 
(Figure 3b; Difference: 5%; t(7) = 3.63, p < 0.01). There was no significant difference in dominance 
between the bound and unbound percept (t(7) = 2.14, p > 0.05). Independent of the probe location, 
there was no significant difference in performance between the bound and unbound percept 
(t(7) = 1.38, p > 0.05). Similarly, there were neither significant differences in reaction times between 
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percepts (mean bound: 0.49s, SD: 0.05; mean unbound: 0.49s, SD: 0.05s; t(7) = 0.09, p > 0.75), nor 
between locations (inside-bound versus outside-unbound: t(7) = 0.31, p > 0.75; outside-bound versus 
inside-unbound: t(7) = 1.03, p > 0.25). In summary, Experiment 2 showed that detection performance 
increased inside the object as compared to outside the object during the bound percept; and that the 
opposite pattern was observed for the unbound percept.  
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5.4 Discussion 
We have examined how the subjective impression of binding feature elements into an object 
influences discrimination and detection performance. With the ambiguous stimulus we could 
distinguish between an observers‟ impression of a bound single-object percept and an unbound 
multi-object percept without change to the physical stimulus. We demonstrate that the bound percept 
facilitates discrimination and detection performance at and within an object‟s borders. Our results 
extend the findings by Baylis and Driver‟s (1993) by excluding the potential confound of differences 
in gestalt cues in the physical stimulus. Since our design neither included stimulus manipulations nor 
differences in cue constellations between the percepts, our findings show strong support for the notion 
that object-based benefits are a result of a higher-order internal representation of an object. Thus, 
“objecthood” is not simply a collection of specific rules or features, but a unique representational 
entity that confers the benefits of object based attention. 
The facilitation of processing inside the object relative to the outside in the bound condition 
finds its straightforward interpretation in the concept of object-based attention: Attentional resources 
are allocated to the object through the object‟s borders and inner body, and irrelevant areas around the 
object are suppressed. Such an interpretation is in line with physiological findings that show that 
neurons with receptive fields within an object have enhanced activity (Lamme, Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 
& Spekreijse, 1999). There are several indications that such grouping-related dynamics in activity are 
controlled by recurrent processes (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000; Roelfsema, 2006). 
Besides the facilitation of the region within the object and suppression outside the object in the 
bound condition, we observed suppression inside and facilitation outside in the unbound condition. 
Several explanations are conceivable for this reversal. First, it is possible that during the bound 
condition the object representation adapts and object-based attention is also subject to adaptation. In 
this view, poorer processing in the inside during the unbound percept is a consequence of this 
adaptation. If all the reversals were due to adaptation, both inside and outside performance should 
approach equality over time, for which we find no robust evidence (data not shown). Nonetheless, as 
adaptation likely contributes to rivalry as such (Alais, Cass, O‟Shea, & Blake, 2010), an effect cannot 
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be excluded. A second explanation would be a phenomenon related or similar to crowding (Bouma, 
1970). In the unbound situation there are more items around the inside probe that could interfere with 
detection (4 apertures instead of one object). The outside would be affected less, since fewer items (1 
or 2) are in the immediate vicinity. A third explanation uses the spatial distribution of attention around 
an attended item. The localization of attention is often assumed to consist of a facilitatory central 
region with an inhibitory surround (Tsotsos, Culhane, Wai, Lai, Davis & Nuflo, 1995; Bahcall & 
Kowler, 1999; Mounts, 2000a, b; Cutzu & Tsotsos, 2003; Carlson, 2007; Scalf & Beck, 2010; Hopf, 
Boehler, Luck, Tsotsos, Heinze, & Schoenfeld, 2006). Similar to the bound situation, in which the 
outside of the object is suppressed and the inside facilitated, in the unbound condition, the individual 
items (apertures) are facilitated and their surround is suppressed. Quantitative predictions will depend 
on a large set of parameters, including width of center and surround, dynamics of attention and the 
interaction between suppressive and facilitating regions. Nonetheless, it is conceivable that non-linear 
interaction between suppressive zones of individually attended apertures inside the diamond yield a 
net-suppression; while outside the diamond, the suppressive zones are more separated, do interact less, 
and facilitation remains dominant on average. We consider it likely that all 3 explanations - adaptation, 
a phenomenon akin to crowding, and the spatial distribution of attention - in part contribute to the 
observed effect. Disentangling them in future research will foster our understanding of object-based 
attention. 
Desimone and Duncan (1995) have argued that objects compete for limited processing 
capacity and that competition can be biased by top-down mechanisms that select relevant objects. In 
the context of the present results it is possible that the competition between independent unbound 
objects decreases the processing accuracy of these objects in general. When these objects are grouped 
or “bound”, competition disappears and processing for all bound components is facilitated. Another 
explanation can be extracted from the view that object-based attention is a form of an object-guided 
spatial attention mechanism (Davis, Driver, Pavani, & Shepherd, 2000; Martínez, Teder-Salejarvi, & 
Hillyard, 2007; Roelfsema, Stanisor, & Wannig, 2010; Weber, Kramer, & Miller, 1997). The grouping 
of independent parts or attributes as one object makes attention automatically spread evenly over the 
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entire object (e.g., Kahneman & Henik, 1981; He & Nakayama, 1995). As many studies have 
presented evidence for the existence of activity patterns closely tied to such object processing in 
relatively high cortical areas (e.g., Cusack, 2005; Cusack, Mitchell, & Duncan, 2010; Shafritz, Gore, 
Marois, 2002), it is tempting to suggest that a top-down cortical mechanisms is required for the 
perception and recognition of an object (e.g., Grill-Spector, Kourtzi, & Kanwisher, 2001) and 
subsequent attention allocation (O‟Craven, Downing, & Kanwisher, 1999). In the light of our results, 
such a top-down mechanism does not rely on bottom-up feature constellations, but can operate solely 
on the basis of high-level representations. 
In conclusion, with our stimulus and design we addressed the problems inherent in the definition 
of an object that have challenged the interpretations of a large body of recent scientific outcomes (e.g., 
Baylis & Driver, 1993; Gibson, 1994; Houtkamp, Spekreijse, & Roelfsema, 2003; Crundall et al., 
2008). We found that the status of being an “object” is generally ambiguous and depends on the 
experience and interpretation of the observer. Some observers experience multiple elements in a scene 
as spatially separate and independent components. Others observe the same exact elements as a single 
object, bound by a previously stored visual representation. Objects do have to contain some specific 
features, such as borders, to separate them from their background, but a specific composition of 
features is not sufficient to produce an object. Gestalt rules such as closure and collinearity can ease 
and facilitate the process of binding multiple elements into a single object, but a high-level object 
representation is necessary to induce this process. 
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Abstract 
Humans process natural scenes rapidly and accurately. Low-level image features and emotional 
valence affect such processing, but have mostly been studied in isolation. At which processing stage 
these factors operate and how they interact has remained largely unaddressed. Here, we briefly 
presented natural images, and asked observers to report presence or absence of an animal (detection), 
species of the detected animal (identification), and their confidence. In a second experiment, the same 
observers rated images with respect to their emotional affect and estimated their anxiety when 
imagining a real-life encounter with the depicted animal. We found that detection and identification 
improved with increasing image luminance, background contrast, animal saturation, and luminance 
plus color contrast between target and background. Surprisingly, animals associated with lower 
anxiety were detected faster and indentified with higher confidence, and emotional affect was a better 
predictor of performance than anxiety. Pupil size correlated with detection, identification and 
emotional valence judgments at different time-points after image presentation. Remarkably, images of 
threatening animals induced smaller pupil sizes, and observers with higher mean anxiety ratings had 
smaller pupils on average. In sum, rapid visual processing depends on contrasts between target and 
background features rather than overall visual context, is negatively affected by anxiety, and finds its 
processing stages differentially reflected in the pupillary response. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Our visual system is optimized to detect, classify, and identify objects that we encounter in everyday 
life. Without this skill we would not be able to recognize components of our visual field as, for 
instance, potentially useful or threatening. The well-developed character of this skill is expressed in 
the accuracy and speed at which we can process objects in natural scenes (Potter & Levy, 1969). For 
example, the human and monkey brain can accurately distinguish between specific classes of objects 
within 45ms (Mouchetant-Rostaing, Giard, Delpuech, Echallier & Pernier, 2000) to 150ms (Thorpe, 
Fize & Marlot, 1996b, VanRullen & Thorpe, 2001b) and instantiate a behavioral reaction to them 
within about 120ms (Kirchner & Thorpe, 2006). Independent of whether brain signals reflect 
differences across object categories through low-level features or high-level decision-making 
(Rousselet, Husk, Bennett & Sekuler, 2008, VanRullen & Thorpe, 2001b), these studies demonstrate 
how fast information about objects can be extracted, represented and used. 
But why can we recognize objects so accurately and fast and what are the mechanisms 
underlying the rapid processing of objects? Some studies have found evidence suggesting that visual 
processing of objects consists of two stages: an early perceptual stage (~75ms) that distinguishes 
between observed features, and a later pathway for decision making (~150ms) (Johnson & Olshausen, 
2003, Johnson & Olshausen, 2005, VanRullen & Thorpe, 2001b). While the diagnostic act of 
recognizing and categorizing objects probably happens at a later stage (Smith, Gosselin & Schyns, 
2007, van Rijsbergen & Schyns, 2009), these studies stress that the analysis of features performed by 
our visual system is highly important for successful detection and identification. In a similar vein, 
several other studies suggested that the automatic feed-forward analysis of specific image features is 
mainly responsible for accurate and fast behavioral responses (Kirchner & Thorpe, 2006, Thorpe et al., 
1996b, VanRullen & Thorpe, 2001a, VanRullen & Thorpe, 2001b). Results that support this line of 
thought come from a variety of studies in which a specific set of image statistics, such as color, 
texture, and shape were varied to study their effect on detection (e.g., Vogels, 1999). Image statistics 
that have been identified to help object or scene recognition are contrast (Brodie, Wallace & Sharrat, 
1991, Macé, Delorme, Richard & Fabre-Thorpe, 2010), color (Brodie et al., 1991, Delorme, Richard 
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& Fabre-Thorpe, 2010, Elder & Velisavljević, 2009, Gegenfurtner & Rieger, 2000, Goffaux, Jacques, 
Mouraux, Oliva, Schyns & Rossion, 2005, Humphrey, Goodale, Jakobson & Servos, 1994, Oliva & 
Schyns, 2000, Wichmann, Sharpe & Gegenfurtner, 2002, Wurm, Legge, Isenberg & Luebker, 1993, 
Yao & Einhäuser, 2008), background coherence with the object (Biederman, 1972, Biederman, Glass 
& Stacy, 1973), shape or posture (Delorme et al., 2010, Elder & Velisavljević, 2009), object size 
(Delorme et al., 2010), texture (Delorme et al., 2010, Elder & Velisavljević, 2009, Renninger & Malik, 
2004), Fourier spectra (Gaspar & Rousselet, 2009, Joubert, Rousselet, Fabre-Thorpe & Fize, 2009, 
McCotter, Gosselin, Sowden & Schyns, 2005), and, though weakly, luminance (Delorme et al., 2010, 
Elder & Velisavljević, 2009, Macé et al., 2010, Nandakumar & Malik, 2009). Many of these studies 
used datasets of images that contain objects belonging to an explicit (target) category. Rarely, 
however, were subcategories or image features controlled for. Depending on the specific choice, 
categories might be subject to a selection bias and may have distinct visual features that make them 
especially easy to detect and recognize (Ohman, 1993, Ohman, Flykt & Esteves, 2001, Tipples, 
Young, Quinlan, Broks & Ellis, 2002). Frequently, animals are chosen as target category, and, indeed, 
they have very specific characteristics, such as eyes and elongated legs, that are considerably 
important for their successful identification (Delorme et al., 2010). In addition, images of animals are 
likely to be pre-segmented by the photographer (Wichmann, Drewes, Rosas & Gegenfurtner, 2010) 
and animals are therefore often subject to “unnatural” positions and figure-ground separations. Hence, 
a variety of features and their constellations are important for efficient and rapid processing of objects. 
It has remained elusive, however, to what extent all these features relatively contribute to recognition 
performance. Here we integrate a large variety of features and their relations in a model to predict 
several measures of performance. 
There are a few indications that particular features have a significant but weaker influence on 
recognition performance as compared to other features. For example, some studies argue that 
luminance or color have less influence on performance than texture, shape, and certain diagnostic parts 
(e.g., eyes and mouth) of the object (Delorme et al., 2010, Elder & Velisavljević, 2009). However, 
“texture” is by definition a repetitive pattern with a specific luminance, contrast, color, and orientation, 
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and thus not independent from these constituting features. Similarly, shape of an object is defined by 
differences between the object and background. Image statistics such as shape are hence a high-level 
and more abstract description for constellations of very basic features. If this terminological hierarchy 
is compared with the hierarchy of the visual system (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991), we see that 
information about luminance, contrast, orientation, and color is indeed already available in early visual 
areas while shape is processed at later stages by areas such as the LOC (e.g., Baylis & Driver, 2001, 
Grill-Spector, Kushnir, Edelman, Itzchak & Malach, 1998, Grill-Spector, Kushnir, Hendler, Edelman, 
Itzchak & Malach, 1998, Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2000, Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2001, Malach, Grill-
Spector, Kushnir, Edelman & Itzchak, 1998). Thus, direct relations between performance and basic 
individual features such as luminance, contrast or color could have been shadowed by seemingly 
stronger but indirect relations between performance and high-level features. More importantly, indirect 
and direct effects on performance cannot be disentangled unless the components of which an object 
constitutes are separately assessed. For example, an object has to be separated from its background in 
order to study the effects of shape on performance. So far there has been little research on the features 
of the object itself because virtually all studies (except for Delorme et al., 2010, Elder & Velisavljević, 
2009, Wichmann et al., 2010) have only looked into the overall statistics of the entire image. And 
although the degree and causality of the contribution of such high-level features to performance is 
debatable, there is still a broad range of other – both low-level and high-level – features for which it is 
unclear to what extent they affect detection and identification performance. Hence, a thorough test as 
to how low-level and high-level features affect performance and to what extent these effects depend on 
whole image, background, or object statistics, is needed. 
Besides the aforementioned features, high-level concepts, such as emotions associated with an 
image or the object depicted therein, may also influence detection or identification. Animals, for 
example, may provoke a wide-spread set of emotions such as fear or emotional affect. Although it 
seems reasonable to assume that objects can induce specific emotions only when they are identified, in 
some cases emotional processing might not require detailed sensory information. Similar to the fast 
and automatic feed-forward brain mechanism that processes image features (Kirchner & Thorpe, 2006, 
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Thorpe, Fize & Marlot, 1996a, VanRullen & Thorpe, 2001a, VanRullen & Thorpe, 2001b), it has been 
suggested that another distinct brain mechanism (i.e., a sub-cortical route to the amygdala) processes 
fear-inducing stimuli (Adolphs, Gosselin, Buchanan, Tranel, Schyns & Damasio, 2005, Isbell, 2006, 
LeDoux, 1996, Morris, Ohman & Dolan, 1999) and incorporates an evolutionary innate bias towards 
threatening animals or objects (Deloache & Lobue, 2009, Lobue & DeLoache, 2008, LoBue & 
DeLoache, 2010, Ohman et al., 2001, Seligman, 1970). An alternative theory proposes that observers 
have acquired an attentional bias towards threatening stimuli by learning (Blanchette, 2006, Brosch & 
Sharma, 2005, Lipp, Derakshan, Waters & Logies, 2004, Mogg & Bradley, 1998, Tipples et al., 2002, 
Waters, Lipp & Spence, 2004). Nevertheless, the emotional valence tied to an object may accordingly 
help improve the speed and accuracy at which they are detected and identified. More importantly, we 
can again question to what degree emotions help to process and behaviorally react to objects. Relating 
this issue back to image statistics, it is important to control for confounds induced by image statistics 
when measuring effects of anxiety for objects presented in images. Studies on anxiety so far have only 
controlled for a small part of the differences in image statistics between non-threatening and 
threatening categories, and this factor may have caused seemingly conflicting results on anxiety. 
Here we try to assess the weighted effects of a variety of both low level and high level image 
features on performance. As it is important to dissociate between detection and identification 
performance (Evans & Treisman, 2005), we have designed a rapid “animal”/“no animal” detection 
task that includes the identification of presented species after detection of an animal. We used images 
of animals with different levels of threat (e.g., snakes are of high threat and caterpillars are of low 
threat) to investigate the role of emotional valence and its interaction with image statistics. Besides 
subjective ratings of anxiety and affect per image, we use pupil size dynamics as an objective measure 
of emotional valence (e.g., Beatty & Lucero-Wagoner, 2000, Hess, 1975) and as reflection of activity 
in the (para)sympathetic nervous system (e.g., Steinhauer & Hakerem, 1992). In a separate analysis, 
animals were dissected from their background for comparison with their background features. With 
these measures, we will assess the following four questions: (i) Which features correlate with 
detection, identification, reaction times, and confidence, and which of these relations is strongest? (ii) 
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How do features of the object itself affect performance as compared to the statistics of the whole 
image? (iii) How do low- and high-level features correlate and to what extent do these correlations 
explain differences in performance across object categories? More specifically, does anxiety affect 
performance after controlling for covariance of image statistics? (iv) Is anxiety or emotional affect 
reflected in visible physiological signals? Specifically, does the pupil, an outwardly accessible 
physiological measure of neural function, reflect emotional valences? 
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6.2 Methods 
6.2.1 Observers 
Eight observers (age range: 22-26, 2 female, 6 male) participated in the experiments. All had normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision, were naïve to the purpose of the studies, and gave informed written 
consent before the experiments. The experiments conformed to Institutional Guidelines for 
experiments with human subjects and to the Declaration of Helsinki. 
6.2.2 Apparatus 
Stimuli were presented on a 21 inch EIZO Flexscan CRT screen at a viewing distance of 70 cm. The 
display refresh rate of the screen was 100 Hz and the resolution was 1152x864 pixels. CIE color space 
coordinates (x,y) of the screen were (0.623, 0.344), (0.287, 0.609), and (0.151, 0.065) for the red, 
green, and blue guns, respectively. Stimuli were generated on an Optiplex 755 DELL computer, using 
Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA) and PsychToolbox (Brainard, 1997, Pelli, 1997) and EyeLink 
toolbox (Cornelissen et al., 2002) extensions. During the rapid animal detection experiment (see 
procedure), pupil diameter (size) and direction of gaze were tracked with an infrared sensitive camera 
(EyeLink 2000, SR Research, Osgoode, ON, Canada) at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz. The eye-tracker 
was (re-)calibrated before each experiment and after each break. Observers‟ head was supported by a 
chin- and forehead-rest to ensure steady viewing. 
6.2.3 Stimuli and Procedure 
Our study consisted of two separate experiments: a rapid animal detection and identification task 
(Figure 1A) and an emotional valence rating task (Figure 1B). Both experiments were taken on 
separate days. To prevent effects of learning due to feedback (the prolonged presentation for rating 
could give observers feedback about their performance, when done after the rapid presentation) and 
priming (rapid presentation could affect subsequent ratings and vice versa), substantial time elapsed 
between the two tasks (mean±sd: 248 ±110 days). 
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Figure 1. Paradigms and stimuli. (A) In the rapid presentation task observers were shown an image of either an animal or 
distracter for 10ms that was subsequently masked by a random noise image. Observers decided as fast as possible whether 
they had seen an animal or not by making an eye movement to the left or right part of the screen (text is here displayed as 
“yes”/“no” for reasons of legibility, but the actual display text was “no animal”/“animal”). Only for trials in which observers 
indicated to have seen an animal, they were asked to identify the species from a list (see grey arrow, arrangement of species 
is here illustrated by letters for reasons of legibility, but in the actual display full species names were shown) and could 
indicate their confidence on a ruler (0–100). (B) In the emotional valence rating task, observers were shown images of 
animals until response. Observers were asked to indicate their affect (-100–100) for the animal and their level of anxiety (0–
100) if they would encounter the animal in a real life. 
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The first experiment was a rapid “animal”/“no animal” detection and identification task. 
Observers were presented with a variety of chromatic images of natural scenes that either did or did 
not contain an animal. Images were chosen from two databases (http://www.photolibrary.uk.com/; 
http://visionlab.ece.uiuc.edu/datasets.html) with a total of 708 animal pictures that were divided in five 
object categories (Figure 2A): Phobic animals (P), predators (PR), domesticated animals (DO), pets 
(PE), and non-phobic animals (NP). Each animal category was divided in three sub-categories of 
species (Phobic-animals: Snakes, spiders, and scorpions; Predators: Bears, wolves, lions; 
Domesticated animals: Cows, sheep, horses; Pets: Rabbits, cats, dogs; Non-phobic animals: 
Caterpillars, beetles, butterflies). The non-phobic category was intended to match phobic animals with 
respect to their gross visual appearance: in particular, snakes share visual features with caterpillars 
and have been used as visually similar categories earlier (Lobue & DeLoache, 2008). Based on 
previous literature, phobic animals and predators were subsumed as “threatening”, all other categories 
as “non-threatening” hereafter (also see second experiment below for the justification of 
categorization).We further distinguished between the superordinate categories of mammals (predators, 
domesticated animals, and pets) and non-mammals, (phobic and non-phobic animals). The images 
containing no animals (distracters, DI) consisted of 383 natural scenes that included natural objects 
such as flowers, meadows, trees, mushrooms, fruits, vegetables, or stones (Figure 2B). Per observer, a 
total of 437 (62%) images of animals and 263 (38%) images of distracters were randomly chosen for 
presentation. Each animal species counted 28-30 images that for each experiment were randomly 
chosen from a database that contained between 42 and 68 images of each species. All images were 10° 
of visual angle in width and 7° in height. Pixel values of images were normalized such that the entire 
range (0-255) of possible luminance value was covered. 
A rapid-detection trial (Figure 1A) started with the presentation of a fixation dot (0.8° 
diameter) for 1000ms, followed by an image for 10ms and a subsequent white-noise mask. Observers 
were instructed to decide as fast as possible whether the presented image contained an animal or not 
by making an eye-movement to either one side of the screen. Each side of the screen contained the text 
animal or no animal. The location of this text (i.e., left or right) was fixed per observer but 
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counterbalanced across observers. If observers reported having seen an animal – independent of 
whether their observation was correct – they were asked to identify the species of the animal. Five 
hundred milliseconds after the animal/no-animal decision, observers could choose the observed 
species from a 4 by 4 grid of 15 species-names with a computer mouse. The arrangement of species in 
the grid was randomized across observers. The identification response was followed by an indication 
of the observers‟ level of confidence on a ruler that scaled from 0 (not confident) to 100 (very 
confident about identification). The experiment continued with the next trial after a button press and 
observers could take a break after each block of 100 trials. 
The second experiment consisted of an emotional valence rating task in which observers were 
asked to rate their level of affect and anxiety for images of animals that were shown in the rapid 
presentation task (Figure 1B). Observers fixated for 1000ms and were subsequently shown an image 
of an animal until response. The images were accompanied with a question and a ruler on which the 
observer could indicate their response with a computer mouse. The first question was designed to 
measure the observers‟ level of emotional affect for the animal. To the question “How do you feel 
when looking at this picture?” observers could indicate how they felt on a scale from -100 (very bad) 
to 100 (very good). The next question appeared after observers had rated their affect: “How anxious 
would you be if you would encounter this animal in real life?” Observers could indicate on a scale 
from 0 (not anxious) to 100 (very anxious) their level of anxiety for the animal. The next trial started 
after a button press. 
6.2.4 Analysis 
To separate the effects of the image as a whole, the target animal alone, and the background (non-
target image area), author MH and a novel observer independently produced cut-outs of the image 
areas containing only the animal (Figure 3A). Cut-outs were consistent across both annotators and the 
overlap (intersect) of both cut-outs was considered the animal for further analysis. The following 
statistics were computed separately for the entire image, for the animal alone, and for the background 
alone (for extreme examples, see Figure 3B): mean and median luminance, mean luminance contrast, 
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mean color and luminance contrast between animal and background, mean radius of animal shape, 
variance in radius of animal shape (i.e., spikiness and elongation of shape), animal size, horizontal and 
vertical position of the animal, and distance between centre of gravity of animal and centre of image. 
Luminance contrast was computed as the standard deviation in luminance.  
 
 
Figure 2. Image examples. (A) Examples of presented images of animal species (columns) per category (rows). (B) 
Examples of several non-animal distracter images from different categories. 
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We calculated the contrast in color between the animal and its background (hereafter: "color contrast 
animal-background") in the physiologically defined DKL color space (Derrington, Krauskopf, & 
Lennie, 1984). DKL space is spanned by three orthogonal axes, luminance, the difference between 
long (L) and medium (M) wavelenght cone exictations (L-M axis, aka "red-green" or "constant-blue"), 
and the difference between the short (S) wavelenght cone excitation and the sum of the other two cone 
excitations (S-(L+M), "blue-yellow" or "tritanopic confusion" axis). Color contrast animal-background 
then was defined as the distance between the mean position of the animal's pixels and the mean 
position of the background's pixel in DKL space, projected on the isoluminant plane. The similar 
measure without the projection on the isoluminant plane encompasses both luminance and color 
information and will be referred to as "color+luminance contrast animal-background". 
6.2.5 Statistics and Notation 
When we report multiple post-hoc comparisons across animal categories (e.g., for detection 
probabilities), we provide only noteworthy t-tests and correlations in the main text. To avoid 
overloading the main text, we in addition only report the effect that has the highest p-value (i.e., is 
"least significant" colloquially speaking). That is, a statement like "(t(7) > 1.90, p < 0.05, conf = )" is 
meant to imply that all p-values were below 0.05, all t-values above 1.90 and the degree of freedom at 
least 7. Full tables are given in the appendix. Main effects or interactions of ANOVAs as well as 
correlation are referred to as "significant", if their p-value is below a corrected alpha level that has 
been adjusted to an expected false-discovery rate (FDR) of 5% using the Benjamini & Hochberg 
(1995) method. Spearman correlations coefficients between behavioral data sets (i.e., performance and 
emotional valence) were based on the average per image. A general linear model (GLM) was created 
with the various image statistics and emotional valence as independent variables and the measures of 
performance as dependent variables. Another GLM used behavioral statistics and emotional valence as 
independent variables and pupil size as dependent variable. Input of the GLMs was z-score 
normalized. For some analyses, pupil size was normalized by subtracting the pupil size at image onset 
from pupil traces per trial, and subsequently dividing by the same value. This way the normalized 
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pupil size represented the proportion pupil size change with respect to image onset. Some analyses 
were based on the “absolute” pupil size (i.e., not normalized). Note that absolute pupil size is 
somewhat arbitrary as it depends on the settings of the gaze-tracking camera. These settings were set 
individually for each observer. To enable comparison within observers, settings were kept fixed across 
trials. To allow comparison of absolute data between observers the variation of settings across 
observers were kept to a minimum (mean and s.e.m. threshold for detection in the unit of the device 
were: 120.5 ±4.8 for pupil and; 228.9 ±2.5 for the cornea reflex). Since we are interested in relative 
rather than absolute reaction times, we define reaction times as the time between image onset and the 
moment the center of gaze crossed the 25% or 75% border of the screen (see Figure 1A). This is a 
more robust measure than saccadic onset because it reduces the probability to miss-categorize 
decisions based on initial mistake saccades that preceded but was directed to the other direction than 
the final decision side. This measure further incorporates time delays of such initial erroneous 
saccades and therefore includes a measure of decisional uncertainty. Trials with reaction times shorter 
than 50ms (5 trials of 5600) and reaction times longer than 1500ms (123 trials) were removed from 
analysis (2% of all trials).  
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Figure 3. Cutout examples and extreme Image statistics. (A) Four examples (rows) of original animal images (first 
column) of which the animal was cut out (second column) and analyzed separately from its background (third column). Cut-
outs were created by two individuals. Green and red areas indicate non-overlapping parts of the individual cut-outs, white 
areas indicate overlap between the two individual cut-outs (see second column). (B) A variety of image statistics were 
computed for correlation with performance; the panel depicts examples of images with statistical extremes are shown. For 
example, the Animal Rad. Var. image shows an image in which the animal has a highly variable shape (i.e., not circular or 
rectangular but complex). Col. Con. Ani.-Bg. shows an image of an animal whose color strongly contrasts with its 
background. 
 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Performance, emotional valence, and image statistics per animal category 
Threatening animals are generally believed to be detected and identified with high accuracy (Deloache 
& Lobue, 2009, Lobue & DeLoache, 2008, LoBue & DeLoache, 2010, Ohman et al., 2001, Seligman, 
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1970). Here we tried to replicate these findings by computing performance and emotional valence 
ratings per animal category. Of all animal pictures, 70%±15% were correctly detected (i.e., hits) and 
consequently 30%±15% missed. Of all distracter pictures, 73%±22% were correctly rejected, and 
consequently 27%±22% mistakenly induced a false alarm of an animal. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Detection and Identification Performance. (A) Percentage of hits (animal correctly detected) and false alarms 
(distracter mistaken for animal) for each of the 8 observers (colored points) and the average (blue). Observers clearly perform 
above chance (diagonal) and show similar performance despite variability in their criteria. (B) Percentage of false alarms by 
animal category (abbreviations see text); each observer is presented by a line (colors as in panel A). Note the similar pattern 
across observers. (C) Probability to correctly detect an animal (percentage of hits) by category (notation as panel B).  (D) 
Mean reaction times per category. (E) Probability to correctly identify the animal's category, given it was correctly detected. 
(F) Mean confidence ratings (G) mean anxiety, (H) mean emotional affect per category. (I) Identification confusion matrix 
given an animal is detected correctly but incorrectly identified. Brighter patches indicate that species are more likely to be 
mixed-up with each other during identification. Matrix is normalized per presented species (3 per category) with the main 
diagonal excluded (blue), such that each entry gives the probability of a presented species (column) being confused with 
another species (row), excluding correct identifications. White lines delineate animal categories, order of species per category 
as given in Figure 1A. See Figure 1 for list of abbreviations of categories. Note that the lines in panel B through H are meant 
for illustration only and do not indicate a functional dependence. 
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Although observers differed in their subjective criteria (i.e., some observers were more liberal 
to mistakenly indicate a distracter as animal, Figure 4A), the performance per animal category was 
generally similar across observers (Figure 4B-F; for box plots, see Appendix). There was a significant 
main effect of animal categories on detection probabilities (hit rates, Figure 4C; F(4,7) = 12.62, 
p < 0.001; FDR adjusted alpha-level for all ANOVAs: 0.022). Detection probabilities were higher for 
predators (PR), domesticated animals (DO), and pets (PE), and were smaller for phobic animals (P) 
and non-phobic insects (NP). Remarkably, the threatening animals did not differ significantly from the 
non-threatening animals (t(38) = 1.41, p > 0.10, conf = -0.19-0.03). The mammalian animal categories 
of predators, domesticated animals, and pets did have higher detection probabilities than phobic 
animals (t(38) > 2.76, p < 0.01, conf = -0.24-0.04; see Appendix for all post-hoc comparisons). 
Domesticated animals and pets also had better detection performances than non-phobic animals 
(t(7) > 2.75, p < 0.05, see Appendix for confidence intervals). A very similar pattern was found for 
reaction times (Figure 4D; F(4,7) = 15.06, p < 0.001): Mammals were detected faster than phobic 
animals and non-phobic animals (t(7) > 2.95, p < 0.05). Since reaction times were qualitatively similar 
to accuracies across categories, data are not affected by a speed accuracy trade-off. Identification 
performance, calculated only for trials in which animals were correctly detected (i.e., the conditional 
probability identification given detection), showed no significant differences across animal categories 
(Figure 4E; F(4,7) = 1.47, p > 0.20). Unconditionally (i.e. without taking detection performance into 
account), identification showed differences across animal categories (F(4,7) = 3.73, p < 0.05), which 
also directly follows from the results on detection and identification conditioned on detection. 
Confidence ratings, however, depicted a pattern analogous to detection probabilities (Figure 4F, 
F(4,7) = 3.31, p < 0.05; t(7) > 2.64, p < 0.05). In general, data implied that detection was better 
(higher performance, faster reaction times) for mammals than for non-mammals. Once correctly 
detected, animal identification did not depend on category, while confidence followed a similar pattern 
as detection. This suggests a dissociation between detection and identification based on category. 
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Interestingly, the dependence of detection and confidence on category does not seem to follow 
an intuitive anxiety or emotional axis. To test whether the a priori categorization indeed matches the 
subjective experience of our observers, we assessed levels of anxiety and affect per animal category 
during the second, emotional valence rating experiment. As expected, anxiety ratings were 
substantially higher for threatening animals (i.e., phobic animals and predators) than for other animal 
categories (Figure 4G; F(4,7) = 101.39, p < 0.001; t(7) > 8.72, p < 0.001, for all comparisons between 
threatening and non-threatening animals). Emotional affect also differed significantly across categories 
(F(4,7) = 10.00, p < 0.001) and was negative for phobic animals (Figure 4H; t(7) = 4.87, p < 0.01, 
conf = 20.14-39.65), neutral for predators (t(7) = 0.25, p > 0.75, conf = 35.46-67.95) and domesticated 
animals (t(7) = 2.30, p > 0.05, conf = 49.73-68.73), and positive for pets (t(7) = 4.73, p < 0.01, 
conf =59.45-78.36) and non-phobic animals (t(7) = 2.47, p < 0.05, conf = 50.19-58.70). These data 
indicate that anxiety and affect are distinct concepts and measurements. The overall pattern of anxiety 
across animal categories did neither seem to overlap with detection nor with identification 
performance. Surprisingly, no effect of anxiety on performance was seen across categories. This 
suggests that low-level features rather than higher-order emotional valences may underlie the 
differences in performance across animal categories. Interestingly, mammals were more easily mixed-
up with each other during identification, and the same held for phobic and non-phobic animals (Figure 
4I; t(5) > 2.21, p < 0.05, for all comparisons of phobic animals and non-phobic animals versus 
mammals). At least for the species considered here, features or high-level categories (e.g., mammal) 
other than those defined by emotional valence contribute more strongly to identification errors. 
To summarize, detection performance and identification performance were not necessarily 
determined by the mean level of threat or affection for the depicted animals per category. For instance, 
although observers had negative affect and high anxiety for phobic animals, these animals were still 
difficult to detect. Predators were also not easier to detect than non-threatening animals. These 
findings might indicate that differences in image statistics relate to the differences in performance 
across animal categories. To test this hypothesis, we next assess the relative contributions of emotional 
valence and image statistics to performance. 
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6.3.2 Correlations between performance, emotional valence, and image statistics 
To assess how strong emotional valences and image statistics affected performance, we calculated for 
a subset of dependent variables whether they correlated with image statistics (Figure 5). Correlations 
with image statistics were only based on images with animals (n=708) and data were based on the 
average across observers per image. Correlations that include identification or confidence (in 
identification) were only based on images that at least one observer had correctly detected (n=681). To 
control for correlations across variables, we performed a partial correlation analysis for correlations 
between performance and emotional valences treating image statistics as controlling variables (for 
correlations between image statistics and emotional valences, see Figure 6). We only report the most 
noteworthy correlations (for scatter plots, see Appendix). We found no significant relations between 
anxiety and detection probability (r(706) = -0.06, p > 0.10), while correlations with identification 
probability (r(680) = -0.11, p < 0.01), reaction time (r(706) = 0.12, p < 0.01), and confidence 
(r(680) = -0.14, p < 0.001) were significant. Emotional affect similarly correlated with identification 
probability (r(680) = 0.10, p < 0.05), reaction time (r(706) = -0.11, p < 0.01), and confidence 
(r(680) = 0.12, p < 0.01).  
Image statistics that correlated with detection included animal luminance (r(706) = 0.29, 
p < 0.001), animal contrast (r(706) = 0.21, p < 0.001), background contrast (r(706) = -0.19, 
p < 0.001), animal color saturation (r(706) = 0.20, p < 0.001), animal size (r(706) = 0.19, p < 0.001), 
and variance of shape radius (r(706) = 0.11, p < 0.01). Also color contrast animal-background and 
color+luminance contrast animal-background had significant effects on detection (r(706) = 0.20, 
p < 0.001; r(706) = 0.27, p < 0.001). All other performance variables (i.e., identification, reaction 
time, and confidence) had very similar correlations with the image statistics (p < 0.01). 
The significant correlations of performance with image statistics were higher than the 
correlations with emotional valence for detection (t(10) = 3.10, p < 0.05, conf: 0.04-0.22), but not for 
the other performance variables (t(7) < 2.31, p > 0.05). The absolute correlations of image statistics 
that related to merely the animal cutouts were also higher than the correlations related to the whole 
image (t(22) = 5.59, p < 0.001, conf: 0.07-0.16) or only the background (t(22) = 3.55, p < 0.01, conf: 
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0.04-0.17). Correlations with detection were further higher than correlations with identification 
(t(14) = 5.39, p < 0.001, conf: 0.03-0.07). Similar to the correlations between performance and 
emotional valences, we also performed a partial correlation per image statistic with each performance 
variable while we controlled for correlations across image statistics. After this control, only 
background contrast, color+luminance contrast animal-background, size of animal, and variance of 
shape radius of animal correlated significantly with performance. As color+luminance contrast animal-
background incorporates information about luminance and saturation, it also correlates with these 
statistics (Figure 6). From this point of view, color+luminance contrast animal-background is an 
intermediate-level statistic and can therefore explain all the variance in performance without the help 
of the more low-level statistics of luminance and saturation. Indeed, when removing the contrast 
animal-background factors as covariates from the partial correlation, animal luminance and saturation 
significantly correlates with all performance variables except for reaction times (r(680) > 0.10, 
p < 0.01). As a final control, we created a GLM with image statistics and emotional valences as 
independent variables and performances as dependent variables (Table 1). For reasons of statistical 
power, we kept the model simple by only selecting the variables that significantly correlated with 
performance (Figure 5) and were indicated as independent factors by a factor analysis (see Appendix). 
The standardized beta coefficients were comparable with the correlations reported above (r(46) = 0.55, 
p < 0.001) but some remarkable deviations were observed. Despite that the GLM was statistically 
stricter than the correlation analysis, several image statistics and emotional valences that correlated 
significantly with performance were not significant predictors of performance in the GLM. Absolute 
beta coefficients of detection were not higher than identification (t(11) = 0.72, p > 0.20), beta 
coefficients of animal features were smaller instead of larger than background and whole image 
statistics (t(22) = 2.20, p < 0.05), and beta coefficients of image statistics were not higher than 
emotional valences (t(10) = 0.53, p > 0.50). It was also remarkable to see that anxiety was not a 
significant factor in the model to predict any performance variable. When comparing beta coefficients 
across observers (i.e., we performed another GLM on data per observer), emotional valences was a 
stronger predictor than anxiety of detection (t(7) = 5.53, p < 0.001) and reaction times (t(7) = 10.12, 
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p < 0.001). No other remarkable patterns were found across predictors. In sum, the overall pattern that 
emotional affect and several image statistics can decrease or improve performance remains evident 
after controlling for covariance across predictors.  
 
 
Figure 5. Correlations matrix. Matrix of correlations between performance variables (vertical axis), and image statistics 
and emotional valences (horizontal axes), r-values given as numbers. Only significant correlations (p smaller than an FDR-
adjusted alpha level of 0.014) are presented with numbers. Most noteworthy correlations were those between animal (rather 
than image) statistics and performance, and absent or weakly negative correlations between anxiety and performance. Animal 
(i.e., the object of interest or target) statistics have much larger effects on performance than whole image statistics, and 
anxiety has a weak effect on performance, which is reversed relative to our prior expectation. See Figure 1 for list of 
abbreviations of categories. Abbreviations of image statistics: Rad. Var. = variance in radius of animal shape outline, Col. = 
color, Lum. = luminance, Con. = contrast, Ani. = animal, Bg. = background. 
 
In conclusion, both image statistics and emotional valences contribute to the recognition of 
animals in natural images. Features generally related to the contrast between animal and background 
rather than the image as a whole contributed significantly to performance. In addition, background 
contrast decreased performance. Contrast in luminance and color between animal and background also 
affected performance, and this became particularly evident after controlling for correlations across 
image statistics. It has been suggested, however, that an animal is more likely to be presented in the 
center of the image because of pre-segmentation by the photographer that took the actual images 
(Wichmann et al., 2010). This bias could potentially underlie our finding that a stronger contrast 
between statistics of the object and background rather than the whole image increased performance 
because parts of the image that are presented in the fovea could be enhanced as compared to parts in 
the periphery. However, the animal‟s position varied and did not have any effect on detection 
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(r(706) = 0.04, p > 0.25) or identification performance (r(680) = 0.07, p > 0.05). Thus, the effect of 
low-level features on detection and identification performance was independent of object position. 
Levels of emotional valences – higher level features that are explicitly tied to the object – also 
significantly contributed to detection, identification, reaction time, and confidence. The negative effect 
of anxiety on performance was unexpected as literature generally reports a positive effect (see 
Introduction). Furthermore, anxiety was not a significant predictor in the GLM, probably because 
emotional affect co-varied with anxiety (see Figure 6) and explained more variance in performance 
than anxiety. Taken together, this indicates that anxiety only weakly affects the processing of objects 
and that emotional affect is a better predictor of performance. To get a better picture of whether 
anxiety is really involved in physiological processes related to object recognition, we next assess how 
they the pupil responses to the presentation of animal pictures. 
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Figure 6. Correlation matrix. Matrix of correlations between image statistics and emotional valences. Only significant 
correlations (at FDR-adjusted alpha level of 0.020) are depicted. 
 
6.3.3 Pupil size as a window to different stages of object processing and anxiety 
To investigate at which stages specific factors have an effect on the neural processing of animal 
images, a physiological signal is needed that reflects such processing. We here quantify the relations 
between the time course of pupillary responses and performance, and emotional valences (for effects 
of image statistics on pupillary responses, see for example Alpern & Campbell, 1962, Gamlin, Zhang, 
Harlow & Barbur, 1998, Li, Liang & Sun, 2006, Tsujimura, Wolffsohn & Gilmartin, 2001, Young & 
Alpern, 1980). We computed correlations between pupil size and these dependent variables as a 
function of time around image onset (Figure 7A). All dependent variables correlated with pupil size 
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(p < 0.05) at some time point. Correlations with anxiety and identification peaked during intermediate 
time points (1000-1500ms), detection probability and confidence peaked during both the pupillary 
response (approximately 600ms; see Figure 7C-G for examples of the pupillary responses) and during 
later time periods (>1500ms), and correlations with reaction time and confidence peaked during 
periods the pupil dilation or constriction was fastest (i.e., around the pupillary response, when pupil 
changes were fast). Remarkably, anxiety, confidence, and reaction times correlated with normalized 
pupil size already before the onset of the trial (for possible interpretations, see Discussion). As a 
control for correlations among the behavioral variables, we performed a GLM with these variables as 
predictors and pupil size as dependent variable (Figure 7B). GLM beta coefficients were very similar 
to the correlation data (compare Figure 7A with 7B). To summarize, performance and emotional 
valence tied to the presented objects were reflected in the pupil. 
We further checked for relations between average performance or emotional valence, and 
pupil size throughout the experiment. We calculated the mean of each dependent variable per observer 
over all trials and computed correlation coefficients between these means. Remarkably, the overall 
mean pupil size correlated with the mean anxiety rating per observer (r(6) = -0.81, p < 0.05). This 
negative correlation between mean pupil size and anxiety ratings could imply that the pupil size is an 
objective indicator of an observer‟s general anxiety level. Anxiety might not only be reflected in the 
mean pupil size but also in the amplitude of the pupillary response. However, the correlation between 
image statistics and anxiety ratings (see Figure 6) could indicate that the reported differences in pupil 
size are a result of image statistics rather than anxiety. To disentangle the effects of image statistics 
and emotional states on pupil size, we hypothesize that fear for an animal is a subjective concept that 
is not necessarily determined by a particular set of image features. 
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Figure 7. Pupil responses. Change in pupil size relative to image onset as a function of time after image onset. (A) Pupil 
size was correlated with each dependent variable at some point in time (thick lines represent periods of significant 
correlations at p < 0.05). (B) Beta coefficients of a GLM indicated how strong behavioral factors predicted pupil size. (C-G) 
Pupil size plotted per anxiety level for correctly identified animals (C), for unidentified animals (D), per presented animal 
category for identified animals (E), per presented animal category for unidentified animals (F), and per observed (i.e., 
perceived animal rather than presented) animal category for unidentified animals (G). In sum, anxiety is reflected in the pupil 
after correct identification of the animal. Significance levels for the plots where pupil size is presented per animal category 
(panels E-G) were based on comparisons between pooled trials of threatening animals on the one hand and pooled trials of 
non-threatening animals on the other hand. High and low anxiety levels in panels C and D were based on splitting the 
respective data at the median, such that each level (high anxiety, low anxiety) contains the same number of trials.  
 
We therefore argue that if the pupil shows a clear response to threat of the presented animal 
while the animal could not be consciously identified, image statistics may underlie effects of anxiety 
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on pupil size. On the contrary, if the pupil only shows a response to threatening animals when 
identification was successful but not when unsuccessful, image statistics do not underlie the effects of 
anxiety on pupillary responses. To test this hypothesis, we performed several additional analyses of 
the effects of anxiety on pupil size as a function of time around image onset (Figure 7C-G). First, we 
computed pupil size for correctly identified animals that were either rated with high or low anxiety 
(Figure 7C). The pupil responded with a larger amplitude (i.e., more negativity in the signal) and with 
an overall lower pupil size after ~600ms to images of animals rated with high anxiety. We further 
computed pupillary responses for unidentified (i.e., correctly detected but incorrectly identified) 
animals per anxiety level of the presented animal (Figure 7D). If animals were not correctly identified, 
the pupil did not show a significant difference between low and high threatening animals. The level of 
threat per animal category also determined the amplitude of pupillary responses and the subsequent 
overall pupil size for correctly identified animals (Figure 7E). Threatening animals (i.e., phobic 
animals and predators) induced larger pupillary amplitudes at ~600ms than non-threatening animals. 
Similar to the anxiety levels, this effect was only pertinent for animals that were correctly identified 
because unidentified animals induced no such difference in pupil size across animal categories (Figure 
7F). In turn, there is a significant effect if pupil traces are sorted per subjectively observed (i.e., 
perceived animal as indicated by the observer) rather than truly presented animal category (Figure 
7G). These results indicate that the effects of anxiety on pupil size only occur after proper 
identification of the presented animal. This is support for the notion that anxiety is a separate 
mechanism that operates on object processing independent of image statistics. 
We found evidence that anxiety contributes to performance and is reflected in pupillary 
responses after conscious identification of the animal. The degree of an observer‟s overall anxiety for 
depicted animals is also reflected in the average size of the pupil. In other words, both short-term 
anxiety and long-term anxiety are reflected in the pupil (for details, see Discussion), and short-term 
anxiety only occurs after the activation of a higher object representation. 
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6.4 Discussion 
6.4.1 Performance relies on contrasts between object and background 
Successful detection of animals in images mainly relied on increased levels of image luminance, 
animal saturation, animal size, animal shape, color and luminance contrast between animal and 
background, and on decreased levels of background contrast. Except for image luminance and 
background contrast, features predominantly tied to the target object seem to contribute to 
performance; a phenomenon that most studies have disregarded because they did not aim at 
distinguishing between effects of object features and overall image features. It is unlikely that this 
phenomenon is explained by the overall foveal rather than peripheral position of animals because of 
lacking effects of position on performance. Although this could be the result of lacking variance in 
animal position (animal center of gravity was 1.0± 0.6 deg; image size was 10 by 6.7 deg), it has been 
shown that the categorization of animals that are presented in the near-periphery rather than the fovea 
is still highly accurate (±90% at 10°; Thorpe, Gegenfurtner, Fabre-Thorpe & Bülthoff, 2001). Hence, 
we suggest that performance is predominantly affected by object features and their contrast with their 
backgrounds rather than overall image features. Obviously, the background alone cannot provide 
definite proof on the presence or absence of an animal for any given image, though – especially when 
the distracter database is carefully selected and the potential habitat of all species under consideration 
is visually similar. Nonetheless the background could in principle still be probabilistically informative 
on the presence or absence of an animal and may even aid identification (say, if the background is 
predominately green, the animal is probably more likely a cow than a whale), rendering the relative 
importance of target features a non-trivial. Scene gist and context can be important factors for rapid 
categorization (Joubert, Fize, Rousselet & Fabre-Thorpe, 2008, Joubert, Rousselet, Fize & Fabre-
Thorpe, 2007). In addition, we found that background luminance contrast negatively affected 
performance. It could well be that the presence of high luminance contrasts in the background 
“distracts” the visual processing of the object. Nonetheless, image features that were tied to the 
segmented object or ground depicted correlations with performance. While clearly beyond the scope 
of the present study, using targeted feature manipulations (‟t Hart, Schmidt, Klein-Harmeyer & 
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Einhäuser, 2011) to address the question as to whether these results are an effect of background per se 
(e.g., by inducing higher-order contrasts), a general property of natural scenes or merely an effect of 
the chosen databases will be an interesting issue for further research. 
6.4.2 Moderate contributions of all image features to performance  
We found that a variety of features had significant effects on performance during the task to detect and 
identify animals as fast as possible after the rapid presentation of natural images. If our visual system 
is indeed tuned for processing natural stimuli particular efficiently (Barlow, 1961) and effortlessly (Li, 
VanRullen, Koch & Perona, 2002), it seems natural that those features represented abundantly early in 
the visual hierarchy contribute especially to rapid processing. However, each of the features 
investigated here, explained only a moderate percentage of variance in performance. Despite the 
considerable number of image features covered, there are of course many other features left untested 
that might explain the remaining variance. We expect that these will be high-level features that are 
characteristic or diagnostic for the objects (Delorme et al., 2010) and relate to responses higher up in 
the visual processing hierarchy. In addition, higher areas may also be involved in rapidly forming 
initial hypotheses about objects that are only later refined by processing in earlier areas (Hochstein & 
Ahissar, 2002). In any case, a great deal of the unexplained variance might still be caused by the 
frequency of feature appearance (expertise), by individual preferences for specific features, and to 
noise in the visual system. For example, it is proposed that observers are flexible when it comes to 
learning to use new features for categorization (Schyns, 1998, Schyns, Goldstone & Thibaut, 1998). 
Such flexibility is necessary because the level as to when a feature is informative depends on the task. 
When for instance only simple features are attended during a task, higher-order information could go 
lost despite its usefulness. Attention is another factor that could strongly determine how we process 
object. Although the detection of objects does not necessarily require attention (Li et al., 2002), 
attention may still modulate performance, in particular for identification (Evans & Treisman, 2005). 
Similarly, fluctuations in arousal and alertness are likely contributors to trial-to-trial variability, which 
will remain largely unexplainable based on image features alone. Although image features alone might 
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not explain image processing in full, our study provides a first quantification of how they interact with 
each other, with object representations, and with high-level processes for rapid detection and 
identification of objects. 
6.4.3 Relative importance of luminance and luminance contrast to performance 
Whereas we find an important role of luminance and contrast features, previous studies reported 
relatively small effects of luminance and contrast on performance as compared to other features (Elder 
& Velisavljević, 2009, Macé et al., 2010, Nandakumar & Malik, 2009). These results may look 
paradoxical to ours but there are three possible explanations for this. (I) Some of the previous studies 
implied that high-level features such as shape and texture affect performance more strongly than 
luminance. However, shape and texture are higher-level features that depend on low-level features 
such as luminance and contrast. Hence, it is difficult to make assumptions about their separate 
contributions to performance as they were not independently assessed. (II) Other studies found a high 
object recognition performance even after decreasing image luminance or contrast. We would like to 
stress that the robustness of such performance after degradation of images does not necessarily have to 
relate to the impact of image features on performance. Very low levels of luminance or contrast might 
still be successfully extracted and employed by our visual system and enhance performance. For 
example, objects in isoluminant images are hard to recognize but only a very small deviation from the 
equilibrium of isoluminance substantially recovers recognition performance (Liebmann, 1927, 
Schiller, Logothetis & Charles, 1991, West, Spillmann, Cavanagh, Mollon & Hamlin, 1996). (III) In 
contrast to previous studies, we accounted for contrast of the object separated from its background. As 
we find that background contrast rather than image contrast correlated with performance, studies that 
manipulated contrast of the whole image could possibly have found larger effects on performance if 
only the object or background would have been manipulated separately. In sum, this suggests that 
luminance and luminance contrast are not unimportant per se, but their importance may depend on 
relations to higher order features, on other features available, and on the objects they constitute. 
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6.4.4 Dissociation between detection and identification 
Though many image statistics relate to both detection and identification performance, several other 
statistics relate to only one of them. In contrast to detection, identification was not significantly 
affected by animal contrast, object size, and variance of object radius. Several other significant 
correlations with identification were weaker than with detection. This dissociation, however, is subtle 
and it is hard to draw conclusions regarding distinct visual processes or stages that could separately 
establish successful detection and identification of objects. However, it has been proposed that correct 
detection and classification of animals may rely on the analysis of low-level image features rather than 
on a high-level object and scene representations (e.g., Evans & Treisman, 2005). Importantly, note that 
detection is not an equivalent but perhaps a prerequisite of identification. Observers might be able to 
classify an object into a category without being able to identify and thus report which exact object they 
have seen (also see our animal species mix-up results in Figure 4I), while successful identification 
cannot occur unless the object as a whole is correctly detected. As such, it is tempting to suggest that 
after correct detection and the extraction of the object from its background, image features – especially 
that of object‟s shape – might lose their usefulness with respect to object processing. That object and 
background/scene information is processed by distinct visual areas (Epstein, Graham & Downing, 
2003, Epstein & Kanwisher, 1998) elegantly concurs with this idea. In the context of these 
dissociations, our data therefore stress the importance to distinguish between detection and 
identification in experimental designs. 
6.4.5 Weak and reversed contribution of anxiety to performance 
Anxiety induced by the animal depicted in the presented images slightly correlated with performance. 
A partial correlation – controlling for image statistics – revealed a negative effect of anxiety on 
reaction times and confidence (i.e., high fear reduced performance). A GLM showed that emotional 
affect rather than anxiety was a significant predictor of performance. These results appear to conflict 
with several earlier studies, which found that objects that induce fear or negative feelings facilitated 
processing. However, there are two possibilities that may explain this apparent discrepancy. First, 
167 
 
 
stronger effects of image features on performance shadowed effects of anxiety when performance was 
assessed per animal category.  This could explain the contrasting results of recent studies that report 
significant fear-induced increases in performance for threatening animals in some cases (e.g., Lobue & 
DeLoache, 2008, Ohman et al., 2001) and none or non-specific increase in other cases (e.g., Lipp et 
al., 2004, Tipples et al., 2002). When categorizing a small number of images into the categories 
“fearful” or “non-fearful” it is conceivable that one or more low-level image features are 
overrepresented in one of these categories and eventually lead to differences in performance across 
categories. If this confound is not controlled for, a facilitation of processing by low-level features may 
shadow or even reverse the intended effect of threat. Second, it is possible that the advantage does not 
arise for threatening animals as such, but rather for them being mammals. An advantage for mammals 
might be based on our increased expertise with this category, which in turn yields better performance. 
Mammals also have very large and salient eyes and this may too facilitate detection (Delorme et al., 
2010). As such, some of the earlier studies may have confounded threat with expertise. Including 
expertise as factor in addition to threat and low level features may thus be an interesting line of future 
research. 
The very short presentation times used in the current design may additionally have played an 
important role for the presence of fear-related effects. Many of the previous studies that report an 
effect of anxiety used a visual-search paradigm in which there is sufficient time for the deployment of 
attention to the stimuli. It could be that attention cannot be deployed successfully if images are 
presented very briefly. There is some evidence that attention is crucial for the processing of fear-
relevant stimulus as reported in a recent fMRI study. Alpers et al. (2009) found that attention is 
important for the activation of the amygdala, a brain structure important for the processing of fear-
relevant stimuli, during the presentation of spiders. As such, very brief presentation times might not be 
sufficient to trigger attention related processes and therefore might not activate the mechanism that 
enhances the processing of fear-relevant stimuli. Nevertheless, even for brief presentations times, our 
results depict effects of anxiety on performance and agree with the view that anxiety acts as a separate 
mechanism by modulating the processing of and responses to threatening objects. 
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6.4.6 Pupil size changes reflect anxiety  
Changes in pupil size have been related to a variety of psychological mechanisms including responses 
to the onset of novel and/or alerting stimuli (e.g., Andreassi, 2000, Beatty & Lucero-Wagoner, 2000, 
Hakerem, 1967, Hess, 1975, Janisse, 1977, Kahneman, 1973). Here we have assessed how the pupil 
responses to onset of images that induced different levels of anxiety and that contained a broad range 
of image features. We find that two types of how anxiety is reflected in the pupil: (I) short-term 
anxiety (i.e., temporary state of anxiety) was reflected in the pupil as frightening animals induced 
larger pupillary responses (i.e., more negativity in the amplitude) to the image, and (II) long-term 
anxiety (i.e., the overall level of anxiety of an individual) was reflected in the average pupil size 
throughout the experiment as this correlated with the mean anxiety ratings of observers. These finding 
agree with a previous study that showed increased pupillary response amplitudes for panic disorder 
patients (Kojima, Shioiri, Hosoki, Kitamura, Bando & Someya, 2004), but also disagrees with another 
study that reported decreased amplitudes for normal observers with an increased state-anxiety. As 
Bitsios et al. (2002) used auditory stimuli that were sometimes paired with unconditioned shocks, it 
could be that the experimental design underlies these results. Indeed, such aversive unconditioned 
stimuli may have other effects on pupillary responses than non-aversive stimuli (e.g., Reinhard & 
Lachnit, 2002a). Furthermore, our results show that mean anxiety ratings were higher for observers 
with smaller pupil sizes. This is unexpected as it is generally reported that raised levels of anxiety 
increase the pupil size (Nagai et al., 2002, Simpson & Molloy, 1971). Thus, in contrast to previous 
reports, our data suggest that an observers‟ increased level of anxiety is reflected in an overall 
decrement of pupil size. Unlike these previous studies, which used standardized psychological 
questionnaires to assess state- and trait-anxiety or audience anxiety (Simpson & Molloy, 1971), we 
here based the anxiety level on subjective image ratings, as our primary aim was to obtain the relative 
anxiety on an image-by-image basis. Whether higher general anxiety levels according to standardized 
test yields a different internal mapping of anxiety to our 0-100 scale or whether image-based anxiety 
ratings are fundamentally different from other types of anxiety remains an open issue. It is known, 
however, that both state and trait anxiety affect other physiological signals, such as heart rate (Kantor, 
169 
 
 
Endler, Heslegrave, Kocovski, 2001). It is therefore not unlikely that the pupil is similarly affected by 
both mechanisms and that we have at least measured some form of anxiety. As several months elapsed 
between pupil size and anxiety measurements (see Stimuli and Procedure - Methods), it is likely that 
we have measured effects of trait rather than state anxiety because the former remains stable over time 
(e.g., Rule & Traver, 1983). Nonetheless, state anxiety might have changed between these moments. 
Such changes could potentially increase variance and therefore decrease correlations between anxiety 
and performance, or anxiety and pupil measurement. Although this hypothesis is interesting of its own 
right and may merit further investigation, it still cannot account for the seemingly contrary effects of 
anxiety on pupil size or performance. 
Based on the relative image-by-image ratings we can speculate on some of the mechanisms 
underlying the relation between anxiety and pupillary control. Activation of the parasympathetic 
nervous system (PSNS) is responsible for contracting the pupil at short intervals (600ms) while an 
activated sympathetic nervous system (SNS) tends to dilate the pupil over longer time intervals 
(1100ms) (e.g., Steinhauer & Hakerem, 1992). The increased contraction and larger pupillary response 
amplitudes could thus be a result of an overall activation of the PSNS through anxiety-related 
processes. Such a relation between anxiety and the PSNS is not implausible as there are known 
neuronal connections between amygdala and locus coerules (Bitsios et al., 2002) – both fear mediating 
nuclei (Charney et al., 1995, Davis, 1992). These have projections to the midbrain Edinger-Westphal 
nucleus which is a parasympathetic control site for pupillary contraction (e.g., Einhäuser et al., 2008b, 
Loewenfeld, 1993). Our results do not rule out the possibility that these connections are part of the 
subcortical “quick and dirty” pathway that has been proposed to be responsible for the processing of 
conditioned threatening stimuli (LeDoux, 1996). 
Also remarkable were the correlations between confidence or reaction time, and pupil size 
before image onset and around the pupillary response. We suppose this is most likely the result of 
general vigilance. As people have an increased level of attention and/or arousal, the pupil is subject to 
more variance and reacts more vigorously to visual changes. This would lead to faster pupillary 
responses and a faster settling back of the pupil size to its baseline. Indeed, we find that the 
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correlations were most evident during the phases of dilation or contraction, thus during periods the 
pupil size was either decreasing or increasing at high speed (0-500ms and 1200-2000ms). It would be 
interesting to study the neurological basis of such vigilance effects and related pupillary dynamics in 
more detail. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
To summarize, features that pop-out the object from its background mainly accounted for both 
detection and identification performance. Furthermore, high image luminance increased and high 
background contrast decreased performance. Anxiety only weakly and negatively affected 
performance although it pupil responses to fearful images showed that anxiety is a valid concept that 
changes neural processing. We further reported a slight dissociation between how particular image 
features affect detection and identification performance separately. These results indicate that future 
studies on object processing should strongly control for relative effects of image features, inter-
correlations, and their relation to a variety of performance measures. 
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6.8 Appendix – Supplementary analyses 
Analyzing data separately by observer (Figure 8A-D) or pooling across observers (8E-H) yields 
qualitatively similar results to the individual data presented in Figure 4. Post-hoc tests including the 
respective test-statistics and confidence intervals for all statistical analysis are provided in Table 2. 
Inspecting the raw data underlying the correlations between performance measures and features 
(image statistics and emotional valences) individually (Figure 9) verifies that the reported correlations 
are not dominated by outliers (cf. Figure 5). A factor analysis revealed groupings of features (Figure 
10). Variables that were largely redundant with other variables - namely background luminance 
(grouped with background contrast and image luminance, red group in Figure 10) or did by themselves 
not correlate to any performance measure (image contrast, background saturation) were excluded from 
subsequent GLM analysis. 
 
Figure 8. Performance details. Box-plots of the data shown in figure 4: median (red line), 25th and 75th percentiles (blue 
boxes), and extent of the data without outliers (black dashed lines). (A-D) Data across observers, (E-H) pooled data. (A,E) 
reaction times, (B,E) confidence ratings, (C,F) anxiety ratings (D,G) emotional affect.  
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Figure 9. Scatter-plots for all correlations between performance measures and features. Plots of performance (y-axis) as 
a function of image statistics or emotional valences (x-axis). Each data point indicates the average performance per image. 
Data was z-score normalized and each line that indicates an axis corresponds to z-score values between -10 and 10. Blue lines 
are fitted linear regressions. Order of features and performance measures as in Figure 5. 
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Figure 10. Factor analysis. Image features as a function of three factors that indicate high covariance across features. The 
colors indicate groups of image features that covariate. Abbreviations as in figure 5. 
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6.9 Tables 
Table 1. GLM – Effects of image statistics and emotional valences on performance (significant predictors are printed in 
bold). 
Detection 
 
Identification 
Variable Beta T stat. P value Variable Beta T stat. P value 
Lum. Im. 0.214 3.97 < 0.001 Lum. Im. 0.122 2.11 < 0.05 
Lum. Ani. -0.021 0.33 > 0.50 Lum. Ani. -0.020 0.29 > 0.75 
Con. Ani. 0.148 2.92 < 0.01 Con. Ani. 0.077 1.42 > 0.10 
Con. Bg. -0.271 6.25 < 0.001 Con. Bg. -0.248 5.27 < 0.001 
Sat. Im. -0.044 0.86 > 0.20 Sat. Im. -0.029 0.53 > 0.50 
Sat. Ani. 0.126 2.55 < 0.05 Sat. Ani. 0.152 2.89 < 0.01 
Col. Con. Ani.-
Bg. 
0.020 0.34 > 0.50 
Col. Con. Ani.-
Bg. 
-0.064 1.02 > 0.20 
Col.+Lum. 
Con. Ani.-Bg. 
0.163 2.87 < 0.01 
Col.+Lum. Con. 
Ani.-Bg. 
0.176 2.90 < 0.01 
Size Ani. 0.082 2.22 < 0.05 Size Ani. -0.003 0.08 > 0.75 
Var. Rad. Ani. 0.059 1.63 > 0.10 Var. Rad. Ani. 0.070 1.81 > 0.05 
Anxiety 0.030 0.66 > 0.50 Anxiety -0.005 0.10 > 0.75 
Emotional 
Affect 
0.131 2.89 < 0.01 
Emotional 
Affect 
0.025 0.51 > 0.50 
 
 
Reaction Times 
 
Confidence 
Variable Beta T stat. P value Variable Beta T stat. P value 
Lum. Im. -0.145 2.49 < 0.05 Lum. Im. 0.202 3.78 < 0.001 
Lum. Ani. -0.034 0.50 > 0.50 Lum. Ani. -0.047 0.75 > 0.20 
Con. Ani. -0.043 0.79 > 0.20 Con. Ani. 0.092 1.83 > 0.05 
Con. Bg. 0.112 2.38 < 0.05 Con. Bg. -0.358 8.21 < 0.001 
Sat. Im. 0.065 1.18 > 0.20 Sat. Im. -0.062 1.22 > 0.20 
Sat. Ani. -0.086 1.62 > 0.10 Sat. Ani. 0.150 3.05 < 0.01 
Col. Con. Ani.-
Bg. 
0.024 0.37 > 0.50 
Col. Con. Ani.-
Bg. 
-0.007 0.12 > 0.75 
Col.+Lum. 
Con. Ani.-Bg. 
-0.060 0.98 > 0.20 
Col.+Lum. Con. 
Ani.-Bg. 
0.210 3.71 < 0.001 
Size Ani. -0.069 1.78 > 0.05 Size Ani. 0.108 2.95 < 0.01 
Var. Rad. Ani. -0.126 3.26 < 0.01 Var. Rad. Ani. 0.068 1.88 > 0.05 
Anxiety -0.030 0.61 > 0.50 Anxiety 0.053 1.15 > 0.20 
Emotional 
Affect 
-0.061 1.24 > 0.20 
Emotional 
Affect 
0.133 2.90 < 0.01 
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Table 2. Post-hoc comparisons across animal categories. Only the post-hoc tests for significant 
differences as indicated by an ANOVA are depicted. Significant differences (p<0.05) are highlighted 
in BOLD text. 
Detection Probability 
p-values Phobic Predators Domesticated Pets 
Predators 0.0046    
Domesticated 0.0022 0.0194   
Pets 0.0045 0.0933 0.2245  
Non-phobic 0.1409 0.0599 0.0011 0.0285 
 
t-statistic Phobic Predators Domesticated Pets 
Predators 4.0910    
Domesticated 4.6858 3.0180   
Pets 4.1098 1.9414 -1.3321  
phobic 1.6598 -2.2419 -5.3225 -2.7500 
 
confidence 
intervals Phobic Predators Domesticated Pets 
Predators 0,0510/0.1909    
Domesticated 0.1003/0.3045 0.0176/0.1453   
Pets 0.0692/0.2568 -0.0092/0.0933 -0.1093/0.0305  
phobic -0.0191/0.1089 -0.1562/0.0042 -0.2274/-0.0875 -0.2197/-0.0166 
 
Reaction times (all) 
p-values Phobic Predators Domesticated Pets 
Predators 0.0105    
Domesticated 0.0001 0.0025   
Pets 0.0042 0.2656 0.0955  
phobic 0.6386 0.0215 0.0007 0.0159 
 
t-statistic Phobic Predators Domesticated Pets 
Predators -3.4605    
Domesticated -8.5654 -4.6003   
Pets -4.1774 -1.2099 1.9260  
phobic 0.4907 2.9485 5.8047 3.1620 
 
confidence 
intervals Phobic Predators Domesticated Pets 
Predators -0.0389/-0.0073    
Domesticated -0.0687/-0.0390 -0.0465/-0.0149   
Pets -0.0496/-0.0137 -0.0253/0.0082 -0.0050/0.0494  
phobic -0.0158/0.0241 0.0054/0.0491 0.0343/0.0816 0.0090/0.0625 
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Reaction times (only correctly detected) 
p-values Phobic Predators Domesticated Pets 
Predators 0.0136    
Domesticated 0.0006 0.0028   
Pets 0.0002 0.5411 0.0885  
phobic 0.9107 0.0146 0.0003 0.0220 
 
t-statistic Phobic Predators Domesticated Pets 
Predators -3.2719    
Domesticated -5.9072 -4.4919   
Pets -7.3335 -0.6423 1.9774  
phobic -0.1163 3.2241 6.6696 2.9295 
 
confidence 
intervals Phobic Predators Domesticated Pets 
Predators -0.0571/-0.0092    
Domesticated -0.0944/-0.0404 -0.0523/-0.0162   
Pets -0.0545/-0.0279 -0.0379/0.0217 -0.0051/0.0575  
phobic -0.0257/0.0233 0.0085/0.0553 0.0427/0.0896 0.0077/0.0723 
 
Confidence 
p-values Phobic Predators Domesticated Pets 
Predators 0.0059    
Domesticated 0.0001 0.0838   
Pets 0.0013 0.4643 0.0432  
phobic 0.4892 0.0336 0.0003 0.0043 
 
t-statistic Phobic Predators Domesticated Pets 
Predators 3.9023    
Domesticated 8.2335 2.0149   
Pets 5.1675 0.7739 -2.4636  
phobic 0.7298 -2.6358 -6.6331 -4.1559 
 
confidence 
intervals Phobic Predators Domesticated Pets 
Predators -2.1860/8.6082    
Domesticated 2.2756/9.9036 -3.5802/9.3371   
Pets -2.8243/7.7106 -6.9180/5.3821 -8.3628/1.0700  
phobic -5.2042/3.5173 -10.3915/2.2824 -11.0435/-2.8225 -5.8813/-0.6919 
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Anxiety 
p-values Phobic Predators Domesticated Pets 
Predators 0.0060    
Domesticated 0.0001 0.0000   
Pets 0.0000 0.0000 0.1430  
phobic 0.0000 0.0000 0.7555 0.5044 
 
t-statistic Phobic Predators Domesticated Pets 
Predators 3.8816    
Domesticated -8.7288 -14.2350   
Pets -12.1246 -37.7291 -1.6498  
phobic -13.0446 -12.8014 -0.3238 0.7036 
 
confidence 
intervals Phobic Predators Domesticated Pets 
Predators 4.9700/20.4646    
Domesticated -71.020/-40.743 -79.994/-57.203   
Pets -74.762/-50.360 -79.996/-70.560 -16.253/2.894  
phobic -68.482/-47.464 -83.748/-57.633 -17.366/13.182 -10.830/20.005 
 
Emotional affect 
p-values Phobic Predators Domesticated Pets 
Predators 0.0259    
Domesticated 0.0009 0.4824   
Pets 0.0007 0.0225 0.1478  
phobic 0.0008 0.7212 0.2749 0.0101 
 
t-statistic Phobic Predators Domesticated Pets 
Predators 2.8155    
Domesticated 5.5024 0.7417   
Pets 5.7372 2.9147 1.6270  
phobic 5.6226 0.3716 -1.1845 -3.4914 
 
confidence 
intervals Phobic Predators Domesticated Pets 
Predators 3.4930/40.1280    
Domesticated 16.7287/41.9421 -16.4653/31.5151   
Pets 22.9300/55.0841 3.2455/31.1475 -4.3844/23.7277  
phobic 14.2240/34.8715 -14.6798/20.1543 -14.3454/4.7702 -24.2520/-4.6665 
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Abstract 
Declarative memories of personally experienced episodes are a key factor in defining oneself as an 
individual, which becomes particularly evident when this capability is impaired. Assessing the 
physiological mechanisms of human declarative memory is typically restricted to patients with 
specific lesions, requires invasive brain access, or functional imaging. We investigated whether the 
pupil, an accessible physiological measure, can be utilized to probe memories for complex natural 
scenes. During memory encoding, scenes that were later remembered elicited a stronger pupil 
constriction compared to scenes that were later forgotten. Thus, the pupil reflects the success or failure 
of memory formation. During retrieval, unfamiliar scenes elicited stronger pupil constriction than 
familiar scenes. The pupil responses for familiar scenes during retrieval were similar to the responses 
to later forgotten scenes during encoding, suggesting that insufficient novelty detection contributes to 
encoding failures. Pupil responses during retrieval related more strongly to the subjective belief of 
familiarity than to the objective truth. Nonetheless, the difference between old and novel persisted 
when memory encoding and retrieval were incidental. All our results were robust across observers, 
images, and task difficulty, and could not be attributed to image features or the observer's confidence. 
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One interpretation of our findings suggests that a cholinergic novelty signal triggered a stronger 
memory encoding and subsequent pupil constriction for scenes perceived as subjectively novel. In 
sum, we show that pupil size, long known to be related to working memory, is also a robust correlate 
of the encoding and retrieval of declarative memories. 
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7.1 Introduction 
Distinguishing novel from familiar items is a key function of the nervous system with immediate 
relevance for survival (Sokolov, 1963). Consequently, many parts of the human brain react differently 
to novel as compared to familiar items. For instance, several processes of memory encoding are only 
triggered if the item is considered novel (Knight, 1996), while familiar items trigger memory retrieval 
processes (Gonsalves, Kahn, Curran, Norman & Wagner, 2005, Squire, Wixted & Clark, 2007). 
Various brain areas are involved in distinguishing familiar from unfamiliar stimuli, including the 
medial temporal lobe (MTL) (Gonsalves et al., 2005, Knight, 1996, Rutishauser, Mamelak & 
Schuman, 2006, Rutishauser, Schuman & Mamelak, 2008, Viskontas, Knowlton, Steinmetz & Fried, 
2006, Xiang & Brown, 1998), Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, and dorsal posterior parietal cortex 
(Desimone, 1996, Grill-Spector, Henson & Martin, 2006, Kumaran & Maguire, 2009, Montaldi, 
Spencer, Roberts & Mayes, 2006, Ranganath & Rainer, 2003, Yonelinas, Otten, Shaw & Rugg, 2005). 
While some memories are implicit and only expressed in changed behavior, others are explicit such 
that observers can declare and assess the quality of their own memories (Tulving, 2002). The 
formation and retrieval of such declarative memories requires the MTL (Squire, Stark & Clark, 2004). 
This differential engagement of particular structures such as the MTL has been used successfully to 
predict whether novel items will later be remembered (Chadwick, Hassabis, Weiskopf & Maguire, 
2010, Hassabis, Chu, Rees, Weiskopf, Molyneux & Maguire, 2009, Johnson, McDuff, Rugg & 
Norman, 2009, McDuff, Frankel & Norman, 2009, Polyn, Natu, Cohen & Norman, 2005, Rutishauser 
et al., 2006) and whether, during retrieval, an item will be recognized correctly and with which 
confidence (Paller & Wagner, 2002, Rissman, Greely & Wagner, 2010). These measurements require 
either invasive access to the brain or sophisticated machinery to infer brain activity (e.g., functional 
magnetic resonance imaging), severely limiting their applicability outside the laboratory and in 
clinical practice. Here we ask whether the pupil size, a simple and outwardly accessible physiological 
measure, can similarly serve as probe of declarative memory processes. 
Besides its rapid constriction in response to bright stimuli (Loewenfeld & Lowenstein, 1993), 
the pupil reacts to a variety of cognitive processes, such as attention (Daniels et al., 2009, Kahneman, 
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1973, Karatekin, 2004, Karatekin et al., 2004), emotions (Bitsios et al., 2002, Charney et al., 1995, 
Nagai et al., 2002, Simpson & Molloy, 1971, Steinhauer et al., 1983), arousal (Bradshaw, 1967, Yoss 
et al., 1970), decisions (Simpson & Hale, 1969), or cognitive load (Hess & Polt, 1964). Cognitive 
processes can enhance or inhibit pupil constriction via several, mostly noradrenergic and cholinergic, 
pathways (Samuels & Szabadi, 2008). This results in the pupil size exhibiting complex temporal 
response patterns.  In the context of memory, pupil size has long been known to increase with working 
memory load (Granholm et al., 1996, Kahneman & Beatty, 1966). Since the neural mechanisms of 
short- and long-term memory are largely distinct and interact in complex ways (Ranganath & 
Blumenfeld, 2005), it is unclear whether a similarly clear relationship between long-term memory 
performance and pupil size exists. Only very recently, several studies have started to address the 
relation between pupil size and forms of memory other than working memory (Heaver & Hutton, 
2011, Otero, Weekes & Hutton, 2011, Sterpenich, D'Argembeau, Desseilles, Balteau, Albouy, 
Vandewalle, Degueldre, Luxen, Collette & Maquet, 2006, Võ, Jacobs, Kuchinke, Hofmann, Conrad, 
Schacht & Hutzler, 2008). During memory retrieval of words presented visually or auditory, the pupil 
dilates more for words that have been shown in a preceding study session (Otero et al., 2011, Võ et al., 
2008). While only familiar words were used, such that no word itself was novel, this previous study 
showed that the pupil can distinguish items based on their recency during retrieval. Similarly, the pupil 
shows a transient increase for famous as compared to non-famous faces (Maw & Pomplun, 2004). In 
both studies, stimuli (words or faces) were previously known, and whether such a relationship exists 
for novel stimuli such as previously unseen natural scenes or unknown faces remains open. Small 
words presented on an otherwise unchanged screen cause little overall luminance change and thus 
allow to easily isolate a memory-related pupil response. However, in a more realistic situation, a 
memory-driven pupil response is intermixed with a stimulus-driven component. Whether such a 
putative memory-component of the pupil response can be isolated is unknown. The presentation of 
novel stimuli initiates learning processes and the extent to which these processes succeed determines 
whether a memory will be established or not. The pupil responds to novel items, but whether a 
significant relationship between the extent of dilation in response to novel items and later memory for 
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those items is not known. Previously, no such relationship could be identified for words (Võ et al., 
2008).  To the best of our knowledge, no study so far has addressed the relation of pupil dilation to the 
formation of declarative memories for truly novel items, their later retrieval among novel distracters, 
nor used used complex natural stimuli to probe the relation between pupil dilation and memory. In a 
series of four experiments, we monitored pupil dilation during presentation of novel natural scenes, 
which we either asked participants to explicitly memorize (exps. 1-3) or to merely use for performing 
a mock task (exp. 4). We continued by measuring pupil dilation during retrieval, when participants 
were either asked to distinguish the previously presented scenes from novel ones (exps. 1-3) or during 
incidental retrieval (exp. 4). This allows us – for the first time - to rigorously evaluate the potential 
usefulness of pupil dilation for both the prediction of memory formation during encoding as well as 
recognition during retrieval for declarative memories of complex natural stimuli. We conclude by 
discussing the neural pathways that drive the different components of the pupil response and their 
overlap with different components of memory formation, which can be accessed conveniently by 
monitoring the pupil. 
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7.2 Methods 
7.2.1 Procedure 
In four experiments, we measured pupil responses of 8 observers during memorization and during 
retrieval of natural images. Experiments 1, 2 and 3 each consisted of a sequence of three phases.  First, 
observers were asked to memorize 100 different images, each of which was presented for 1s and 
followed by a 8s blank period (Figure 1A). This memorization phase was followed by a distraction 
phase, during which observers performed a Stroop-task (Figure 1B). This task was merely to prevent 
active rehearsal and is not considered further. During the retrieval phase the 100 “memorized” old 
images were presented randomly intermixed with 100 different novel images for 1s each. Each image 
was followed by a blank period, during which observers simultaneously indicated by pressing one of 
six buttons, whether the image had been presented during the memorization phase ("old image") or not 
("novel image") and how confident they were of their decision (3 levels of confidence: “Confident”, 
“Probable”, or “Guess” , Figure 1C). After a further 1.5s of blank the next image was shown. In 
retrieval, observers could indicate their response any time after stimulus onset and the next trial only 
started after a response was given during retrieval (on average there was one trial about every 4s). 
Thus, images were presented every 9 seconds during memorization and about every 4 seconds during 
retrieval The distraction phase either lasted for 5 minutes (experiment 1 and 2) or 20 minutes 
(experiment 3). Observers were instructed to fixate before and after image presentation. The fixation 
point (1° radius) was green before image onset and red after image offset, indicating that observers 
were allowed or not allowed to blink, respectively. Observers were allowed to scan the image (i.e., 
make eye movements) during presentation.  
In experiment 4, we tested whether pupilometric effects related to memory require explicit 
memorization. Therefore we asked a new group of 8 observers to imagine participation as judges in a 
photo contest and rate the aesthetic quality of several images instead of categorizing images as 
novel/familiar. During an exposure phase, which matched the memorization phase of experiments 1, 2 
and 3 except for the instruction, observers were instructed “to become an expert for a particular set of 
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images such that we could investigate the effect of expertise on inter-observer rating reliability”. To 
ensure that observers did not explicitly recognize the images during the “retrieval” phase, observers 
were only asked to rate the aesthetic quality ("how beautiful do you rate this image?") on a scale from 
0 to 100 rather than indicating whether they had previously seen the image (Figure 1D). In all other 
aspects the procedure of experiment 4 was identical to that of experiment 1-3 except that it did not 
contain a distraction phase. 
 
Figure 1. Tasks. (A) Memorization phase for experiments 1 through 3, exposure phase for experiment 4. Observers were 
asked to memorize 100 images (Exp.1-3) or had to watch images without explicit instruction for memorization (exp. 4). 
Image examples are from experiment 1. (B) Distraction phase for experiments 1 through 3, observers performed a Stroop-
task to prevent active rehearsal (5mins in Exp. 1,2; 20mins in Exp. 3). (C) During the retrieval phase of experiments 1-3, 
observers were presented 200 images, of which 100 had been shown during memorization, and had to report whether the 
image was old or novel and the confidence in their decision by a single button press (levels in the order of assigned buttons: 
"1: novel, confident", "2: novel, probably", "3: novel, guess", "4: old, guess", "5: old, probably", "6: old, confident"). (D) In 
experiment 4, observers watched 100 novel images (as shown in panel A) and were then asked to rate the aesthetic quality of 
100 novel and 100 old images on a scale from 0 (not beautiful) to 100 (very beautiful) rather than explicitly reporting 
recognition. 
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7.2.2 Stimuli 
Three different image databases consisting of 200 images each were used (see Figure 2). In 
experiment 1 and 3, images belonged to the following five object categories: Houses, general 
landscapes, vehicles, phones, and animals. In experiment 2, images were divided in five natural scene 
categories: Bushes, mountains, mushrooms, forests, water. Images in experiment 4 similarly belonged 
to five natural categories: Flowers, general landscapes, mushrooms, forests, meadows. Images in 
experiment 2 and 4 were more alike per category than images in experiment 1 and 3, and thus more 
difficult to memorize as reflected in memory performance (see Results). Images were 10° wide and 7° 
high in visual angle. 
 
Figure 2. Example images shown to observers. Common objects and diverging landscapes were presented in experiments 1 
and 3 and natural images were presented in experiment 2 and 4. Image database was the same for experiment 1 and 3, but 
different between experiment 2 and 4. Each image database was divided into five categories (see x-labels). 
 
7.2.3 Observers 
Thirty-two observers participated (age range: 21-28, 21 female, 11 male), 8 for each of the 4 
experiments. One observer was removed from the analysis of experiment 3 because of a combination 
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of extreme performance (>95% correct), leaving very few miss and false alarm trials, and a largely 
reduced inter-trial variability in pupil response as compared to all other observers. All observers had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were naïve to the purpose of the studies, and gave informed 
written consent before each experiment. The experiments conformed to the ethical principles of the 
Declaration of Helsinki and were approved by the local ethics commission (Ethikkommission FB04 
Philipps-University Marburg).  
7.2.4 Apparatus 
Stimuli were presented on a 21” Samsung Syncmaster CRT screen at a viewing distance of 70cm. The 
refresh rate of the screen was 85Hz and the resolution was 1280x1024 pixels. Monitor beams CIE 
color space coordinates (x,y) were (0.623, 0.344), (0.287, 0.609), and (0.151, 0.065) for the red, green, 
and blue gun, respectively. Stimuli were generated on an Optiplex 755 DELL computer, using Matlab 
(Mathworks, Natick, MA), the Psychophysics toolbox (Brainard, 1997), and EyeLink toolbox 
(Cornelissen et al., 2002) extensions. Pupil size was tracked with an infrared sensitive camera 
(EyeLink 2000, SR Research, Osgoode, ON, Canada) at a rate of 500Hz. Observers‟ head was 
supported by a chin- and forehead-rest. The eye-tracker was (re)calibrated before each experimental 
phase using a 13-point calibration grid. 
7.2.5 Analysis 
Pupil size was based on the pupil's diameter as recorded by the Eyelink eye-tracking system. During 
blink periods (as detected by the eyelink software), pupil size was interpolated with a cubic-spline fit. 
To compare across observers and to measure the effect of pupillary responses to image onset, pupil 
size was first trial-wise normalized to z-scores (subtracting mean and dividing by the standard 
deviation of pupil size). To align pupil size traces at image onset, from each trial's pupil trace the pupil 
size at t=0 was subtracted.  
To quantify retrieval performance, measures from signal-detection theory (SDT) were 
employed. Two kinds of correct decisions were distinguished (Figure 3A, green and cyan squares): 
196 
 
 
correctly identifying an image as old (a “Hit”) or correctly identifying it as new (a “Correct 
Rejection”, CR). Similarly, we distinguished between two types of errors (Figure 3A, magenta and red 
squares): incorrectly identifying an image as old (a “False Alarm”, FA, i.e. a false memory) and 
incorrectly identifying an image as new (a “Miss”, i.e. a forgotten item). Retrieval performance was 
then quantified by the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). Each 
point of the ROC (cf. Figure 3B) is the cumulative average proportion of correctly remembered items 
(hit rate, y-axis) and the proportion of falsely remembered items (false-alarm rate, x-axis) at a given 
confidence level across observers per experiment. A point in the lower left corner (lowest FA and Hit 
rate) corresponds to the highest confidence level (old, confident). The degree of asymmetry of the 
ROC was assessed by fitting the z-transformed ROC with a linear regression for each experiment 
(Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). The slope of this line is 1 if the ROC is symmetric and less than 1 if it 
is asymmetric (Squire et al., 2007, Wixted, 2007). We further utilized the area under the curve (AUC) 
of the ROC to quantify how strong the pupil can dissociate between familiar and unfamiliar images 
(50% is chance, 100% is perfect dissociation). For the AUC calculations, average pupil size between 
1500 and 3000ms after stimulus onset were used.  
 
Figure 3 SDT-Nomenclature and behavioral data. (A) Nomenclature used throughout the paper: Trials are classified into 
one of four categories as a function of stimulus presentation (objective, i.e. ground truth) and subjective report of observers. 
The terms familiar/unfamiliar denote subjective report, old/novel objective truth; the term "familiarity" is used for both, but 
explicitly qualified as "subjective" and "objective", where not clear from context; the terms hit, false alarm, miss and correct 
rejection follow SDT conventions. The color coding indicated is re-used in the following figures. (B) Average hit rate as a 
function of false-alarm rate (crosses), and average receiver operating characteristic (ROC) across observers as a function of 
confidence level (1-6) starting with the highest (6: old, confident) in the lower left quadrant for each experiment. 
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7.3 Results 
7.3.1 Behavior 
In experiments 1-3 we asked observers to memorize a set of 100 images and later tested their retrieval 
performance for these against a novel set of 100 images. Observers had good memory for the easy 
image set in experiment 1 (average Hit: 84.2 ±4.6%, FA: 6.0 ±4.0%) and exp. 3 (average Hit: 
84.6 ±10.0%, FA: 8.4 ±4.0%) while – as intended by the choice of stimulus material - performance 
was significantly lower for the more difficult image set in experiment 2 (average Hit: 76.8 ±9.6%, FA: 
17.8 ±8.2; performance exp. 1 vs. exp. 2: t(14) = 3.07, p < 0.01; exp. 2 vs. exp. 3: t(14) = 2.43, 
p < 0.05; exp. 1 vs. exp. 3: t(14) = 0.35, p > 0.50). Using the 6 confidence levels, we computed the 
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) for each experiment (Figure 3B) (Macmillan & Creelman, 
2005). The areas under the ROC curves (AUC) were 0.93, 0.87, and 0.95 respectively, confirming 
high performance for all experiments. The slopes of the z-transformed ROCs were 0.87, 0.75, 0.74 for 
experiment 1, 2, and 3, respectively, and were significantly smaller than 1 (t(2) = 5.15, p = 0.036). 
This ROC asymmetry is a hallmark of declarative memories (for review see Squire et al., 2007, 
Wixted, 2007), and confirms the validity of our task as a test of declarative memory. 
7.3.2 Pupil responses during memorization predict later recognition 
In experiments 1 through 3 we obtained usable pupil data from 23 observers. During memorization, 
the pupil response to image onset consisted of two components: a fast contraction of the pupil 
approximately 500ms after image onset, followed by a slow dilation of the pupil back to baseline after 
approximately 1000ms (Figure 4A). Pupil responses to images that were later successfully 
remembered (hits) were stronger (Figure 4A; green) compared to images that were later forgotten 
(misses, Figure 4A; red). This difference was significant for the average pupil size in the second after 
image offset across all experiments (t(22) = 2.21, p = 0.038), and for each individual experiment 
(Figure 4B). As a function of time, the difference was significant (p<0.05, uncorrected) for each 
individual time point starting 511ms after image onset (Figure 4A, gray bar). There was no significant 
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correlation between the luminance of an image and its probability of being remembered (Exp. 1-3: 
r(299) = 0.09, p = 0.139; Exp. 1: r(99) = 0.032, p = 0.75; Exp. 2: r(99) = -0.029, p = 0.78; Exp. 3: 
r(99) = 0.008, p = 0.94), verifying that this difference is not caused by luminance impacting 
memorization and pupil alike, but by one or more cognitive factors. Hence, the pupil response during 
memorization robustly predicts whether or not an image will later be remembered during retrieval. 
 
 
Figure 4. Pupil response during memorization predicts whether an image will later be remembered or forgotten. (A) 
Average pupil size as a function of time and memorization success. Z-scores were calculated per trial, and subsequently 
traces were normalized to image onset. Throughout the text, the terms "weaker constriction" and "stronger constriction" are 
used, irrespective of whether the physiological origin is a stronger/weaker constriction or a weaker/stronger dilation signal. 
Later remembered stimuli (hits) are green, later forgotten (misses) red. Image onset is at t = 0. Shading around average pupil 
size indicates s.e.m. across all trials of experiments 1-3. Grey patch at the top of the panel indicates time points of significant 
(p < 0.05) differences. (B) Difference (Δ) in average pupil size between hits and misses (hits minus misses) as a function of 
time for each experiment. Shaded areas indicate when the image was on the screen (1s total). Trials were pooled across all 
observers, and across all experiments (panel A) or per experiment (panel B). 
 
7.3.3 Pupil responses during retrieval distinguishes familiar from novel images 
During retrieval, images judged as unfamiliar (Misses and CRs) resulted in stronger pupil constrictions 
compared to subjectively familiar images (Hits and FAs). This main effect of subjective memory was 
significant starting approximately half a second after image onset (Figure 5A, see grey patches; 
F(1,4797) > 3.98, p < 0.05 for each time point after 615ms), well before observers typically responded 
(mean±sd response times for Exps. 1-3: 2193 ±499ms, 2214 ±424ms, 2229 ±354ms). The pupil 
response for Hits (Figure 5A, green) started to transition from the correct rejection and miss trace to 
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the false-alarm trace after approximately one second. On average, the false-alarm pupil response was 
attenuated earlier than the hit response, indicating that some additional factors, such as reduced 
alertness or vigilance, may make an early contribution to false alarms.  The fact that the difference 
between hits and misses has the opposite sign during retrieval as compared to the memorization phase 
provides compelling evidence against any confound by low-level image features that could have 
potentially influenced pupil and memory alike. Instead, the pupil response that robustly predicts 
whether or not an image will be recognized or has been recognized must be related to higher-level, 
cognitive factors.  
7.3.4 Subjective and objective familiarity 
Unlike subjective familiarity (Hits+FA vs. misses+CR), which shows a significant effect till the end of 
the trial, objectively novel stimuli (FA+CR) resulted in an stronger pupil constriction compared to 
objectively old stimuli (Hits+Misses) only between 552ms and 990ms after stimulus onset (Figure 5A, 
F(1,4797) > 3.88, p < 0.05). The interaction between subjective report and objective stimulus also 
showed a significant difference in this period (between 621ms and 1027ms, F(1,4797) > 3.87, 
p < 0.05). The time-course of the latter main effect and the interaction statistically confirms the "cross-
over" of the "hit" trace evident in Figure 5A: up to about 1s from matching the objectively similar 
(CR, actually an old image) to the subjectively similar (miss, report unfamiliar). As expected from the 
ANOVA data, a post-hoc t-test showed that pupil responses were significantly stronger for unfamiliar 
compared to familiar images from about stimulus offset (Figure 5B, p < 0.05 for all time-points after 
1008ms). This difference between familiar and unfamiliar iages has a similar time course for all 
experiments (Figure 5C) and is thus independent of task or image-set difficulty. Since the 
discrimination “objectively old” compared to “objectively novel” showed similar behavior (Figure 
5D), this difference cannot be explained by a putative dominance of error trials.  
 
  
200 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Pupil responses during memory retrieval. (A) Average pupil size as a function of time after image onset for the 
conditions Hit (green), Miss (red), CR (cyan), and FA (magenta) pooled across observers and experiments 1-3. Shading 
around average pupil size indicate s.e.m. over all trials and gray patches at the top indicate points of time when pupil size 
differed significantly (p < 0.05) between familiar (Hit+FA) and unfamiliar (Miss+CR) images (subjective report, familiarity; 
light grey), old (Hit+Miss) and novel (CR+ FA) images (objective, stimulus presentation; grey), and when there was a 
significant interaction between report and stimulus (interaction; dark grey). Misses and CRs trials resulted in stronger pupil 
constriction than Hits and FAs. The small colored vertical bars indicate the mean reaction time for each condition, which 
were not significantly different across conditions (F(3,4596) = 1.35, p = 0.26). (B) Comparison of average pupil size 
according to subjective report regardless of correctness, pooled across observers and experiments 1-3. Unfamiliar trials 
(subjectively new; orange) resulted in a significantly stronger pupil constriction compared to familiar trials (subjectively old; 
aqua). (C-D) Difference in average pooled pupil size between familiar-unfamiliar (subjective, panel C), and between old-
novel (objective, panel D) conditions, as a function of time after image onset for each experiment. (E-F) Average normalized 
pupil size for each experiment for familiar (aqua, panel E) and unfamiliar (orange, panel E), and old (yellow-green, panel F) 
and novel images (pink, panel F). Unfamiliar and novel images induced significantly stronger pupil constriction compared to 
familiar and old images, respectively. Average across observers and s.e.m. are indicated in black. 
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7.3.5 Trial-by-trial Robustness 
All effects during retrieval exhibit a high inter-individual consistency. Considering the time 1.5s-3s 
after stimulus onset (i.e., right after the cross-over of the HIT trace), of the 23 observers used, 20 
showed a decreased average pupil size (i.e. a stronger constriction) for unfamiliar as compared to 
familiar images (Figure 5E), and similar for novel as compared to old stimuli (Figure 5F). These 
differences were significant in each individual experiment, with the exception of the objective data in 
Exp. 3, which, however, included one less observer (subjective: Exp. 1: t(7) = 3.96, p = 0.006; Exp. 2: 
t(7) = 3.66, p = 0.08; Exp. 3: t(6) = 2.84, p = 0.030; objective: Exp. 1: t(7) = 2.95, p = 0.021; Exp. 2: 
t(7) = 3.72, p = 0.007; Exp. 3: t(6) = 1.44, p = 0.199). Trial-by-trial analysis showed that the pupil can 
dissociate novel from familiar stimuli above chance (AUC of 50%, see Methods) for subjective 
familiarity (Exp. 1-3: t(22) = 5.47, p < 0.001; Exp. 1: 57 ±5%, t(7) = 4.00, p = 0.005; Exp. 2: 58 ±7%, 
t(7) = 2.99, p = 0.020; Exp. 3: 54 ±4%, t(6) = 2.79, p = 0.032) and – with the exception of experiment 
3 – also for objective familiarity (Exp. 1-4: t(30) = 5.68, p < 0.001; Exp. 1: 55 ±5%, t(7) = 3.15, 
p = 0.016; Exp. 2: 57 ±4%, t(7) = 4.65, p = 0.002; Exp. 3: 52 ±4%, t(6) = 1.29, p = 0.244; Exp. 4: 
53 ±3%, t(6) = 2.75, p = 0.028). These data show that the relation between pupil response and 
recognition is robust both across and within observers, task design and stimulus set. Importantly, the 
pupil response can be used trial-by-trial within a single observer to distinguish familiar from novel 
images. 
7.3.6 The pupil response is primarily driven by subjective familiarity 
Next we tested whether the pupil is dominated by subjective or objective familiarity (i.e., by subjective 
report or objective ground truth). We computed for each observer in experiments 1-3 the effect of 
subjective familiarity as the difference in mean pupil response for images judged as familiar minus 
images judged as unfamiliar (i.e., the difference between left and right data point in Figure 5E). 
Similarly, we computed the effect of objective familiarity as the difference in pupil between actually 
old and novel stimuli (Figure 5F). Comparing these measures, we found that the effect size for 
subjective familiarity was significantly larger than for objective familiarity (difference in pupil size 
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was significantly weaker for the objective condition compared to the subjective, t(22) = 3.17, 
p = 0.004). This confirms the observation (cf. Figure 5A-B) that the pupil – at least after some time 
after image offset has elapsed – is driven more strongly by subjective than by objective familiarity. 
7.3.7 Pupil difference between novel and familiar items does not require explicit 
memorization 
The effects observed during retrieval can potentially be explained by – for example arousal-related - 
processes that are triggered by successfully recognized target images (i.e., an explicit decision). To test 
this, we assessed in experiment 4 whether the pupil size still distinguishes familiar from novel images 
in the absence of explicit recognition (i.e., when no decision related to memory is required). Despite 
the absence of an explicit recognition component in the task, pupil size still distinguished between 
novel and old images (Figure 5D, solid black line). The average pupil size differed significantly 
between objectively novel and old images (Figure 5F, Exp. 4; t(7) = 2.44, p = 0.048). Aesthetic ratings 
for novel and old stimuli did not differ significantly across observers (t(7) = 0.15, p = 0.884; pooled: 
t(1598) = 0.17, p = 0.865), and the correlation between pupil size and aesthetics was weak and 
negative (r(1599) = -0.09, p < 0.001, Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6. Average pupil size for each trial as a function of aesthetic ratings for images. Average pupil size negatively 
correlated with aesthetic ratings as the most beautiful images (rating 100) induced smaller pupil sizes. Grey markers indicate 
data of a single trial per subject, colored line indicates the fitted regression per observer, and the black dotted line is based on 
pooled data across observers.  
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This verifies that the observed relation between objective familiarity and pupil size cannot be 
explained by a putative confound with perceived aesthetics. Experiment 4 therefore demonstrates that 
the difference in pupil size between old and novel items depends neither on explicit retrieval nor on 
explicit memorization.  
7.3.8 Confidence 
Pupil size during retrieval was systematically related to confidence (Figure 7). To statistically assess 
this relation, we performed 2-factor ANOVAs, each with factors confidence (guess, probable, 
confident) and familiarity for data pooled over experiments 1 through 3, separately for subjective and 
objective familiarity. For subjective familiarity, we observed a main effect of confidence (Figure 7A, 
F(2,4594)=12.57, p<0.001). A consistent pattern emerged for both levels of subjective familiarity 
(familiar/unfamiliar): the weakest pupil constriction was elicited at the intermediate level of 
confidence. This inverse U-shape was preserved when objective familiarity (novel vs. old, Figure 7B, 
F(2,4594)=13.13, p<0.001) or only correct trials (Figure 7C, F(2,3910)=10.33, p<0.001) were 
considered. For each level of confidence, subjectively unfamiliar images elicited a stronger pupil 
constriction than familiar ones (Figure 7A, F(1,4594)= 26.58, p<0.001), and there was no significant 
interaction between confidence and subjective familiarity (F(2,4594)=1.23, p=0.29). Objective 
familiarity also showed a significant main effect (F(1,4594)=7.95, p=0.005), and – with the exception 
of the "guess" condition – the same consistent pattern: novel images elicited a stronger pupil 
constriction for confidence levels "probable" and "confident". The deviation of the "guess" condition 
is not surprising, as it contains an abundance of incorrect judgments, and there was a significant 
interaction between objective familiarity and confidence (F(2,4594)=6.08, p=0.002). Indeed, 
considering only correct trials (Figure 7C), the difference between hits (novel and unfamiliar) and 
correct rejects (old and familiar) was again evident for each level of confidence (F(1,3910)=17.20, 
p<0.001) and there was no significant interaction between familiarity and confidence (F(2, 3910)= 
1.60, p=0.20). In sum, this analysis shows that intermediate levels of confidence elicit the weakest 
pupil constriction, effects are more robust for subjective than objective familiarity and – most 
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importantly – the effect of familiarity on the pupil persists for all levels of confidence. The effect of 
confidence, however, independently adds variance to the pupil response: if there were only an effect of 
memory, the weakest pupil constrictions would be expected to be for high-confidence familiar trials, 
contrary to the inverse U-shape actually observed. With pupil size inversely related to uncertainty 
(Preuschoff, 't Hart & Einhäuser, 2011), the inverse U-shape may suggest that on top of the memory 
signal, the pupil signals the uncertainty about one's confidence judgment rather than confidence (i.e., 
the uncertainty about the correctness of one's memory) per se. 
 
 
Figure 7. Subjective confidence is reflected in pupil size. (A) Average pupil size after image offset for all trials as a 
function of confidence ratings per subjective familiarity condition (regardless of objective ruth). Trials for which observers 
reported high confidence (Confident, C) and low confidence (Guess, G) resulted in stronger pupil constriction compared to 
intermediate confident (Probable, P) trials for both familiar (aqua) and unfamiliar images (orange). Trials were pooled across 
observers and experiments 1-3, error bars are s.e.m. across trials. (B) Average pupil size as a function of confidence, sorted 
by objective familiarity - old (light green) and novel (pink). (C) Average pupil size as a function of confidence only for hit 
(green) and correct-rejection (cyan) trials (i.e., subjective=objective). Trials for which observers had high confidence 
(Confident, C) and low confidence (Guess, G) resulted in stronger pupil constriction compared to intermediate confidence 
(Probable, P), independent of the subjective or objective state.  
 
7.3.9 Does the pupil reflect a novelty signal that triggers memorization? 
The stimuli that elicited stronger pupil constriction (or less dilation) during memorization were the 
ones later remembered correctly; during retrieval, novel images elicited stronger constriction than the 
familiar ones. Under the hypothesis that a novelty signal is required to trigger memorization, the pupil 
might reflect this signal: during retrieval the novelty signal is related to novelty directly, during 
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memorization those images correctly tagged as novel are later remembered and thus become hits. If 
true, the pupil response during memorization to images that later become hit should be similar to the 
pupil response for novel images during retrieval. When aligned to the time when constriction started in 
both conditions (t=300ms), later hits indeed elicited similar pupil traces during memorization as novel 
items did during retrieval (Figure 8). The two traces are statistically indistinguishable (p>0.05) from 
0.61s to 2.86s (and, by definition, at 0.3s); that is from well before image offset to well after the 
typical response time. For comparison, we also contrasted the response of later remember stimuli 
during memorization with the response to correctly remembered stimuli during retrieval (green trace 
here vs. aqua trace in Figure 5B) and found a significant difference (from about image offset at 1.02s 
till the end). Note that this significant difference is the result of single-trial learning, since in both 
conditions the same images are shown but once they are novel and the second time familiar. Similarly, 
the response to images later forgotten was significantly different from the response to unfamiliar 
images during retrieval (from 0.65s to the end; misses in Figure 4A vs. orange trace in Figure 8). We 
thus confirmed that we have sufficient statistical power to compare the pupil response between 
memorization and retrieval and the lack of such difference (see above) is thus not due to statistical 
power. Our finding of close similarity between later hits during memorization to novel items during 
retrieval is in line with the hypothesis that stimuli which were subjectively novel were preferentially 
encoded and thus later remembered. In contrast, stimuli which were subjectively less novel (note that 
objectively all stimuli were novel during memorization) were less likely to be remembered. Hence, the 
notion that the pupil response reflects a generic novelty signal provides a possible unifying 
explanation for our results during memorization and retrieval.  
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Figure 8. Comparison of the novelty response during memorization and retrieval. Pupil size during memorization of 
novel images that were later correctly remembered (green) compared to pupil size during retrieval of novel images that were 
reported as unfamiliar (orange). Data are the same as depicted in figures 4A (green trace) and 5B (orange trace), but 
normalized to t=300ms (the time of constriction onset in both conditions to account for the initial unspecific dilation that is 
present in retrieval but not during memorization). 
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7.4 Discussion 
Our data showed robust relations of pupil constriction to declarative long-term memory processes – 
both during memorization and retrieval – for a variety of natural stimulus sets and difficulty levels. 
During memorization, pupil constriction was stronger for images that will later be remembered 
correctly. During retrieval, unfamiliar items trigger stronger constrictions than familiar ones. The 
natural stimuli we used varied in mean luminance, but none of our results could be explained by image 
features or image aesthetics.  The pupil size difference during retrieval was observed for both explicit 
as well as implicit (incidental) retrieval. Also, pupil size was more tightly coupled to the subjective 
judgment of familiarity rather than to the objective truth. 
In learning, the subjective judgment of novelty is hypothesized to be a strong driver of memory 
formation (Knight, 1996). In our data, items later correctly remembered (i.e., items for which a 
memory is successfully formed) showed a stronger constriction during memorization than later 
forgotten items, and the constriction was very similar to the response observed for novel items during 
retrieval. This suggests that the subjective novelty of a stimulus was a primary driver of the pupil 
response. While during memorization all images are objectively equally novel, one determinant of 
later memory strength is the subjective novelty of a stimulus for an individual. In line with the 
novelty-triggers-encoding hypothesis, the similarity of the response for later remembered novel items 
and distractors during retrieval suggests that the later remembered items were subjectively novel to the 
participants and that this in turn facilitated memory formation. 
Whereas relations between working memory load and pupil dilation have long been 
established (Gardner, Beltramo & Krinsky, 1975, Gardner, Philp & Radacy, 1978, Granholm et al., 
1996, Kahneman & Beatty, 1966), no study has yet addressed pupil dilation in the context of long-
term declarative memory for novel natural scenes. We used a 6-point confidence scale during retrieval 
combined with analysis of ROC slopes to verify that our participants had established declarative 
memories. Confidence judgments can be used to distinguish between different models of memory 
according to whether an effect is observed at certain or all levels of confidence. The dual process 
model of declarative memory retrieval assumes there are two different mechanisms involved during 
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familiarity processes (for details, see Wixted, 2007) and predicts that signatures of recollection and 
familiarity judgments should only be visible for high-and low confidence judgments, respectively. In 
contrast, we found that the extent of pupil dilation distinguishes between novel and familiar stimuli for 
all confidence levels. This suggests that the driver of the pupil-response component attributed to 
memory cannot be explained by the dual process model and is driven by other type of mechanisms 
(e.g., the unequal variance signal-detection model; for details, see Wixted, 2007). Our findings 
indicate that the stronger constriction that follows novel stimuli can be utilized successfully to assess 
components of both memory formation as well as retrieval. We deliberately used natural scenes of 
varying luminance and aesthetic value to demonstrate that this effect can be observed in relatively 
realistic situations. This is in contrast to some of the few previous studies that addressed familiarity 
effects in the pupil with words (Heaver & Hutton, 2011, Otero et al., 2011, Võ et al., 2008). 
Participants were asked to study a list of words and were later asked to indicate for another list of 
words whether the word was present on the previously studied list (Heaver & Hutton, 2011, Otero et 
al., 2011, Võ et al., 2008). Importantly, none of the words were novel as such. Hence, rather than 
testing the formation of memory for novel items these studies queried a form of recency and no 
significant relationship between pupil dilation and later memory performance could be found (Võ et 
al., 2008). In contrast, we demonstrate that pupil dilation during memory formation for novel natural 
scenes is predictive of later memory strength, i.e. it exhibits a difference-due-to memory effect (Paller 
& Wagner, 2002) similar to what has previously been found using either invasive recordings or 
imaging (Johnson et al., 2009, Rutishauser, Ross, Mamelak & Schuman, 2010).  Note that in our tasks 
stimuli were seen only once by participants before the memory test, indicating that the old-novel pupil 
difference can develop rapidly after single-trial exposure. This suggests that pupil response is a 
valuable tool to assess memory formation. We consider it likely that simultaneous recordings of pupil 
diameter with other measures, such as invasive electrophysiology or brain imaging, will provide a 
powerful combination of signals that operate on different spatial and temporal scales and may thus 
enable deeper insights into the neural mechanisms of memory formation.  
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Since the pupil  is an outwardly accessible signal that is under little to no volitional control, it has 
been suggested that the pupil may betray covert thoughts in the context of decision making (Einhäuser 
et al., 2010), economic gambling (Wang et al., 2006) or valence judgments in social interactions 
(Harrison et al., 2006), bringing the possibility of lie detection based on the pupil response from mere 
fiction to within reach of reality. Considering the present results, could the pupil also serve as a 
reliable indicator of having seen a stimulus previously? This question becomes of particular interest if 
pupil measurements are combined with brain activity measurements such as fMRI BOLD multi-voxel 
pattern analysis (Rissman et al., 2010), which are also frequently combined with claims of "mind-
reading". We found that the pupil difference persists if retrieval is only implicit rather explicit and a 
previous study indicated that the pupil difference persists also if participants actively try to simulate 
amnesia for the stimuli presented (Heaver & Hutton, 2011). While we – based on the difference in 
temporal resolution – consider it likely that the pupil may provide additional information as compared 
to current fMRI data, this question will only find a definite answer by simultaneous imaging and 
pupillometry. In the context of "lie detection", it is furthermore important to note that our findings 
indicate that the pupil response is more closely related to the subjective judgment of familiarity rather 
than to whether the stimuli are truly familiar. This is in agreement with a previous fMRI BOLD 
decoding study that similarly indicated that primarily the subjective familiarity of faces could be 
decoded (Rissman et al., 2010). This thus indicates that neither the fMRI signal nor the pupil response 
itself could serve as a lie detector in the sense of telling whether or not a person has actually been 
exposed to the stimulus previously. Rather, both measures would serve as a detector of whether a 
person subjectively thinks that a particular stimulus is familiar or novel. Further research, with for 
example truly amnesic patients, will, however, be necessary to confirm or falsify this hypothesis. 
7.4.1 A possible neural account of pupil dynamics 
Cognitive processes affect pupil dynamics through both the sympathetic and parasympathetic 
pathways (e.g., Bradshaw, 1967, Einhäuser et al., 2010, Einhäuser et al., 2008b, Friedman et al., 1973, 
Gilzenrat et al., 2010, Granholm et al., 1996, Hess & Polt, 1964, Jepma & Nieuwenhuis, 2011, 
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Kahneman & Beatty, 1966, Naber, Frässle & Einhäuser, 2011, Raisig et al., 2010, Simpson & Hale, 
1969, Yoss et al., 1970). Pupil dilation via the sympathetic pathway by cognitive processes is assumed 
to be carried mainly by noradrenergic (NA) projections originating in the locus coeruleus (LC) 
(Berridge & Foote, 1991, Jepma, Deinum, Asplund, Rombouts, Tamsma, Tjeerdema, Spapé, Garland, 
Robertson, Lenders & Nieuwenhuis, 2011, Koss, 1986, Nieuwenhuis, de Geus & Aston-Jones, 2011, 
Phillips, Szabadi & Bradshaw, 2000, Rajkowski, Kubiak & Aston-Jones, 1994, Samuels & Szabadi, 
2008, Sterpenich et al., 2006, Vankov, Hervé-Minvielle & Sara, 1995), although direct 
electrophysiological evidence in humans is still lacking. Only rarely, however, has NA been related to 
memory processes, and if so, in particular in the context of processing emotional items (Sterpenich et 
al., 2006). Interestingly, LC neurons respond vigorously to novel objects (Vankov et al., 1995), which 
in humans would result in more dilation, rather than in the stronger constriction observed here. In 
contrast to NA, acetylcholine (ACh), which leads to pupil constriction through the parasympathetic 
nervous system (Hasselmo & Giocomo, 2006) and is best known for mediating the pupil light reflex 
(Loewenfeld & Lowenstein, 1993), seems to play an important role in memory processes: i) ACh 
modulates memory encoding in rats (Hasselmo, 2006, Hasselmo & Giocomo, 2006, Warburton, 
Koder, Cho, Massey, Duguid, Barker, Aggleton, Bashir & Brown, 2003), which has also been shown 
in humans (Kukolja, Thiel & Fink, 2009, Silver, Shenhav & D'Esposito, 2008) with pharmacological  
manipulations. ii) Patients with Alzheimer‟s disease show attenuated pupillary constrictions 
(Fountoulakis et al., 2004, Prettyman et al., 1997) and reduced levels of ACh (Francis et al., 1999). iii) 
ACh release has been related to neural plasticity (Bakin & Weinberger, 1996, Kilgard & Merzenich, 
1998) and memory consolidation during REM sleep (Power, 2004). The complex interplay between 
dilation and constriction renders it difficult to conclude from our data alone, whether "sympathetic 
dilation" or "parasympathetic constriction" is at the foundation of the dilation we observe for forgotten 
and familiar items or the stronger constriction we observe for remembered and unfamiliar items, 
respectively. Nonetheless, our data together with the aforementioned evidence allows us to 
hypothesize that a cholinergic novelty signal both underlies the observed pupil constriction and 
participates in memory formation. Irrespective of the neural origin, however, the finding that pupil 
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size predicts as to whether an item will later be remembered provides an immediately available signal 
that can potentially be used for online monitoring of memory formation. Such online monitoring 
potentially paves the way for interfering with memory formation, which then – in combination with 
imaging and electrophysiology – may provide a useful tool both for studying and eventually 
improving declarative memory formation. 
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8.1 Short Report 
The possibility of “mind-reading” is a common theme within popular culture, with the idea that subtle 
facial signals may provide clues into one‟s private thoughts. While facial expressions and gaze 
direction are known to reveal some information about an emotional state or intention (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001; Frith & Frith, 2008), it is less clear whether pupil dilation 
can be used to gain strategic insights into another‟s mind. Although pupil dilation accompanies a wide 
range of behaviors and mental processes including decisions (Bradshaw, 1967; Hess & Polt, 1964; 
Beatty, & Wagoner, 1978; Einhäuser, Koch, & Carter, 2010; Gilzenrat, Nieuwenhuis, Jepma, & 
Cohen, 2010), evidence that humans can exploit pupil dilation to infer another individual‟s decisions is 
lacking. Here we adapted the popular childhood game “rock-paper-scissors” and show that humans 
can actually use this signal in a competitive game scenario to increase their wins by approximately 
50%. 
In rock-paper-scissors, two competitors each choose "rock", "paper" or "scissors", with the 
winner determined by their respective choices (Fig.S1A, supplemental material online).   Here, 3 
individuals (“opponents”) first played 25 rock-paper-scissors games against a computer while video of 
their left eye was recorded and pupil size was tracked (Fig.1A). Opponents were instructed to select 
their choice as the words were read-out by the computer in random order at 4s intervals. After each 
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game, opponents were given feedback about the computer‟s (random) choice and rewarded 
accordingly. Maximal pupil dilation followed the selected word in 45/75 games (upper dashed line 
Fig.1B; chance: 25/75), confirming that pupil dilation accompanies choices (Einhäuser et al., 2010).  
A separate group of participants (“players”) played against the previously recorded opponents‟ games. 
For each game, players were provided the same auditory “rock-paper-scissors” sequence presented to 
their opponent. Players then made their own selection and were rewarded depending on whether they 
won, lost or drew against the opponent‟s real choices. Order of games was randomized for each player 
to ensure that the sequence of previous choices was uninformative. 
Players were presented four different versions of the recorded games: 1) Naïve-eye condition: 
Ten players were presented video of their opponent‟s eye (Movie S1A; Fig.S1B) and instructed to 
look for any behavioral signs that could reveal their opponent's decision. 2) Informed-eye condition: 
The same players were presented the videos, but were now informed that the largest pupil dilation 
should follow the presentation of the word selected by their opponent. 3) Informed-reconstructed-pupil 
condition: To exclude any potential effects of facial features other than pupil dilation, a fresh group of 
10 players were only presented a centred black disk that represented the opponents‟ pupil size over 
time (Movie S1B; Fig.S1B) with instructions identical to the informed-eye-condition. 4) no-video 
condition: Only the audio sequence, but no visual information was presented to 5 players from each 
group (10 total). In all conditions, videos were scaled such that size of the pupil corresponded to a 
real-life conversation distance of approximately 50cm (Hall, 1959). 
Average player performance was indistinguishable from chance if no video was shown 
(t(9)=0.46, p=0.66, Fig.1B) or if videos were presented but players were naïve to the usefulness of 
pupil-based cues (t(9)=0.73, p=0.48). However, players performed significantly above chance, after 
they were advised to use maximum pupil dilation to identify their opponents selection when viewing 
either unedited footage (t(9)=4.56, p=0.001) or the reconstructed pupil (t(9)=7.71, p=3.02x10-5).  
In the naïve-eye condition all players reported a range of strategies (including blinks, small 
movements of the eye/head/brow in addition to pupil dilations and/or constrictions). Post-hoc testing 
of individual's performance showed that one player performed significantly above chance (37 wins, 
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p=0.003, Binomial test) with clear signs of learning (Supplementary Methods and Fig.S2). One 
additional naïve player learned to choose the option signaled by the pupil significantly above chance 
(p=0.003). Since the pupil correctly indicated the opponents' choice in only 45/75 trials ("60% 
validity"), this individual's win frequency remained below significance till the end. To test whether 
increased validity speeds up learning, we selected 30 trials (10 from each response interval) for which 
maximum pupil accompanied correct choice ("100% validity"). A fresh set of 10 naïve players played 
4 randomized blocks of the 30 trials. On average they performed above chance (t(9)=2.77, p=0.022) 
and 5 players performed significantly above chance individually (p<0.0005 for each, Binomial test, 
Fig.1B).  
 These results provide the first demonstration that people can use pupil dilation to gain an 
advantage in a competitive game scenario without the use of any fancy equipment or brain-imaging 
technology. It is possible that other facial features, like individual twitches or blinks, may provide 
some useful information about a person‟s decision in this context. However, the fact that the best 
performance was seen in the reconstructed-pupil condition shows that pupil size alone is at least as 
informative as pupil size plus untrained use of other facial cues. Remarkably, a few observers 
implicitly learned to use the pupil despite its relatively low validity in the original condition and half 
did so when the pupil's validity was increased. While we chose rock-paper-scissors for the present 
study because its intuitive rule structure allowed naïve participants to play without training, the game 
shares key elements with more elaborate social exchanges and competitive situations. Hence, our 
findings are in line with a recent suggestion that the human brain is capable of monitoring pupillary 
dynamics in social contexts (Harrison, Gray, & Critchley, 2009). Pupil dilation is clearly sufficiently 
salient to be detected and could potentially be used in a range of social contexts such as reading out a 
client's preference during financial negotiations or detecting hidden decisions during strategic games 
such as poker.  
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Figure 1. Opponents‟ pupillary responses and players‟ performance. (A) Average z-normalized pupil size (shading: s.e.m) 
for games in which opponents selected the first, second or third option; pupil dilation peaks shortly after the presentation of 
the selected word (dashed vertical lines). (B) Percentage of trials won on average (bar) and by individual players (circles). 
For the 60%-validity conditions upper dashed line indicates maximum performance if a player always selected the interval 
signaled by the pupil. 
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8.3 Supplementary Material 
Group performance was tested against chance level (1/3) by a two-sided t-test. Individual performance 
was tested by a Binomial test. The Binomial test was used as it is an exact statistical test that provides 
the probability (p) that for a certain total number of trials (n), a certain amount of wins (k) or more are 
to be expected by chance. For the present case of 1/3 chance, the p-value is thereby given to 
 
where  denotes the binomial coefficient "n choose i". Since learning a successful strategy can be 
expected to have positive effects, numbers provided in the main text refer to the one-sided version of 
the test as described here. Using a two-sided version does not change the results qualitatively. 
 
Supplementary Movie S1. Videos depicting three trials (games) as the players viewed it in the 
informed and naive pupil conditions (A) and in the informed-reconstructed-pupil condition (B).  
If you want to try the experiment yourself, watch the movies and pick the best option to beat 
your opponent. You can use the instructions provided in the informed eye condition, “look for pupil 
dilations following each of the three auditory word options. The auditory presentation of the word 
selected by the opponent will be followed by the largest pupil dilation”. The answers are provided at 
the end of this caption. 
The audio track consists of the words “rock”, “paper”, and “scissors”, presented in 4-s 
intervals in the identical (randomly ordered) sequence the opponent heard when the video of their left 
pupil was recorded with a an infra-red camera. To match the real-life conversation distance of about 
50cm, videos (640x480pixels) were presented on a 52x32.5cm TFT-screen with a resolution of 
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1920x1200, a frame rate of 60Hz, and a grey background on which the videos subtended 
approximately 4°x 3° degrees of visual angle and the average radius of the pupil was ~0.25°.  
In absolute terms, opponents' pupil size varied on average by 3.75mm (SD: 0.97mm) in each 
trial (maximum-minimum diameter). Maximum dilation followed the choice in 45 out of 75 trials (1st 
interval chosen: 28/75, 2nd interval chosen: 25/75, 3rd interval chosen: 22/75). 
The 3 trials show 1 game from each of the 3 opponents recorded. In the main experiment the 
25 trials recorded from each opponent were shown in a single block with the game order randomised 
within the block. After each individual game, players received feedback and financial reward for 
games won (maximum financial reward) and drawn (reduced reward) against the opponent‟s real 
choices (totaling approximately $10-$20 depending on performance).  
[Correct answers for both movies: Opponent 1 selected “Rock” (3rd option). Opponent 2 
selected “Paper” (1st option). Opponent 3 selected “Scissors” (2nd option). So you are a winner if you 
chose “Paper” in the first game, “Scissors” in the second and “Rock” in the last game.]  
 
 
Supplementary Figure S1. (A) During a game of rock-paper-scissors, two opponents choose one of three options of which 
rock beats scissors, scissors beats paper, and paper beats rock; if both players choose the same option the game is drawn. 
Unlike in the original version, here choices were not made simultaneously, but the opponent's choice was concealed till the 
trial´s end; observers were given feedback on the outcome and rewarded depending on whether they had won, drawn or lost. 
(B) Snapshots of a recorded opponents‟ eye (left) and reconstructed pupil (right). 
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Supplementary Figure S2. Learning curves for the 5 different experimental conditions (Black lines: aggregate number of 
wins for each individual; red line: chance level; green line: 5% significance level for Binomial test at the given number of 
trials). Note that all preceding trials are considered in this computation, such that learned information has to persist longer if 
learning starts later. A) No-eye control condition: no signs of learning are evident. B) "Naïve-eye" condition (60% validity): 
one individual shows signs of learning and reaches significant performance (p=0.003) on aggregate. C) Informed-eye 
condition and D) informed-reconstructed-pupil condition: all but one player performs above chance, but – unlike the 
"learner" in panel B, most deviate from chance early, reflecting the use of explicit information rather than learning. E) Naïve-
eye (100% validity): 5 out of 10 players learn to use the information contained in the pupil signal to perform significantly 
above chance on aggregate. While 1 player deviates from chance early (signaling an initial intuition about the optimal 
strategy), the 4 others deviate from chance only later during the session, suggesting that they are learning to use the pupil to 
their advantage over the course of trials. 
 
228 
 
 
9.  Chapter 9 
9.1 Discussion of dissertation 
The experimental results presented in this dissertation have provided several insights into how the 
visual system handles and resolves ambiguous information. As visual input is generally incomplete, 
vague, or impoverished, the human mind highly demands on its skill to infer a coherent interpretation 
from only few available pieces of information. Here we have investigated how this is accomplished, 
how this affects human behavior, and which cognitive processes are involved. The following 
paragraphs discuss the findings of this dissertation in the context of cognitive interpretations of 
ambiguous visual stimuli. 
9.1.1 Dominance sequences, durations, and piecemeal dynamics in rivalry 
Perceptual rivalry is the process of changes in visual awareness driven by ambiguity. These dynamical 
changes have very specific properties and depend on a range of cognitive processes. By using 
ambiguous rivalry stimuli, several novel characteristics of perceptual dynamics were found. First, 
change sequences and durations of dominance periods of percepts in rivalry were not independent but 
biased by history (Chapter 2). By showing stimuli to observers that allowed three percepts (tri-stable 
stimulus), it could be examined whether percept sequences and durations were affected by history. 
Perceptual reports by observers showed that sequences of serial percepts were not random (“non-
Markovian (dependent on history)”) but highly depended on which percepts preceded the subsequent 
percepts. Preceding sequences also determined the dominance duration of subsequent percepts and, 
vice versa, the dominance duration of a preceding percept affected the sequence order of subsequent 
percepts. Second, the speed of a perceptual transition during rivalry relied on its direction and the 
physical properties of the stimulus that triggered the transition (Chapter 3). By careful manipulation 
of the direction and initiation of alternations between percepts, it was found that the spread of 
dominance decelerated when it moved towards to fovea but not when it moved towards the periphery. 
In addition, the spread of perceptual dominance in space from one percept to the other was faster when 
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initiated with a stimulus that consisted of a grating with higher contrast. The latter finding is a clear 
demonstration of the effect of feature saliency on dynamics in rivalry. The former finding, however, is 
puzzling and could not be explained by the cortical magnification factor. A solid neuroscientific 
explanation remains to be found and it can only be speculated that the deceleration of travelling 
suppression waves are probably related to the connectivity properties of horizontal (lateral) 
interactions between neurons in the primary visual cortex. Nonetheless, these novel observations 
enable more refined comparisons across multiple phenomena: The more characteristics of a process 
are revealed, the better it can be estimated which phenomena share the same underlying mechanism. 
All the reported novel properties were evident in a variety of phenomena, independent of stimulus 
design. This suggests that changes in visual awareness might be governed by the same process that is 
responsible for all kinds of ambiguous stimuli, optical illusions, and other phenomena in which 
cognition renders stimuli invisible although their appearance remains physically present and 
unchanged.  
9.1.2 A neural explanation of perceptual rivalry 
Which brain mechanisms are responsible for rivalry and changes in awareness, and how do these 
interact? There are multiple theories on consciousness available, each with their own implications and 
predictions (e.g., Baars, 1993, Crick & Koch, 2003, Dehaene & Naccache, 2001, Eccles, 1992, 
Lamme, 2006, Llinás, Ribary, Contreras & Pedroarena, 1998). For example, it has been suggested that 
our nervous system consists of a “Global Workspace” with multiple parallel input processors that 
compete for dominance to eventually win and “broadcast” the information throughout the brains other 
processing units (e.g., Baars, 1993, Dehaene & Naccache, 2001). Such theories are plausible and 
worth investigating more thoroughly to see how they are in accord with behavioral and neurological 
data. But the question remains whether rivalry is a general process that is instantiated at a single 
location in the brain. Although it is not unlikely that many different instantiations of ambiguity and 
illusory disappearances of objects from awareness can be generalized to a single process, there is no 
meta-study that has compared all possible phenomena and probed their neural locus. Some studies 
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have, for example, examined rivalry in detail and it was suggested that the representation of perceptual 
transitions in rivalry may take place at small anatomical levels distributed across several sites in the 
brain (Hupé, Joffo & Pressnitzer, 2008, Pressnitzer & Hupé, 2006). Indeed, as perceptual rivalry 
occurs in many sensory modalities (Blake & Logothetis, 2002, Carter et al., 2008, Van Noorden, 1975, 
Warren & Gregory, 1958, Zhou & Chen, 2009), it is not far-fetched to hypothesize that cognitive 
ambiguity within a specific feature domain may occur at any site in the brain. A recent fMRI study 
that applied pattern classification methods to the BOLD responses during perceptual rivalry, showed 
that the neural locus of the process underlying rivalry between the eyes is in the lateral geniculate 
nucleus (LGN) while rivalry between features such as color correlates with activity in the early visual 
areas V1-V3 (Haynes, Deichmann & Rees, 2005, Haynes & Rees, 2005). In addition, several other 
studies showed that changes during perceptual rivalry depend on activity in designated brain areas that 
are responsible for the processing of the features or objects in the rivaling stimuli (Castelo-Branco, 
Formisano, Backes, Zanella, Neuenschwander, Singer & Goebel, 2002, Leopold & Logothetis, 1996, 
Muckli, Kriegeskorte, Lanfermann, Zanella, Singer & Goebel, 2002, Polonsky et al., 2000, Sterzer, 
Eger & Kleinschmidt, 2003, Tong et al., 1998). These findings strongly support the view that rivalry 
and the related changes in visual awareness take place at very local levels in brain areas that are 
responsible for the processing of the rivaling features. Thus, each part of the brain may incorporate its 
own process of rivalry through, for example, mutual inhibition and adaptation of pools of neurons that 
each process a feature or percept (Alais et al., 2010a, Blake, 1989, Blake & Bravo, 1985, Klink et al., 
2008a, Lehky, 1988, Matsuoka, 1984, Mueller, 1990, Sugie, 1982). It is still to be discovered how the 
process of inhibition and adaptation is cortically organized. In particular, how is perceptual dominance 
represented by neurons, how do attentional processes affect the activity of these neurons, and what is 
the role of piecemealing and traveling dominance waves in this process? As shown in Chapter 4, 
simulating rivalry in both temporal and spatial dimensions, and using a continuous measure can 
specifically address these issues. Looking at perceptual rivalry as a process with predictable patterns 
(Chapter 2) may further flourish rivalry research in the near future. Especially research that use other 
methods to measure or simulate rivalry and its underlying neural activities at high temporal and spatial 
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resolutions with electrophysiology (Bai, Huang, Yang & Wu, 2006, Wilke, Logothetis & Leopold, 
2006) and neural models (Knapen, van Ee & Blake, 2007b, Wilson, 2003, Wilson et al., 2001), may 
reveal the true neural mechanisms of changes in awareness. 
Perceptual rivalry may thus occur at any site in the brain where multiple streams of information 
rival for neurological resources and processing. There are, however, several studies that found 
evidence of the general involvement of frontoparietal brain areas in perceptual rivalry (Britz et al., 
2009, Lumer et al., 1998, Sterzer et al., 2002). Activity in these areas was related to the timing of 
switches in perceptual dominance. Perceptual switch rates of individuals further correlated with the 
size of their parietal cortex (Kanai et al., 2010). Thus, activity in these areas do not specifically 
indicate which percept was dominant at which time point but they might induce and determine the 
timing of perceptual changes in dominance. Importantly, frontoparietal areas are also involved in the 
deployment of (spatial) attention. Hence, these areas might be responsible for the allocation of 
attention to detect the changes in dominance rather than for the initiation of changes. These 
frontoparietal activity patterns during rivalry might have been correlates of the amount of attention 
that was employed to the rivalry stimulus. Thus it cannot be concluded that frontoparietal areas are 
necessary for rivalry and changes in visual awareness. As attention affects the rate of rivalry switches 
(Alais et al., 2010b, Paffen et al., 2006), it is not unlikely that attention is strongly involved during 
perceptual dominance and may affect perceptual switches. Furthermore, it has recently been opted that 
attention rather than awareness is largely responsible for changes in activity in the early visual areas 
that, however, were initially indicated as crucial brain parts for visual awareness (Watanabe, Cheng, 
Murayama, Ueno, Asamizuya, Tanaka & Logothetis, 2011). In sum, frontoparietal areas may not 
necessarily be responsible for the initiation of perceptual switches but could affect the balance of 
reciprocal inhibition between the neural pools devoted to the processing of each rivaling percept. To 
test this, activity reflecting attentional deployment needs to be somehow extracted and filtered out 
from the activity patterns related to the actual rivalry process. In a similar vein, introspection – the 
subjective report and attendance – of perceptual dominance during rivalry by observers, needs to be 
circumvented. This is where objective measures of rivalry come into play (Chapter 4). This 
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dissertation reported a novel and successful technique to apply a reflex – pupil size – to objectively 
measure changes in visual awareness during perceptual rivalry. When two rivaling percepts have 
dissimilar luminance or contrast levels, the pupil will adapt to the amount of luminance or contrast of 
the dominant percept. If a percept with a low luminance is dominant, the pupil increases in size, and if 
perception switches to a percept with a high luminance, the pupil will react by decreasing its size. As 
shown in this dissertation, the changes in pupil size serve as relatively reliable indicators of perceptual 
dominance. It is hypothesized that the combination of two objective measures (e.g., pupil and OKN) 
and a conjunction analysis might be a promising method to pinpoint the neural locus of the processes 
that handle ambiguous input, initiate rivalry, and induce changes in visual awareness. 
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9.1.3 The formation of object representations  
When ambiguity is resolved and a clear and single interpretation of an item, object, or entire visual 
surrounding is instantiated, the visual system tends to store its representation for immediate or later 
use. To attend and recognize previously encountered items, the human brain has a highly organized 
network that deals with the formation, maintenance, and retrieval of object representations (Knight, 
1996, Squire et al., 2007). It is suggested that this network relies on sparse coding, that is, complex 
visual objects can be efficiently encoded and represented by just a few neurons (Gross, 2000, 
Logothetis & Sheinberg, 1996, Quian Quiroga, Reddy, Kreiman, Koch & Fried, 2005). If true, only 
few neurons and their synapses are necessary to store a new memory item. However, before such 
higher-order representations and cells are activated, visual information streams through a series of 
hierarchical stages that separately assess the occurrence of and connections between multiple features 
depicted by the stimulus (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991, Zeki et al., 1991). The resulting pattern of 
brain activation may eventually activate just a few “grandmother” cells that could be responsible for 
the detection or recognition of a single object. However, when visual information is ambiguous, 
incomplete, or noisy, the activation pattern by neurons might be unspecific and may activate multiple 
grandmother cells. In this case, several object interpretations would be possible. The visual system 
could then either be forced to choose the most likely interpretation (decision-making) or to switch 
between them over time (rivalry). Moreover, it may also happen that no object representation is 
activated. For example, if the stimulus is too noisy, the visual system is simply unable to detect 
structure, maybe because the code is either too sparse or too distributed. Additionally, presented 
objects may also be novel to the observer and its sensory activation pattern has not yet been stored as a 
higher-order neural trace. In the latter case, the new object can be, when required, encoded and stored 
in the visual system for future purposes. Here it was tested how formed representations deploy 
attention to objects (Chapter 5), how features can help to minimize ambiguity (Chapter 6), and how 
the encoding and formation of novel object representations is reflected in the pupil (Chapter 7). These 
three experiments reported several novel results which are supporting evidence for particular theories 
on ambiguity and the formation and retrieval of object representations.  
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Data showed that the deployment of attention to an object is guided by a unique higher-order 
representation (Chapter 5). An ambiguous stimulus was used to create two separate percepts of either 
a bound and coherent single object state (i.e., interpretation) and an unbound incoherent multiple 
object state. Note that the physical appearance of the stimulus remained unchanged while our 
cognition created multiple interpretations of the stimulus that switches dominance over time. With this 
stimulus, we tested for differences in target detection and discrimination performance between the 
single object and multiple object percepts. The dominance of the single object percept resulted in 
better detection and discrimination performance for areas inside and at the borders of the object 
compared to outside the object. Vice versa, the dominance of the multiple object percept resulted in 
better performance outside the object. Thus independent of features and physical appearance of the 
ambiguous stimulus, attention was only accurately allocated to an object if it was cognitively 
interpreted as an object. Besides that these findings demonstrate that ambiguous stimuli can provide 
useful insights into how we process objects and allocate attention, they also support the view that 
features are not sufficient to explain object-based attention effects and that higher-order object 
representations are necessary to guide attention. Salient features, such as luminance, luminance 
contrast, color contrast, shape and collinearity, can, however, facilitate the activation of object 
representations and resolve ambiguity. It makes sense that an object cannot be recognized as an object 
if it isn‟t constituted of features that separate it from its background. Nonetheless, features are not 
sufficient to allocate attention to objects. We have to be aware of the existence of an object (i.e., 
objecthood) before the features can be bound together and facilitated as a whole by attentional 
processes.  
The detection of objects and the allocation of attention to them are often followed by 
recognition or the consolidation of its representation. Object and scene representations are, however, 
not always effectively stored (Chapter 7). Objects are often forgotten (Miss) or they are recognized as 
familiar while actually being novel (False Alarm). The successful encoding of novel stimuli could 
therefore be a process that is limited by ambiguity because stimuli are sometimes impoverished and 
hard to distinguish from others. For instance, when an observer has to encode objects that are similar, 
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recall performance is typically lower than if objects are highly dissimilar (e.g., Conrad & Hull, 1964). 
Thus, weak differences in feature modalities across objects may increase ambiguity and consequently 
impair successful encoding and retrieval. A strong factor that may resolve ambiguity and facilitate 
object processing is the potential pop-out effect of an object. Here we have demonstrated that the 
object must contrast with its background along a variety of features to become most salient and easy to 
recognize (i.e., successfully retrieved) (Chapter 6). The strength of certain object and background 
features were quantified and luminance, luminance contrast, color contrast, and object size were found 
to be key features for successful object processing. It was also shown that pupil constrictions reflected 
novelty of the presented object (Chapter 7). This is termed the pupil old/new effect because new 
stimuli induce stronger pupillary constrictions as compared to old and familiar stimuli. Besides object 
retrieval, it was also found that the pupil responded to novelty during the encoding of objects and 
scenes. If the pupil strongly constricted as a reaction to the presentation of a novel stimulus, there was 
a larger probability that the stimulus was correctly encoded by the visual system. Taken all together, 
these results demonstrated that (1) ambiguous conditions can be helpful to learn about object 
representations in the visual system, (2) ambiguity and resulting multiple neurological object 
representations can be narrowed down to a coherent and single interpretation by strengthening 
particular object features, and (3) successful encoding of novel and unambiguous objects was reflected 
in pupillary constrictions. The next paragraph discusses these three findings from a neuroscientific 
perspective. 
9.1.4 A neural hierarchy for object representations 
From the moment light, coming directly from a luminous source or reflected by a visual stimulus, falls 
on an eye‟s retina, a stream of neuronal processes is activated that distribute the stimulus‟ attributes 
(i.e., features) in multiple components. Luminance, contrast, and colors, and a variety of other features 
are assessed by functionally separate areas of the visual cortex (Zeki et al., 1991, Zeki, 1978). These 
functional brain areas project to higher-level areas such as the lateral occipital cortex (LOC) and the 
temporal lobe to process more abstract representations of objects that consist of the previously 
236 
 
 
analyzed features (e.g., Aguirre, Zarahn & D'Esposito, 1998, Ishai, Ungerleider, Martin, Schouten & 
Haxby, 1999, Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2000, Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2001, Ostwald et al., 2008). The 
supposition that there are multiple distinct hierarchical stages that are sequentially activated is not new 
(e.g., Felleman & Van Essen, 1991, VanRullen & Thorpe, 2001b), but the elucidation of the exact 
nature of each stage and the behavioral consequences of their mechanisms are challenging and 
unresolved issues. Here it was investigated how features are extracted and how this process progresses 
to the activation of higher-order abstract object representations. This hierarchical process seems to be a 
general mechanism for the detection and identification of objects in natural scenes (Chapter 6) and 
eventually determines the subsequent allocation of attention to these objects (Chapter 5). Based on 
recent literature (Roelfsema, 2006), it is tempting to suggest that the allocation of attention is a 
recurrent (i.e., feedback) process that strengthens the signals of the neurons that are responsible for the 
processing of the object‟s features. It was further shown that novel objects and scenes are paired with 
stronger pupillary constrictions (Chapter 7), an indication that acetylcholine (ACh) – a 
neurotransmitter that is responsible for the regulation of the constrictory sphincter muscle of the pupil 
– is likely involved during the successful encoding of novel stimuli into memory. ACh has been 
indicated as an important neuromodulator of learning (e.g., Roelfsema, van Ooyen & Watanabe, 2010, 
Seol, Ziburkus, Huang, Song, Kim, Takamiya, Huganir, Lee & Kirkwood, 2007) and the formation of 
new memories (Hasselmo, 2006, Hasselmo & Giocomo, 2006). It is therefore not unlikely that the 
pupil reflects the release of ACh through increased constriction as a result of successful memory 
encoding. The pupil is therefore deemed as a promising tool for future research on the release of ACh 
(and other neurotransmitters) and its relation to cognition. To conclude, this dissertation has presented 
evidence that suggests that object processing consists of the extraction of specific low-level features to 
separate the object from its background. It is further suggested that higher-order features such as 
anxiety have very limited influence at this initial stage (Chapter 6). This process is followed by the 
activation of a unique higher-order object representations, and, in case of successful activation, the 
allocation of attention to the object (Chapter 5), or, in case of unsuccessful matching (i.e., no hit of a 
stored representation), the encoding of the novel object paired with the release of acetylcholine as 
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reflected in the pupil (Chapter 7). In contrast to previous literature that suggests object-based 
attention is merely bottom-up driven through features (e.g., Crundall, Cole & Galpin, 2007), it is here 
shown that the allocation of attention to objects can be guided by higher order object representations 
as well. Stimulus features are thus essential at early processing stages as they differentiate between 
multiple interpretations and resolve ambiguity, and object representations are important for further 
steps related to attention and memory processes. 
9.1.5 Pupil dynamics and their implications 
The size of the pupil is an extraordinary property of the eye because it reflects a multitude of neural 
processes and can easily be observed, measured, and utilized for a variety of purposes. Despite the 
pupil‟s prone appearance, it is not necessarily a signal that is actively used by others during social 
interaction. On the contrary, it has recently been proposed that humans have neuronal mechanisms that 
are engaged with the continuous monitoring of other‟s pupils (Harrison et al., 2006). This dissertation 
has shown that observers can indeed detect changes in pupil size and relate it to very obvious mental 
states of other persons during a competitive game (Chapter 8). It was demonstrated that some 
observers could use the opponent‟s pupil to gain the upper hand during a game. The opponent‟s pupil, 
however, did not always clearly dilate as a reaction to a decision and was therefore not always 
informative. After controlling for the pupil‟s validity, half of the observers were able to successfully 
extract information from their opponent‟s pupil, but did not report to have looked for pupil dilations 
specifically. Thus, although observers have the visual acuity to use the pupil as a visual marker and 
“read” a person‟s mind, they were not fully aware of the specific pupil dynamics that contain most 
information. It would be interesting to test in forthcoming studies whether other cognitive states can be 
read-out from the pupil in real-life situations and to what extent the reading out of bodily signals is an 
implicit and evolutionary developed social skill. The exact timing of pupil dilations or constrictions 
might provide information about the underlying nervous system that is responsible for its dynamics 
(Steinhauer & Hakerem, 1992), or about the temporal properties and stages along the hierarchical 
stream of visual processing for a variety of cognitive states (Chapter 6). 
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Yet it remains considerably vague which cognitive processes underlie changes in pupil size. 
Although this dissertation presented several correlations of cognitive concepts and behaviors with 
pupillary dynamics (Chapter 4-8), it is difficult to interpret these findings in the context of a unified 
framework or single process. For example, it was here reported that pupil size correlates with anxiety, 
target detection and identification performance, response latencies, confidence, successful memory 
encoding, and decision-making. A gross part of studies on pupil size as an indicator of cognitive 
processes have tried to interpret their findings in the context of arousal or mental effort (Andreassi, 
2000, Beatty & Lucero-Wagoner, 2000, Janisse, 1977, Loewenfeld & Lowenstein, 1993, for review). 
Arousal is, however, not sufficient to explain the findings of this dissertation because several results 
did not fit its properties. For instance, it was shown that observers with increased average anxiety for 
threatening animals, had smaller pupil sizes (Chapter 6). Assuming that an increased level of anxiety 
leads to an increased level of arousal, more anxious observers are expected to have an over-all larger 
pupil size. In a similar vein, observers that had to memorize images had increased constrictions of 
pupil responses as a reaction to the onset of images that were later correctly remember compared to 
images that were forgotten (Chapter 7). Again, it makes most sense that images, that are easily 
remembered, increase arousal and therefore increase pupil size rather than constrict it. Then which 
processes are responsible for the differences in pupil size during the visual processing of images? As 
mentioned before, many cognitive processes affect the pupil. For example, surprise (Preuschoff et al., 
2011) and anticipation of upcoming events (Reinhard & Lachnit, 2002a) can also dilate the pupil. To 
address how all these cognitive concepts may relate to changes in pupil size, a fresh look is taken at 
the neural processes underlying pupil dynamics in the next paragraph. 
9.1.6 A neural account of pupil dynamics 
The size of an eye‟s pupil is controlled by two muscles: A radial and sphincter muscle that dilate and 
constrict the pupil respectively. The radial muscle is activated by the release of norepinephrine (NOR), 
a noradrenergic hormone and neurotransmitter. Dilation of the pupil is a consequence of the activation 
of adrenergic related processes such as arousal (Hall, Uhrich & Ebert, 2001), stress (Tanaka, Yoshida, 
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Emoto & Ishii, 2000), attention (Aston-Jones, Rajkowski & Cohen, 1999, Coull, Jones, Egan, Frith & 
Maze, 2004), behavioural orienting (Aston-Jones et al., 1999, Beatty & Lucero-Wagoner, 2000), and 
decision-making (Einhäuser et al., 2010). The sphincter muscle is activated by the release of the 
neurotransmitter acetylcholine (ACh). Constriction of the pupil is a result of the cholinergic related 
responses that relate to neural plasticity (Bakin & Weinberger, 1996, Easton, Ridley, Baker & Gaffan, 
2002, Juliano, Ma & Eslin, 1991, Kilgard & Merzenich, 1998, Seol et al., 2007, Winkler, Suhr, Gage, 
Thal & Fisher, 1995), behavioural reward (e.g., Mark, Shabani, Dobbs & Hansen, 2011), sustained 
attention (Himmelheber, Sarter & Bruno, 2000), and learning (Roelfsema et al., 2010). Note that both 
the increase and decrease of the release of these neurotransmitters can dilate and constrict the pupil. 
Furthermore, their effects are not independent as the release of ACh can inhibit the release of NOR 
(Steinhauer et al., 2004). In sum, pupil size depends on a subtle balance between the amount of ACh 
and NOR in the nervous system. Although studies on how cognition is reflected in the pupil generally 
report only effects of dilations, the neural systems driving pupil size depend on both types of 
neurotransmitters and thus both can also contribute to constrictions of the pupil. For example, it was 
demonstrated that the increased levels of anxiety might relate to increased levels of attention or focus 
on the stimulus mediated through ACh which consequences in a smaller rather than larger pupil size 
(Chapter 6). Additionally, the learning of tasks or encoding of novel stimuli may also be 
accompanied by the release of ACh and therefore the constriction of the pupil (Chapter 7). The role 
of both ACh and NOR in cognitive functioning has often been neglected in neuroscientific studies and 
it is here proposed that pupillometry is an easy and informative method to measure the effects of these 
neurotransmitters on cognition. With the current knowledge about the pupil, pupillometry is a 
comparatively simple and effective research paradigm and future studies may uncover a wide range of 
cognitive functions that are controlled by ACh and NOR. Through the inhibition of either the dilator 
or constrictor muscles of the pupil with drugs, the separate effects of ACh and NOR can be assessed 
during cognitive tasks. Drugs that affect one of the muscles in isolation have effectively been 
administered in earlier studies on pupil dynamics (Steinhauer et al., 2004) and seems to be a promising 
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test-bed for further research on the separate contributions of either ACh and NOR to attention, arousal, 
memory, and other cognitive mechanisms. 
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9.2 Conclusion 
This dissertation assessed how visual ambiguity arises, what its properties are, how it affects 
cognition, and which factors can resolve it. By using a variety of tools, including perceptual rivalry, 
rapid object detection paradigms, memory encoding tasks, pupil dynamics, and introspection, it was 
studied (1) which factors underlie the rate and speed of changes in perceptual interpretations induced 
by ambiguity, (2) the reflection of ambiguity in reflexes and cognitive awareness, (3) the spatial 
allocation of attention to resolve ambiguity in objects, (4) recognition performance of ambiguous 
object representations, (5) the ambiguity tied to the encoding of object representations, and (6) the 
successful and implicit search for cognitive markers in seemingly ambiguous pupil dynamics. In 
conclusion, this dissertation has outlined how our visual system handles sensory signals from noisy 
surroundings that inevitably lead to ambiguous situations in which multiple percepts, representations, 
decisions, and locations have to rival for attention and processing resources. Ambiguity is a core 
property of sensory systems and provides several advantages to cope with signals from our every day 
surroundings. 
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10. Summary 
10.1 English summary of dissertation 
Brains can sense and distinguish signals from background noise in physical environments, and 
recognize and classify them as distinct entities. Ambiguity is an inherent part of this process. It is a 
cognitive property that is generated by the noisy character of the signals, and by the design of the 
sensory systems that process them. Stimuli can be ambiguous if they are noisy, incomplete, or only 
briefly sensed. Such conditions may make stimuli indistinguishable from others and thereby difficult 
to classify as single entities by our sensory systems. In these cases, stimuli fail to activate a 
representation that may have been previously stored in the system. Deduction, through context and 
experience, is consequently needed to reach a decision on what is exactly sensed. Deduction can, 
however, also be subject to ambiguity as stimuli and their properties may receive multiple 
representations in the sensory system. In such cases, these multiple representations compete for 
perceptual dominance, that is, for becoming the single entity taken by the system as a reference point 
for subsequent behavior. These types of ambiguity and several phenomena that relate to them are at 
the center of this dissertation. 
Perceptual rivalry, the phenomenal experience of alternating percepts over time, is an example 
of how the brain may give multiple interpretations to a stimulus that is physically constant. Rivalry is a 
very typical and general sensory process and this thesis demonstrates some newly discovered 
properties of its dynamics. It was found that alternations between three perceptual interpretations – a 
relatively rare condition as rivalry generally occurs between two percepts – follow predictable courses 
(Chapter 2). Furthermore, such alternations had several properties that determine their speed and 
direction of spatial spread (suppression waves) in the visual field (Chapter 3). These properties of 
ambiguity were further strongly affected by attention and other introspective processes. To demarcate 
the true underlying process of perceptual rivalry and the accompanied changes in awareness, these 
subjective processes need to be either circumvented or controlled for. An objective measure of 
perceptual rivalry was proposed that resolved this issue and provided a good alternative for 
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introspective report of ambiguous states (Chapter 4). Changes in percepts occur along a specific 
feature domain such as depth orientation for the famous Necker cube. Alternatively, luminance may 
also be a rivalry feature and one percept may appear brighter as the other rivaling percept. It was 
demonstrated that the pupil gets smaller when a percept with high luminance becomes dominant, and 
vice versa, gets bigger when a percept with low luminance gets dominant during perceptual rivalry. As 
such, the pupil can serve as a reliable objective indicator of changes in visual awareness. By using 
such reflexes during rivalry, several new properties of alternations were discovered and it was again 
confirmed that introspection can confound the true processes involved in ambiguity. 
Next, the usefulness of ambiguous stimuli was explored in the context of objects as entities 
(Chapter 5). Some ambiguous stimuli can induce two percepts that alternate along the feature domain 
of object coherency, that is, whether a single coherent object or multiple incoherent objects are seen. 
In other words, an ambiguous stimulus can induce two cognitive interpretations of either seeing an 
entity or not. It was reported that being aware of a single coherent object results in the increase in 
visual sensitivity for the areas that constitute the object. These results are evidence of how the 
activation of a representation of a single and unique object can guide and allocate attentional resources 
to relevant areas in the visual field in a top-down way. It was further explored which features help to 
bottom-up access such object representations (Chapter 6). Ambiguity of objects can be successfully 
resolved by adding strong contrasts between the object and its background in luminance and color. 
The size and variability of the object's shape was also found to be an important factor for its successful 
detection and identification. Furthermore, the characteristics of objects do not only determine the rate 
of success in a recognition task, but are equally important for the storage of their representations in 
memory if, for instance, the object is novel to the observer. The subjective experience of a novel 
object is also subject to ambiguity and objects may appear novel to the observer although they are 
familiar (i.e., previously shown to the observer), or vice versa, they appear familiar to the observer 
although they are actually novel. It was here shown that such subjective effects are reflected in the 
pupil (Chapter 7). In addition, if novel images were presented to observers, their pupils constricted 
stronger as compared to if familiar images were presented. Similarly, if novel stimuli were shown to 
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observers, pupillary constrictions were stronger if these stimuli were successfully stored in memory as 
compared to those later forgotten. As such, the pupil reflected the cognitive process of novelty 
encoding. Finally, it was tested whether other cognitive processes, such as decision-making – an 
important process when multiple options are available and ambiguity has to be resolved with a 
conscious decision – were also reflected in changes of pupil size (Chapter 8). It was confirmed that the 
pupil tends to dilate after an observer has made a decision. These dilations can successfully be 
detected between individuals and further used to gain the upper hand during an interactive game. 
In sum, this thesis has explored how ambiguous signals affect perception and how ambiguity 
inside perceptual systems can be used to study processes of the brain. It is found that ambiguity 
follows predictable courses, can be objectively assessed with reflexes, and can provide insights into 
other neuronal mechanisms such as attention, object representations, and decision-making. These 
findings demonstrate that ambiguity is a core property of the sensory systems that enable living beings 
to interact with their surroundings. Ambiguity adds variation to behavior, allows the brain to flexibly 
interact with the world, and lies at the bottom of the dynamics of sense, interpretations, and behavioral 
decisions. 
10.2 Deutsche Zusammenfassung der Dissertation 
Unser Gehirn muss zu jeder Zeit relevante Signale von irrelevanten Informationen trennen. Dazu 
müssen diese als spezifische Einheiten erkannt und klassifiziert werden. Mehrdeutigkeit ist ein 
wesentlicher Aspekt dieses Verarbeitungsprozesses und kann durch verrauschte Eingangssignale und 
durch den Aufbau unserer sensorischer Systeme entstehen. Beispielsweise können Reize mehrdeutig 
sein, wenn sie verrauscht oder unvollständig sind oder nur kurzzeitig wahrgenommen werden. Unter 
solchen Bedingungen werden Wahrnehmung und Klassifikation eines Reizes deutlich erschwert. 
Bereits vorhandene kognitive Repräsentationen werden somit möglicherweise nicht aktiviert. Folglich 
müssen Rückschlüsse über die Reize aufgrund von Kontext und Erfahrung gezogen werden. Ein und 
derselbe Reiz kann jedoch unterschiedlich repräsentiert und im sensorischen System kodiert werden. 
Da nur eine Repräsentation die Basis zukünftigen Handelns bilden kann, entsteht eine Art Konkurrenz 
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innerhalb der Wahrnehmung. Derartige Wahrnehmungsphänomene, die mit der Mehrdeutigkeit von 
Reizen in Verbindung stehen, bilden den Mittelpunkt der vorliegenden Dissertation. 
Wenn einem physikalisch konstanten Reiz mehrere Interpretationen zugeordnet werden, entsteht 
ein Wechsel zwischen diesen Einordnungen, den man wahrnimmt und Rivalität ("rivalry") nennt. In 
dieser Dissertation werden diverse neue Erkenntnisse zu diesem grundlegenden Phänomen der 
sensorischen Verarbeitung beschrieben. So wird gezeigt, dass Übergänge zwischen drei 
wahrgenommenen Interpretationen – ein vergleichsweise selten untersuchtes Phänomen, da Rivalität 
meist mit zweideutigen Reizen untersucht wird – vorhersehbaren Mustern folgen (Kapitel 2). Darüber 
hinaus zeigt sich, dass derartige Übergänge spezifische Eigenschaften aufweisen, welche die 
Geschwindigkeit und die Richtung ihrer räumlichen Ausbreitung im visuellen Feld bestimmen 
(Kapitel 3). Diese Eigenschaften der Mehrdeutigkeit werden weiterhin stark von Aufmerksamkeit und 
anderen, introspektiven Prozessen beeinflusst. Um die der Rivalität in der Wahrnehmung tatsächlich 
zugrundeliegenden Prozesse und die damit verbundenen Änderungen des Bewusstseins von derartigen 
subjektiven Prozessen abzugrenzen, müssen letztere kontrolliert oder sogar vollständig umgangen 
werden. Ein objektives Maß der Rivalität in der Wahrnehmung wird zur Lösung dieser Aufgabe 
vorgeschlagen und bietet eine wertvolle Alternative zu introspektivem Berichten über den 
Wahrnehmungszustand (Kapitel 4). Übergänge in der Wahrnehmung entstehen entlang einer 
bestimmten Merkmalsdimension des Reizes, wie beispielsweise der Orientierung des berühmten 
Neckerwürfels. Zudem kann auch eine Änderung in der Merkmalsdimension der Luminanz eine 
unterschiedliche Interpretation des Reizes hervorrufen. Es wird gezeigt, dass die Pupille kleiner wird, 
wenn eine Interpretation mit hoher Luminanz die Wahrnehmung übernimmt, und umgekehrt, dass die 
Pupille größer wird, wenn eine Interpretation mit niedriger Luminanz die Wahrnehmung übernimmt. 
Folglich kann die Pupille als ein zuverlässiges und objektives Maß für Änderungen in der 
Wahrnehmung verwendet werden. Durch die Verwendung solcher objektiven Maße konnten neue 
Eigenschaften der Übergänge in der Wahrnehmung aufgezeigt werden, welche die Theorie 
unterstützen, dass Introspektion die der Verarbeitung mehrdeutiger Situationen zugrundeliegenden 
Prozesse merklich beeinflussen kann. 
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Als Nächstes wurden mehrdeutiger Reize im Zusammenhang mit der Wahrnehmung von 
Objekten eingesetzt (Kapitel 5). Am Beispiel der Kippfigur des "bewegten Diamanten" wird dabei die 
Bedeutung von mehrdeutigen Reizen veranschaulicht. Beim bewegten Diamanten werden zwei 
Interpretationen wahrgenommen, die sich entlang der Dimension der Objektkohärenz abwechseln. Das 
bedeutet, dass die Wahrnehmung zwischen einem einzelnen zusammenhängenden Objekt (Diamant) 
und mehreren unzusammenhängenden Komponenten kippt. Es wird gezeigt, dass die Interpretation 
des Reizes als ein einziges kohärentes Objekt, verglichen mit der Interpretation als mehrere 
Komponenten, zu einer Erhöhung der visuellen Empfindlichkeit innerhalb des Objektes führt. Diese 
Ergebnisse sind ein Beleg dafür, wie die Aktivierung einer Interpretation eines Reizes als Einzelobjekt 
(im Vergleich zur Komponentenwahrnehmung) dazu führt, dass die Aufmerksamkeit top-down zu den 
relevanten Bereichen des Gesichtsfeldes gelenkt wird. Es wird weiter untersucht, welche 
Eigenschaften des Reizes zu einer bottom-up Aktivierung der Interpretation solcher Objekte beitragen 
(Kapitel 6). Die Mehrdeutigkeit von Objekten kann erfolgreich aufgehoben werden, indem man einen 
starken Kontrast in Luminanz oder Farbe zwischen dem Objekt und dem Hintergrund erzeugt. Auch 
die Größe und die Form haben einen großen Einfluss auf die Detektion und Identifikation von 
Objekten. Des Weiteren sind die Eigenschaften eines Objektes nicht nur bestimmend für die 
Erfolgsquote bei der Objekterkennung, sondern ebenso bedeutend für die Speicherung der 
Repräsentation im Gedächtnis, beispielsweise von neu wahrgenommenen Objekten. Das Klassifizieren 
von Objekten durch die Versuchsperson wird ebenfalls durch Mehrdeutigkeit beeinflusst. So kann ein 
Objekt der Versuchsperson einerseits als neu erscheinen, obwohl es bereits bekannt war, weil es 
beispielsweise der Versuchsperson schon einmal gezeigt worden ist. Andererseits kann auch ein 
eigentlich unbekanntes Objekt der Versuchsperson dennoch vertraut vorkommen. In dieser Arbeit 
wird gezeigt, dass solche subjektiven Effekte einen Einfluss auf die Pupillengröße haben (Kapitel 7). 
Außerdem verkleinert sich die Pupille der Versuchspersonen beim Betrachten neuer Bilder stärker als 
bei bekannten. Ein ähnlicher Effekt wird gefunden, wenn das Bild vorher erfolgreich im Gedächtnis 
gespeichert wurde. Daher ist es wahrscheinlich, dass die Pupille die Verfestigung von neuen Objekten 
im Gedächtnis widerspiegelt. Abschließend wird untersucht, ob sich kognitive Prozesse, wie 
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Entscheidungsfindung – ein wichtiger Prozess, falls mehreren Optionen zur Verfügung stehen und 
Mehrdeutigkeit aufgehoben werden soll – auch in der Pupille widerspiegeln (Kapitel 8). Es wird 
zunächst bestätigt, dass die Pupillen sich erweitern, nachdem man eine Entscheidung getroffen hat. 
Neu wird gezeigt, dass diese Pupillenausdehnungen erfolgreich von anderen Personen erkannt und 
verwendet werden können, um ein interaktives Spiel gegen die erste Person (den "Gegner") zu 
gewinnen. 
Insgesamt wird in dieser Dissertation untersucht, wie mehrdeutige Reize die Wahrnehmung 
beeinflussen und wie Mehrdeutigkeit verwendet werden kann, um Prozesse des Gehirns zu studieren. 
Es hat sich gezeigt, dass Mehrdeutigkeit vorhersehbaren Mustern folgt, sie objektiv mit Reflexen 
gemessen werden kann, und Einblicke in neuronale Prozesse wie Aufmerksamkeit, 
Objektwahrnehmung und Entscheidungsmechanismen liefern kann. Diese Ergebnisse zeigen, dass 
Mehrdeutigkeit eine zentrale Eigenschaft sensorischer Systeme ist, und Lebewesen in die Lage 
versetzt, mit ihrer Umwelt flexibel zu interagieren. Mehrdeutigkeit macht das Verhalten vielfältiger, 
ermöglicht es dem Gehirn, mit der Welt auf verschiedenen Wegen zu interagieren, und ist die Basis 
der Dynamik von Wahrnehmung, Interpretation und Entscheidung. 
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